Defence and strategy

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Abstrakt
Od počátku devadesátých let 20. století mezinárodní společenství použilo při mnoha příležitostech ozbrojené síly, aby zabránilo systematickému, agrantnímu a rozsáhlému porušování lidských práv a humanitárního práva způsobem, který byl hovorově nazýván "humanitární intervence". Navzdory skutečnosti, že některé ozbrojené intervence uspěly, humanitární intervence vyvolává kontroverzi. Pochyby jsou vždy nad otázkou, zda použití ozbrojené síly je za těchto okolností legitimní. Čerpajíce z učení o spravedlivé válce Tomáše Akvínského, článek se zaměřuje na otázku, kdy je humanitární intervence ospravedlnitelná. Zkoumání začíná popisem smyslu humanitární intervence. Poté je vysvětlen pojem "legalistické paradigma" a význam Charty OSN. Následuje diskuse nad měěnící se povahou koniktu a nad myšlenkou "válečného humanitarismu", která předchází části věnované analýze Akvínského učení o spravedlivé válce. Článek končí přezkoumáním legitimity humanitární intervence v kontextu Akvínského morální teorie války, jejího současného chápání a relevantních politických, právních a morálních okolností.

Klíčová slova
Humanitární intervence, lidská práva, teorie spravedlivé války, Tomáš Akvínský, válka.

Keywords
Humanitarian intervention, Human rights, Just War theory, Thomas Aquinas, War.

MORAL DILEMMA

Probably no recent international relations theory issue is more controversial than the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds known as “humanitarian intervention.” This is especially the case when it comes to the intervention in Iraq, which is now defended increasingly on humanitarian grounds, perhaps, because the primary justication of the action–the existence of weapons of mass destruction–proved to be misleading.[1] Humanitarian intervention, however, is a sensitive issue, fraught with difculty and not susceptible to easy answers. The challenge of a moral appraisal of humanitarian intervention arises from the intersection of two competing ethical demands: the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state on the one hand and the objective of stopping massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law on the other. This inquiry recognizes the moral dilemma and suggests when humanitarian intervention can be justied.

THE QUESTION OF LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY

Before proceeding, it is necessary to dene what is meant here by legality and legitimacy. The question of legality is determined by international treaties and customs, two primary sources of international law that is the ultimate arbiter of any inquiry whether particular conduct or action is legal or illegal. The notion of legality is intended to be objective and universal, that is, its meaning is the same for all actors that are subject to it. As a result, deciding whether a specic act is lawful remains a purely legal question addressed by legal experts, although disagreement often prevails on the limits of law.[2]

Legitimacy is far less objective and it is often used as synonymous with morality and justice. Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy is less precise. There is neither a consensus about the test of legitimacy nor about the methodology for doing it. The idea of legitimacy is a multidisciplinary concept, encompassing moral, philosophical, political as well as legal principles. There is no law–like learning that would guide us to pronounce particular action as legitimate. It is upon personal predisposition of the interpreter to decide whether a specic act is justied and anyone can say it without a fear of contradiction. Legitimacy is always a matter of assessment, and although less rigid it is unavoidable when it comes to legal–olitical considerations.[3]

The problem arises when legality and legitimacy come into conict, that is, when something that is deemed to be legitimate is prohibited by law and vice versa. Legitimacy is an inherently subjective concept, so agreement is not always possible on what is legitimate and illegitimate. Without institutional endorsements of a particular action by the Security Council of the United Nations, for instance, which create a sense of consensus as a result of a successful political process on what is seen as legitimate, a tension between law and legitimacy may weaken the bidding force of legal rules that are necessary for the very existence of the society of states.[4] If this situation prevails, the breakdown of any international legal regime is unavoidable.[5]

