Obrana a strategie

Článek ve formátu PDF Více o autorovi

Abstrakt
Tato práce pod názvem „Afghánská mise: druhá strana mince” přináší zamyšlení nad povahou strategií Severoatlantické alliance a Tálibánu v současném afghánském prostředí. Skrze koncept „center přitažlivosti“ je zkoumána strategická volba obou aktérů a ta je následně konfrontována se specifickou afghánskou situací. Zvláštní pozornost je věnována tzv. zápasu o srdce a mysli v rámci strategie NATO. Závěr pak redukuje počet těchto center na jedno jediné, které se nabízí jako hodnotící kritérium pro postupy a kroky uplatňované v afghánské válce.

Klíčová slova
Povstání, Afghánistán, ISAF, Tálibán, NATO, strategie.

Keywords
Insurgency, Afghanistan, ISAF, Taliban, NATO, strategy.

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“The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”
Henry A. Kissinger

INTRODUCTION

In 2001 the territory of Afghanistan was the base and training ground for Al-Qaeda militants recently expelled from North Africa. The ruling Taliban movement offered safe haven for the organization and its leadership including Osama bin Laden1. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington eyes of the U.S. turned to Afghanistan in search for organizers of the attack. Quick offensive of the local opposition and Western SOF toppled the Taliban regime. After the initial success the period of struggle for settlement began. A new government was established and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) started to operate in the Kabul area. Even though the ISAF’s area of operation steadily grew and the responsibility for the mission was taken over by NATO, no later than in 2006 the situation in the field began to deteriorate again. Re-emerging enemy - in this paper called the Taliban, even if there are other groups involved, such as regular criminals or rivaling warlords - reverted to insurgent techniques of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Today, the state of things is critical. The death toll is rising; the public support in opinion polls is falling. Every single soldier or armored vehicle to be sent in the theatre is a subject of heavy political struggle. It appears that NATO is likely to fail in its most crucial mission. In the most optimistic scenario, there is no chance for NATO to press forward in Afghanistan, unless a serious reconsideration of mission parameters occurs.

Today, in the end of 2009,2 we find ourselves fighting irregular conflict in the distant land with no clear victory conditions and non-existent exit strategy. We have reached the deadlock in an obvious clash between technically, financially and organizationally superior Western coalition, and relatively inferior poorly equipped Taliban insurgents. Furthermore, the West, at least some of the coalition members, has significant experience in fighting insurgencies all over the world. Why is that so, that NATO is unable to change the current state of things? What is so different in the Afghan situation and the Taliban in particular, that makes it so hard to achieve any progress? What can the West do in order to win in Afghanistan, or better to say, what can the West do to prevent its failure in Afghanistan?

Control of the strategic weights or centers of gravity3 in any war, large or small, limited or unlimited, is a basic advantage that should be sought by any strategist.4 It is the fundamental key to conduct of warfare. Both Wylie and Clausewitz agree that any strategy shall aim at such significant concentrations of decisive moments. Furthermore, the concept of the centers of gravity seems to be a valuable analytical tool while judging the actual chances of any strategy for success. Therefore, the assessment of strategic choice of both actors is crucial for identification of such centers of gravity and their subsequent evaluation. It seems to be the most useful analytical instrument for fulfilling the aim of this paper, which is to constitute a background study for the recommendations for improvement of NATO’s military strategy. This paper shall deal with military dynamics which occurs between the Taliban and NATO within the Afghan theatre of operations and their spillovers to NATO home front. Through the theory of counterinsurgency (COIN), the respective strategies of actors shall be assessed and subsequently the centers of gravity identified. As Clausewitz advised, the aim should be to trace a single center of gravity of the Afghan war. In this paper, the author offers such an option, although he agrees with Wylie and Lonsdale5 that within such a multifaceted environment, such as irregular war, there may be more strategic weights that influence the outcome, than solely one.

THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF THE TALIBAN

The concept of politico-military insurgency may be relatively new, but many of the techniques involved, particularly that of guerrilla warfare, are merely adaptations of traditional rebel tactics.6 As in any other war or armed struggle, the famous thought of Carl von Clausewitz - that all use of armed force is political and serving a political end - is valid here again. In particular, the political nature of irregular conflict is decisive and more influential in the choice of strategy. In 400 BC the famous Chinese theorist of war Sun Tzu claimed that the essence of war is to break the will of the foe. The use of physical force is then one of the means to achieve such an end. In this sense, the guerrilla, terrorism or conventional warfare are simply different tactics of reaching rational, political goals. The use of violence shall therefore serve only one purpose, which is to break the will of the adversary to defend himself or fight back - to give up the (political) cause. An irregular conflict is then a clash of the will of opposition group to continue fighting and the will of the state to resist.