The language with which this article will argue about legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is similar to the language of international law. This is useful and often necessary. Legitimacy as a mélange of different institutions and value–systems can never be isolated from legal norms within which it remains embedded. But this article is not about the positive laws of war. Legal treaties do not provide for a coherent account of moral arguments. The lawyers have constructed a paper world, which in reality often fails to t the world the rest of us live in–as the case of humanitarian intervention may be. International law principles governing the use of armed force in international relations do not have any standing in the abstract, since it is the circumstances, not the concept, that determine the quality of a particular action; they remain nevertheless a legitimate subject of the study. The textual level of analysis upon which lawyers rely cannot give a satisfactory basis for humanitarian intervention, nor can it provide a suitable rationale for rejecting humanitarian imperative to stop massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law when they occur. Indeed, textualism cannot consider whether the means chosen were legitimate in light of the goals being pursued, and in the end an emphasis on it obscures the fundamental question of justice. More nuanced attention to political, moral as well as legal circumstances is, therefore, necessary in order to address the question of legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and Aquinas’ seminal work on just war may be a good point of reference in doing so.

THE MEANING OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Adam Roberts dened humanitarian intervention as “military intervention in a state without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”[6] Although the concept of humanitarian intervention is vaguely dened and elusively broad, Robert’s denition refers to three of its essential characteristics, which are, at least in principle, subject to a general consensus.[7] First, humanitarian intervention is armed, because the employment of military force is its central feature. Second, it is an intervention, because it entails sending military forces across the state borders without giving the state concerned an opportunity to object to this action. Third, the intervention is humanitarian, because it is directed to prevent massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the concerned state.

LEGALIST PARADIGM

The issue of humanitarian intervention has a long history in international relations theory. Early doctrines of humanitarian intervention, expounded in the seventeenth century, considered the use of armed force as an instrument of justice and a lawful recourse to help those mistreated by their sovereign.[8] However, the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, formally acknowledged at the same time in the Peace of Westphalia, pointed in exactly the opposite direction. They stressed autonomy of states, and the necessity of non-interference as a principle of order in international relations.[9]

The contemporary debate on humanitarian intervention does not have a secure theoretical home either. Both dominant perspectives–realism and liberalism and their derivations–confront it with resistance and skepticisms. Realists are primarily concerned with security and order in the relations among states. In such circumstances, intervention should be exceptional and effective not to disrupt international order and endanger the security of states.[10] For realists, normative goals are rarely achievable in international arena and intervention on humanitarian grounds is unpredictable and therefore costly. In line with realist reasoning, intervention is an instrument in pursuit of self-interest driven by the concern of security and order and not an instrument of universal justice, goals and values, which are at best of secondary importance, if not entirely irrelevant. Liberals are not enthusiastic about humanitarian intervention either. From their perspective, intervention deprives individuals and groups within the state from the exercise of the right to self-determination.[11] Liberals seek to preserve the freedom of people forming the state, an autonomy which intervention would certainly threaten. They prefer the protection of state autonomy and freedom of its inhabitants to intervention, even for normative reasons.

Trying to escape Scylla and Charybdis of international relations theory, Michael Walzer went beyond the two dominant perspectives. Drawing upon the just war ethic, he provided for a normative treatment of war along with humanitarian intervention, and developed a theory of aggression, which is summed up in the following six propositions, forming the “legalist paradigm”:

1. There exists an international society of independent states.

2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members–above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.

3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.

4. Aggression justies two kinds of violent responses: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of the international society.

5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.

6. Once the aggressor state has been multilaterally repulsed, it can also be punished.[12]

Walzer’s “legalist paradigm” reects the conventions of law and order the society of states has established.[13] Underscoring these conventions are international treaties, declarations, and customary law principles prohibiting the use of armed force in international relations and forbidding a state from intervening in the internal affairs of another state. Chief among them is the United Nations Charter, a written constitution of the United Nations adopted in the aftermath of the World War II in 1945.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN THE LIGHT OF REALITY AND EXPERIENCE

The Charter of the United Nations devised a legal regime its fathers hoped would govern the use of armed force for generations to come–recognizing all states as sovereign equals,[14] prohibiting interference in their internal affairs,[15] and permitting the non-defensive use of armed force[16] only when decided by a supranational authority, the Security Council,[17] all of which was aimed to fulll the Charter’s primary objective “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”[18]

In setting limits on state power, the Charter sought to introduce new principles into relations among states and the methods by which international relations are managed. In accordance with the very rst article of the Charter, the United Nations are committed:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation, in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these ends.[19]

The ambitious task of achieving collective security was assigned to the Security Council, the executive body of the United Nations, which was endowed with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”[20] As a means to that and, ve permanent members of the Security Council[21] were equipped with a right of veto,[22] an act which reected the realization that the use of armed force to maintain international peace and security against the will of one of the permanent members would be destabilizing and might undermine international order. If challenged by an act of aggression, the Security Council should confront the aggressor with an incontrovertible law based on the irresistible force of the society of states.[23]

However, shortly after the Charter had been ratied, the Cold War severely curtailed the ability of the United Nations to function according to its Charter. For most of the organization’s history, the Cold War dened the boundaries of United Nations actions. The intensity of the ideological struggle left little time, energy, or moral vision for fulllment of Charter’s ambitious task in transforming relations among states.[24] In practice, the use of the veto power in the Security Council meant that the supposed system of collective security became in fact a more or less classical system of balance of power wherever one superpower’s commitment or interest was at stake.[25] Thus, the United Nations was effectively disempowered to stop massive human rights violations.[26] Indeed, direct involvement in the spheres of inuence of either superpower for the sake of human rights protection would further increase the probability of the direct confrontation between the two superpowers, a step which at the time of mutually assured destruction (MAD) nobody was willing to take.[27] Arguably this is no longer the case. Since early 1990s the Security Council has taken much more proactive approach in maintaining international peace and security.[28] However, this does not mean that after the end of the Cold War intervention, including humanitarian, has become more probable or palatable to the advocates of Walzer’s “legalist paradigm.”

THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT

The development of international relations in the 20th century was dominated by the common experience of two world wars which convinced the society of states that the use of armed force to solve international disputes is not only a violation of state’s territorial integrity and political independence but also a threat to international order and the society of states as a whole. The Charter of the United Nations therefore generally outlawed the use of armed force between states, except in self- or collective defense as a response to an armed attack and the implementation of enforcement action for the maintenance of international peace and security with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.[29]

However, if an armed conict arises between government forces and loosely organized irregulars and takes place within a state, how can the protection of human rights and civilian victims of warfare be reconciled with the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of a state? How, under such circumstances, can one dene the “hreat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”[30] that must exist before the Security Council can take action for the maintenance of international peace and security?[31] What should the society of states do if the Security Council cannot unite around the aim of confronting massive human rights violations?

These moral and political dilemmas arise from a new sort of intrastate warfare which was not anticipated at the time when the Charter was signed but nowadays represents a profound political and moral challenge.[32] In the aftermath of the World War II, the transcendent issue was interstate conict. But the current problem is intrastate violence.[33] Nowadays more than 90 percent of armed conicts take place within states, rather then between them.[34] Common to civil war, civil strife and other forms of internal violence is that they typically occur within disintegrating states and are accompanied with massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law often committed under the auspices of a government, not to mention the case when civilians become the main target of the conict.[35] Beyond the absence of any form of protection for civilian population against killings, executions, physical abuse, rape, forced displacement, destruction of property and looting, these conicts have almost invariably international consequences, particularly in the form cross-border refugee ows, usually bringing about social, political and economic destabilization of a concerned region.[36] The society of states then faces a dilemma which principle–the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of a state or the objective of stopping serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law–should take precedent when they come into conict?

MILITARY HUMANITARIANISM

The use of armed force to moderate state’s policy toward its inhabitants is, of course, not the most efcient instrument to address an internal conict. Unfortunately, it may be the only remedy at hand which the society of states may use to prevent massive violations of human rights, humanitarian law and related disruption of social, political and economic affairs.[37] Indeed, the armed interventions of the 1990s, such as the interventions in Northern Iraq and Somalia (1992), in Rwanda and Haiti (1994), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), and in Kosovo and East Timor (1999),[38] bore witness to the society of states’ recognition of the necessity to use armed force in such circumstances. These interventions also marked a high point in the increasing emphasis on human rights and humanitarian issues, which have been the most striking feature of international relations since the early 1990s.[39] They embodied a remarkable twist in a strange and long-running association between two supposedly contradictory factors: the allegedly “hard-nosed” factor of armed force and the purportedly “soft” factor of human rights, in what may be termed “military humanitarianism.”[40]