Insurgency is political in its very core, because the fighters live amongst local communities, attack in civilian clothes, hide in populated areas, and use armed force unconventionally and inseparably from civilians. This type of conflict differs from conventional warlike operations, because the enemy operates clandestinely, among indigenous population.7 The weakness with regard to the military power is then major point of departure for such enemy. Their tactics aim at the vulnerabilities not appreciated by the targets, or capitalize on the victims’ limited preparations against the threat.8 Such vulnerabilities, although affected by military or violent tactics, may still remain political in their nature. Thus, the aim of the waged opposition is political, while the means of winning or losing are mainly non-military.

In the situation of clear military disadvantage those who wish to challenge the presence of Alliance forces sought to offset the conventional superiority of their enemies and opted for only logic tactics; they blended together elements of insurgency- guerrilla and terrorism. For example, there is a common misperception that insurgents only use guerrilla tactics. Acts of terrorism, such as bombings, assassinations, hijacking and kidnapping, are strictly the realm of terrorists.9 But, noteworthy theorists such as Mao Tse-Tung or Ernesto Guevara10 are against such simplistic assessment of tactical options. In their view, the tactical choice is scenario-specific. Insurgents and terrorists are not limited to specific means or methods, but make the best use of the available tools to suit the environment instead.11 The Afghan case is the proof of it. Both tactical varieties are utilized within the theatre, having their particular use: 1. creating pressure at higher levels of NATO’s strategy; 2. inflicting fear on the local population. Both elements are crucial for the strategy of the Taliban.

When it comes to guerrilla operations, the paradoxical logic of multilayered phenomena begins to operate. On the tactical and operational levels, the insurgents could inflict the casualties on ISAF and at the same time prevent its conventional superiority to be brought to bear. However, the main goal of attacking the forces in the field is not a military victory or weakening of the Alliance. It is simply the matter of raising costs of the mission beyond acceptable levels. The West likes winning quickly and likes being seen to win - particularly at home,12 and the absence of such a victory alienates the public.

This tactics also seeks the other main goal within the long time strategy of insurgency - the protracted conflict. The constant-if-incremental loss of soldiers, supplies, and equipment with little chance of a quick resolution is aimed at the balance of political forces13 in the NATO member states. In the early 20th century, T. E. Lawrence wrote that main definition categories of an insurgent strategy are time, space and will.14 It is obvious that the longer the campaign goes on, the lower is the support of deployment at home. The lower the support is, the lower is the political will to send more troops and therefore it is less and less possible to manage operations within the field. On the other hand, for the Taliban time scarcely matters. As long as they keep the ability to continue with their guerrilla operations, the time is on their side. After all, limited wars are intended not to be won, but no to be lost. The essential goal is to be still there when the fighting ends.15

Space in the sense of the Taliban’s strategy is apparently the media16. Jaane Haaland Matlary described the Afghan war as global guerrilla warfare where the publics of NATO countries are the targeted audience. We are the ones who see the cruelty and the blood. Independent media cover each part of the battlefield and even bring private interviews with the insurgents. And this is of course very good news for the insurgents - they have direct access to our homes. The more immoral or gruesome are their strikes, the more effective is the media coverage.17 By the acts of bestiality they put the pressure behind their message. Even physical control of certain geographic areas is secondary to the control or successful utilization of media space. It is necessary to promote the picture of coalition losing militarily to achieve overall goals of the Taliban - to lower the support for Afghan mission at home down to the point of withdrawal.

We can hardly forget the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005. At that time, the Iraqi campaign was at the stake, but there is no clear reason why the same logic should not be applied for Afghanistan. Only the role and structure of the Taliban and its local18 recruitment, local ambitions and local funds do prevent such a thing to happen19. And, of course, effective intelligence and police operations at home and abroad have serious impact on any possible plans to attack within NATO home countries. The other possible explanation is that there is no need to mount attack so far away when one can behead the NGO workers and the tape will be almost for sure broadcasted in the entire western world. They must bring their stories and violence sells.20 Terrorist attacks perpetrated against both western and local targets have again a sole aim - to inflict fear. In the West, the horrific pictures appeal to public notion of humanity, which is meant to wage opposition to further involvement in the theatre. At the local level the fear means no disturbance to the Taliban operations.

In sum, the strategic choice of the Taliban is a protracted violent and nonconventional conflict. Within this conflict the civilians as well as military personnel are to be targeted by terrorist and guerrilla methods in order to strengthen the impact on the audience. The reason for such an approach is again the same as in any war - to break the will of political communities in the West, to prolong the campaign, and thus force the withdrawal of Alliance. Should the will of the public be broken, there would be no politician willing to send troops to Afghanistan again.

NATO AND THE STRATEGY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Modern COIN practice, based upon such fundamental works as Robert Thompson´s Defeating Communist Insurgency, tends to be regarded less as a form of war and more as a security challenge, with popularity and legitimacy being the key means to achieving the desirable end.21 In the age of no existential threat, the West began to approach security as a risk-based phenomenon. Since the Cold War, western security policy has not dealt with threats and therefore not with strategic thinking.22 Extremism, terrorism and other security threats became risks; a few in a long line of risks. However, these risks fundamentally differ from others, e.g. environmental ones, because our response became inadequate under the influence of this new view.

Once perceived differently, the threat became addressed differently. The situation has led to increasing emphasis on risk management and consequence management, and subsequently it has promoted democracy or nation-building, first as a continuation of humanitarian intervention, later as the response to terrorism.23 The seriousness of this point is obvious with the ISAF mandate, mandates of deployed forces and even the political situation within the Alliance itself. The results have seriously undermined not only NATO’s effort in Afghanistan, but also its reliability as a security guarantor for its members. Member governments have different appetite for risk, often dependent on the internal dynamics within their own countries.24 The immediate effect is free-riding in Afghanistan and lack of solidarity within the Alliance.

In practice, this means that deployed forces have as tight mandates as possible - it is not a mandate for warlike situations, but rather for policing. When policing becomes impossible in the face of the rational enemy who acts logically and maximizes utilizing of the limited power within his possession, there is no willingness to tell the constituents that reality is different than expected. Without sufficiently explaining the changing character and complex nature of the conflict, this has led to military missteps, public confusion, and domestic and international opposition to the war.25 This is obvious on today’s almost 80 national caveats for ISAF forces, mostly raising the restriction on combat operations and subsequently insufficient numbers in the South of Afghanistan where the most of the fighting takes place. Furthermore, there is no consensus even on the character of the mission. In other words, what do we do there?

The Danes and Brits, Germans, Norwegians or Czechs, all those are in different missions in Afghanistan, despite the fact that they all carry ISAF badges. Counterinsurgency, development aid, peace building, or reconstruction; these are the names for our missions. These labels are misleading. The conflict is on-going in parts of the country. International forces are engaged in fighting insurgency.26 At first glance, such misperceptions may appear trivial or academic, until they are linked to policies, military operations and public perceptions within democracies.27

Why is that so? The answer is simple again; the mislabeling of the mission has led to overestimating the perceived role of the struggle for Hearts and Minds (HaM)28. This famous phrase once used to describe the British effort to deny public support for communist guerrillas in Malayan Emergency is being overused these days.

Origins of the HaM campaign are derived from the logic of revolutionary violence for which local public support is the matter of life and death.29 In other terms, the supposed center of gravity of revolutionary movement is public support. After the Malaya, this thesis quickly established itself within small war doctrines all around the world. However, some authors30 argue, that modern insurgencies (like the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq at the moment) are not of the same type as the anti-colonial conflicts of the past. The level of support required for insurgencies to sink roots and operate successfully is context-specific, as in the case of clan or tribal-based societies, in which case these social units can be self-supporting.31