The extraordinary conjunction between armed force and human rights, however, seems to be no longer in place. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, military humanitarianism has been overshadowed by the evolution of the doctrine of preemption, which provided justication for war against terrorism in Afghanistan (2001), in Iraq (2003), and all around the world.[41] The United States–then the major proponent of humanitarian actions in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti and Kosovo, seems to be disinclined to use armed force ever, anywhere, except when it is obviously employed to address the hard security threats to country’s national interests.[42]

But using armed force in support of humanitarian objectives does not belong in the shadow, and it will not stay there. Given the changing pattern of conict from interstate to intrastate violence, there will be new cases of domestic unrests accompanied by atrocities or ethnic cleansing, and it will be discovered again that using armed force in such circumstances has an urgency that stands close to the urgency of preemption, as the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2000),[43] in Liberia (2003),[44] in Haiti (2004),[45] and in Sudan (2005)[46] have already demonstrated. Nevertheless, questions, such as how the society of states should act when a government massacres its own population, as it was the case in Rwanda, for instance;[47] or when human rights supersede those of sovereignty; and what are the criteria for using armed force on humanitarian grounds, are still waiting for answers.[48]

Humanitarian intervention requires legitimacy; without widespread acceptance of the action as part of a formal justice system, humanitarian intervention will be built on neither law nor justice, but on power alone. This turns us back to the question of when humanitarian intervention is justied, a question which brings us to the discussion of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of just war articulated in the thirteenth century, its twentieth century reconstruction and contemporary international legal regime derived from it.

JUST WAR DOCTRINE

As a primary source and the main point of reference, the proposed inquiry employs the just war ethic–a political-moral vision that restrains, directs and guides the use of armed force in international relations.[49] Although this normative theory–developed in the Middle Ages by Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, Francisco Suarez and Francisco de Vitoria–was designed primarily to deal with the ethic of war,[50] its structure and line of reasoning may be used analogically to “just” intervention, and it is, therefore, well-suited for this inquiry. Along with Aquinas, the greatest theorist of the just war tradition, the inquiry outlines presumptions against the use of armed force and species conditions under which the presumptions can be overridden as morally justied exceptions. These exceptions are dened in terms of criteria of the just war ethic, which may be broadly summarized as jus ad bellum principles, namely legitimate authority, just cause and rightful intention, which denes conditions under which armed force can be used; and jus in bello principles, that is, discrimination and proportionality, both of which set limits on how armed force can actually be employed. Although each of the criteria stands alone, they all must be applied together. It is this systemic character and dynamic of just war doctrine that comes into play when the case is to be made to decide when humanitarian intervention is justied.

Legitimate Authority

Aquinas argued that “three things are necessary” in order for a war to be just.[51] The rst is that the “authority of the ruler, by whose command the war is to be waged,”needs to be present.[52] Secondly, a “just cause” is required, namely, that “those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.”[53] Finally, it is essential that “the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.”[54] With regard to the rst “thing,”the “authority of the ruler”means that decisions to wage war are upon those who are legally authorized to do so, since, as Aquinas put it, “the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority.”[55] It is, therefore, “their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them,” and to that end, “it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil doers..., so too in defending the common weal against external enemies.”[56] Indeed, he proceeded to quote Augustine, claiming that “the natural order conductive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.”[57] For Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, this authority came ultimately from God, who provided legitimacy and moral sanction for its execution.[58]

The supreme authority of those in power in our times, however, rests in certain institutions and personnel, whose legitimacy is no longer derived from God’s will, but it is subject to national as well as international laws and constituencies that reect the will of people, and states respectively, and that hold them responsible and accountable for their behavior. Although, to quote Aquinas, “the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority,”and it is “their business to watch over the common weal” of those who are subject to their authority, and to that end, it is lawful for them to “recourse to the sword of war”in “defending the common weal against internal disturbances” and “external enemies,”[59] as enshrined in the principle of sovereignty and its corollary rule of non-intervention, the current norms of the society of states deprive those in power of the authority to make their war decisions but as a measure of selfdefense against an armed attack.[60] This restriction of the just war doctrine rests in the main on the presumption that war no longer serves as an act of vindictive justice taken to “punish evil doers.”[61] It has proceeded from the conviction that whatever grievances, war is an unjust–and illegal–means for settling those grievances.[62]