The rotten fruits of camouflaging reality in the field, even one’s own experience and ignorance of enemy’s capabilities, are collected in Afghanistan these days. Arguably, it is possible to identify several reasons for such a development. First and foremost, the Taliban seeks withdrawal of NATO and US forces. It does seek the power and the influence, but the strategy and tactics they use is based on fear, not on support. Insurgencies of this type may not require the support of the general population, but rather the spreading of enough instability, uncertainty and fear to prevent the population from assisting the insurgents’ adversaries.32 The significance of local support is even lowered considering the fact that Taliban is neither dependent on Afghan recruitment, nor supplies, because it enjoys the sanctuary in and support from certain groups in Pakistan. The lack of popular support itself can therefore hardly cause the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. As Metz & Millen noted, it is less an assessment of preferred future that drives insurgents or insurgent supporters than an assessment of who is likely to prevail.33 As Charles Townshend brilliantly pointed, as a threat to the safety of the state, terrorism is implausible, if not absurd, but as a challenge to the state’s monopoly of force and the broader sense of public security, it is actually effective.34 To put this in simple words, NATO concentrated its effort to “contest in popularity”, but rather than in popularity, the COIN in Afghanistan shall be the “contest in authority”.35

The aforementioned strategy suggests that the Taliban is well aware of this logic and acts accordingly. For example, by offering protection against the government’s Central Eradication Forces and other abusive actors the Taliban is proving to some Afghans36 that it is capable of moderation and protecting people.37 But such strategy is strongly dependent on the ability to reach western media through spectacular attacks on the Westerners or local civilians and significant targets. Then the fear hits not only the Westerners but locals as well. This is particularly important given the insurgents attempts to put the wedge between the population and the government by showing that the government is unable to protect its citizens.38 As Charles Calwell noted more than a hundred years ago, prestige is everything in such warfare.39 Here the character of insurgency comes into play again; one shall never lose sight of the fact that it is still a form of war. In fact, the essential ingredient of COIN is inflicting serious military setback on the insurgents and thus limiting their ability to endanger the security and promote the sense of authority of central government and its allies in the contested territory.40

To sum up; in 1990’s Europeans quickly forgot that HaM campaign is but one of a wide range of methods necessary to mount successful COIN, where many of them consist of various military and even combat operations. But, where the military focus strategy of the insurgents emphasizes guerrilla warfare, the government emphasis must be on counter-guerrilla campaigns, which are small unit operations, sustained and aggressive patrols and ambushes in guerrilla infested zones, forward basing, intelligence-led operations and strict coordination of all agencies involved.41 This may be very well true in the beginning of 21st century for the newly emerging type of insurgency called by some “liberation”.42 Thorough thinking shall be given to this type of irregular conflict and serious reconsideration of current strategies and approaches shall be made to address particular specifics of such wars. Specifically, it is the imbalance between the HaM approach and military oriented approach - in this respect, one may claim that this new type of insurgency (particularly that in Afghanistan) is impossible to be solved solely by an HaM campaign. The latest surge in numbers of American forces and offensive in southern regions may be the step in the right direction.

CONCLUSION

To sum up the current shortcomings in the NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan, one must inevitably say that main problems are of political nature. First and foremost, politicians failed to show the significance of the Afghan mission for their respective publics in Europe. They agreed on development effort, but could not find consensus on necessary war fighting effort. This was not the choice of strategy but of political illusions, non-respective to local conditions and real situation on the ground. At the same time, the same politicians labeled ISAF the cornerstone of NATO’s success and therefore put the Alliance on the edge of downfall.

The adversary is very much aware of NATO’s political will (or won´t?). Clearly, the Taliban identified home public43 as the center of gravity within Alliance. The Taliban systematically strikes the will of political communities in Europe with a sole aim - to undermine the liability of NATO, ISAF, and even the Afghan government. This is being done through the media used to project fear out-of-area as well as upon locals. The ability to do so is crucial for the Taliban’s strategy. Western governments that deploy forces in ISAF have seldom considered the fact that there is an enemy in Afghanistan that they have to engage in battle with and that this enemy chooses the tactics that will maximize its utility and affect the will of the same politicians maximally. In addition, there has been little strategic consideration of the dynamics that occur when the enemy acts like an enemy. Therefore, the government and NATO shall demonstrate unified effort to sustain the activity no matter what circumstances and subsequently the ability to deny the Taliban its only valuable asset (and its center of gravity) - the ability to strike within highly populated areas and to hit high profile targets.