The legal and moral assumption, however, can be overcome by war decisions made by the United Nations under Chapter VII,[63] which allows “taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” in order to “maintain international peace and security.”[64] To that end, the Security Council, provided with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”[65] possesses the legitimate authority to make war decisions on behalf of the society of states.[66] Decisions of the Security Council to wage war or launch intervention take the form of authorization of a state, or group of states, to carry out enforcement action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter.[67]

Nonetheless, the Security Council cannot literally claim the legitimate authority to make war decisions while remaining within the idiom of Aquinas’s just war doctrine, as the requirement of the legitimate authority limits the right to make such decisions to sovereign political entities, that is, states.[68] The United Nations as an international organization in general, and the Security Council as its executive arm in particular, lack the sovereignty in the traditional sense of state’s supremacy over all authorities within its territory and population and independence of authorities outside it.[69] Yet, both international law reality and moral prudence dictate that United Nations’ war decisions in the form of the Security Council authorization of enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter are highly desirable, if not necessary, for that it provides war with legitimacy and moral sanction for its execution.[70] In the absence of the Security Council authorization then, war other than that of self-defense against an armed attack is to be rendered illegal and unjust, the lack of the proper legitimate authority on the part of the United Nations, which may be claimed on the basis of Aquinas’s theoretical standpoint, notwithstanding.

Just Cause

The second criterion for a war to be just, Aquinas proposed, is a “just cause.”[71] Namely, that “those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.”[72] More to the point, Aquinas referred to Augustine saying that “a just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inicted by its subjects or to restore what is has seized unjustly.”[73] Such action is deemed and intended to bring about the good of either the community or those against whom the war is waged by preventing or rectifying a wrongful, that is, unjust, action of another nation or state.[74] The just war in this sense is a defensive war upholding good by punishing evildoers.[75]

What follows is that without a damage inicted or injury received on the part of the state no war can be justied. The just war, in this context, is an action of a retaliatory or defensive nature, and an unjust war is a war of aggression, a war waged to commit evil rather than good. Thus, “nothing but aggression can justify war,” and “once the aggressor... has been military repulsed, it can also be punished.”[76] In the language of contemporary principles and norms of the society of states, this means that any violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a state constitutes an act of aggression, and that any state, as a victim of aggression, has the right to use necessary force to defend itself against an aggressor,[77] in compliance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.[78]

Although the right of self-defense is a fundamental rationale for waging a just war, the requirement of the just cause may eventually extend to include defense of other states against acts of aggression as well as interventions to assist secessionist movements, to balance other interventions, and to protect victims of massive human rights violations.[79] Humanitarian grounds, for their part, have not traditionally been considered a just cause for a state or group of states to intervene with the use of armed force in the internal affairs of another state.[80] But the praxis of the society of states is changing in this regard, and humanitarian grounds may become a prima facie just cause for intervention, as it was the case of the interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Somalia, in Rwanda, in Haiti and in East Timor, referred to above, which were conducted with the authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations on behalf of the society of states.[81]

Whether or not it is just for a state or group of states to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of another state is, however, a different question. It is entirely clear that any armed intervention, even if it is undertaken on humanitarian grounds, collides with both just war and international law lines of reasoning. This is because armed intervention is always viewed as a crime against peace from the perspective of the just war doctrine, and international law respectively, as every such intervention involves the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, on whose territory the action takes place.[82] In other words, every armed intervention is an act of aggression, and, as such, it is to be repulsed and punished accordingly.