However, the Taliban’s strategy is primarily aimed at western populations; the role of public diplomacy at home countries has been totally ignored. This has already undermined many efforts to change the situation in the field and it is going to cause the failure of ISAF in the worst case scenario. Given that western vulnerabilities are cultural44 and the payoffs from exploiting them are high, the West has locked itself in a vicious cycle.45 It is the support for deployment from the countries of origin, the showing of support to the troops which is a necessary condition to any progress out there in the field. Help to the locals is, of course, of huge value but it always must be used as one tool in the toolbox of COIN which is directed towards the Taliban and its ability to strike where the media exploitation is likely. This also offers a way of winning wars cheaply.

The tool for fighting an irregular opponent using guerrilla and terrorism tactics is well known, but not used. The role of “hearts and minds” is overestimated and the role of sharp end combat operations is subsequently underestimated due to political choice. Virtually, there is no lack of skills or capabilities; there is simply the lack of will - the will to deploy them or even to use them. Unfortunately, this lack of will is caused by successful employment of a violent strategy by the adversary. NATO’s center of gravity is home public that is affected by the Taliban’s overall strategy on a regular basis. And the root causes, even though addressed, are not the silver bullet to solve the situation in Afghanistan; the conclusion is therefore that the center of gravity of the Taliban - the ability to threaten the public - is simultaneously the center of gravity of the NATO-Taliban conflict. In this sense, the words of General Sir Mike Jackson may easily prove prophetic, once major allies announce the dates to withdraw, the Taliban may only feel encouraged to hold out until then to resurge.46

NOTES

1. In exchange for considerable amount of money and support. For more information on Afghanistan prior to 9/11 see Horák, S. (2005). Afghan Conflict. Prague: Public History. [in Czech]. or Nojumi, N. (2002). The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. New York: Palgrave.
2. First draft of the paper.
3. Term introduced by Carl von Clausewitz, further developed by various strategists and scholars (e.g. WYLIE, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control).
4. WYLIE, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control.
5. Ibid.; LONSDALE, David J. Strategy.
6. DE B. TAILLON, Jean Paul. Evolution of Special Forces in Couter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences.
7. KITSON, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.
8. COKER, Christopher. Asymmetrical War. p. 11.
9. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. p. 270.
10. CE-TUNG, Mao. Selected Military Writtings of Mao Tse-Tung.; GUEVARA, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare.
11. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare and Insurgency.
12. COKER, Christopher. Asymmetrical War. p. 14.
13. ARREGUIN-TOFT, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars. p. 34.
14. LAWRENCE, Thomas E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom.
15. BEAUFRE, Andre. An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to the Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age.
16. Media have been utilized by many irregular adversaries and not only through casualties inflicted upon the stronger actor in the conflict, the most flagrant example to be medialization of targeting errors or claiming responsibility for coincidental damage or deaths of high profile targets.
17. HELLE, Nils. Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare - It is all about legitimacy. p. 38.
18. Rather regional; including Afghan-Pakistani borderland and tribal areas.
19. And that might change as well in the final stages of the conflict, close to the edge of decision in the US or other major contributor. Failed bombing attempt on 5th Avenue claimed by Taliban is to serve as the first example.
20. Ibid. p. 43.
21. THOMPSON, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
22. DE WIJK, Robert. The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West´s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters.
23. LINDLEY-FRENCH, Julian. The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security dynamics in the 21st Century.
24. SKY, Emma. Increasing ISAFs Impact on Stability in Afghanistan. p. 16.
25. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. p. 271.
26. SKY, Emma. Increasing ISAFs Impact on Stability in Afghanistan. p. 9.
27. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. p. 270.
28. In order to put emphasis on the point, in this paper the narrow definition is used - the struggle for hearts and minds is understood as a contest in popularity and subsequently in legitimacy or root causes oriented. The author acknowledges the existence of other views where the heart and mind phrase is used differently.
29. In Mao Tse- Tung’s famous metaphor, the revolutionary is like a fish in the sea of public support. TSE-TUNG, Mao. Selected Military Writtings of Mao Tse-Tung.; KITSON, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.; THOMPSON, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
30. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare and Insurgency.; KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare.; METZ, Steven, MILLEN, Raymond. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.
31. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. p. 235.
32. Ibid.
33. METZ, Steven, MILLEN, Raymond. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.
34. TOWNSHEND, Charles. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction.
35. LONSDALE, David J. Strategy.
36. Particularly in the Pashtun belt.
37. PATEL, Seema. Breaking Point: Merasuring Progres in Afghanistan.
38. SKY, Emma. Increasing ISAFs Impact on Stability in Afghanistan. p. 15.
39. CALLWELL, Charles. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.
40. KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. p. 39.
41. DE B. TAILLON, Jean Paul. Evolution of Special Forces in Couter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences.; BROWN, Jason. Fighting for Intelligence: The Design of Intelligence-Led Operations.; O´NEILL, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare.
42. METZ, Steven, MILLEN, Raymond. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response.; According to Metz and Millen there are two types of insurgencies - Liberation and National.
43. Considerable scholarly literature has been devoted to this subject; for more on the theory, see Arreguin-Toft, Merom (How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failure of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the US in Vietnam, 2003), Mack (Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars, 1975) or Coker (Humane Warfare, 2001).
44. Meaning democracy values, human rights and humane society, precisely the qualities deemed to be worth fighting for in the West.
45. COKER, Christopher. Asymmetrical War. p. 6.
46. BBC. Afghanistan withdrawal possible from 2011, says Cameron.

LITERATURE

Monographs

[1] ARREGUIN-TOFT, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005. 274 p. ISBN 0521548691.

[2] BEAUFRE, Andre. An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to the Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. London : Faber & Faber, 1965. 138 p. ASIN B0007DOEDE.

[3] BROWN, Jason. Fighting for Intelligence: The Design of Intelligence-Led Operations [online]. Quantico : Marine Corps University, 2007 [cit. 2010-07-10]. Available on WWW: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504937&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

[4] CALLWELL, Charles. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. 1996. 579 p. ISBN 080326366X.

[5] CE-TUNG, Mao. Selected Military Writtings of Mao Tse-Tung. Peking : Foreign Languages Press, 1966. 410 p. ASIN B0007JK3RE.

[6] DE B. TAILLON, Jean Paul. Evolution of Special Forces in Couter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences. London : Praeger Institute, 2001. 208 p. ISBN 0275969223.

[7] DE WIJK, Robert. The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West´s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters. Amsterdam : Mets & Schilt, 2004. 288 p. ISBN 905330424X.

[8] GUEVARA, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. London : Harper Perennial, 2009. 176 p. ISBN 0007277202.

[9] KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare. In JORDAN, David (et al.). Understanding Modern Warfare. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 2008, pp. 224-298. ISBN 0521700388.

[10] KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare and Insurgency. In BAYLIS, John (et al.). Strategy in the Contemporary World. New York : Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 163-192. ISBN 0199289786.

[11] KITSON, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. London : Faber and Faber, 1991. 220 p. ISBN 0571271022.

[12] LAWRENCE, Thomas E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London : Johnattan Cape, 1935. 672 p. ASIN B000O6KHBC.

[13] LONSDALE, David J. Strategy. In JORDAN, David (et al.). Understanding Modern Warfare. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 2008, pp. 17-64. ISBN 0521700388.

[14] METZ, Steven, MILLEN, Raymond. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Carlisle : Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. 51 p. ISBN 1584871784.

[15] O´NEILL, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Washington DC : Brassey´s, 1990. 182 p. ISBN 1574883356.

[16] PATEL, Seema. Breaking Point: Merasuring Progres in Afghanistan. Washington DC : Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007. Retrieved July 10, 2010 from : http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf.

[17] THOMPSON, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. London : Chatto & Windus, 1966. 171 p. ASIN B0000CMZ9U.

[18] TOWNSHEND, Charles. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002. 168 p. ISBN 0192801686.

[19] WYLIE, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control. Annapolis : Naval Institute Press, 1989. 169 p. ISBN 0870211897.

Articles

[20] COKER, Christopher. Asymmetrical War. IFS Info. 2000, No. 1. pp. 5-17.

[21] HELLE, Nils. Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare - It is all about legitimacy. Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift. 2008, No. 10, pp. 38-50.

[22] LINDLEY-FRENCH, Julian. The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security dynamics in the 21st Century. European Security. 2004, No. 13. pp. 1-15.

[23] SKY, Emma. Increasing ISAFs Impact on Stability in Afghanistan. Defense & Security Analysis. 2007, Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 7-25.

[24] BBC. Afghanistan withdrawal possible from 2011, says Cameron. July 21, 2010 [online]. [cit. 2010-07-22]. Available on WWW: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10708063.