In Aquinas’s doctrine, the just war was a war of execution, a vindication of good, taken to avenge the wrong suffered, implying more favorable approach to an armed intervention undertaken on humanitarian grounds viewed as a punishment of evil.[83] In the twentieth, as in the twenty-rst, century, however, the use of armed force, either in the form of war or armed intervention, has no longer been a means generally permitted to redress wrongs inicted by evildoers.[84] International legal regime enshrined in international treaties, including the Charter of the United Nations, and customary international law prohibits the threat or the use of armed force against another state.[85] The bellum legale, as the bellum justum, is limited to one of self- or collective defense against an act of aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and enforcement action of a state or group of states with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.[86]

This restriction of the just war rests in the main on two ethical presumptions. The rst stems from the assumption–indeed, conviction–hat the destructiveness of the modern warfare makes war a completely disproportionate means for the resolution of international disputes and for the redress of state’s grievances, even where they are considered just.[87] The second ethical presumption follows from the supposition that an admittance of the right of a state or group of states to initiate war, even if is intended to punish evil, would impede efforts of the society of states to establish a judicial method of outlawing war altogether, an attempt drawing upon the experience of two world wars that left millions of people dead and bodily or mentally disordered.[88]

Rightful Intention

Provided that the war is undertaken by a legitimate authority and in a just cause does not ensure that it is a just war. As Aquinas identied, the third “thing” is required, that is, “the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.”[89] Noting Augustine in this regard that “true religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the good,” he proceeds to argue that “even if the war be declared by legitimate authority and for a just cause, it is nonetheless rendered unlawful through a wicked intention.”[90] Indeed, the wicked intention can render the war which, having a just cause and being declared by the legitimate authority, is otherwise just, unjust.[91] The rightful intention, seeking to secure peace, to punish evildoers, and to promote good, is, therefore, essential for a war to be just. From this perspective, war can be transformed into peace by the spirit in which it is waged, that is, by a rightful intention. As Augustine had said, noted by Aquinas,” we do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace.”[92] In line with this assertion, those who wage war can be peaceful in warring, “so that they may vanquish those whom they war against and bring them to the prosperity of peace.”[93] The moral efcacy of a rightful intention is, thus, dependent upon the existence of a just cause, and vice versa.

The inclusion of the rightful intention in Aquinas’s moral analysis of war is meant to limit war objectives to vindicating the just cause. For it may happen that the appeal to a just cause cannot be literal but purely rhetorical and the war that is waged for a just cause may have a different, hidden, and perhaps far from just, motive. The presence of such motive, however, does not nullify the just cause,[94] provided that the motive “intends the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.”[95] The question is not whether the motive is present, but whether it is itself legitimate, and if so, whether it is only present, or it is dominant, in other words, whether the motive is relevant to a just cause, or it is the real cause for which the war is being waged.[96] A full expression of this problem is usually given in the justication(s) invoked by a state or group of states for their resort to armed force, usually mixing humanitarian concerns with other less altruistic motives.

Discrimination and Proportionality

As described above, Aquinas held that for a war to be just “three things are necessary:” (1) that those who possess the legitimate authority should make their war decisions; (2) that war should be waged for a just cause; (3) and that belligerents should resort to war with a rightful intention. Once these requirements are met, however, the belligerents are subject to two additional constraints of their activity: their action must be discriminate, that is, directed against an aggressor, not against an innocent person; and the course of war must be proportionate to a good effect sought.[97]

Aquinas rened the rst of these constraints further, under the so-called principle of double effect, to encompass situations in which injury or death of an “innocent and just person” is unavoidable.[98] The principle was formulated as follows: “nothing hinders one act having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention.” [99] “Moral acts take their species according to what is intended and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental.”[100] Following the line of this argument, indirect evil effects of the belligerents’ behavior are beyond the bounds of moral responsibility as long as the intended action is good in its nature and a good effect is sought. The evil effects are not to be willed as a means to the good effect, but both effects have to arise simultaneously from the good action which caused them.[101] The goodness of the good action, then, has to be done directly as well as directly willed, and the good effect has to arise as immediately from the act as any secondary evil effects for which the belligerents are not to be held responsible.[102] Under this principle, thus, the belligerents are, if there is a good effect sought, justied in causing incidental evil effects of their action.

As far as the second constraint is concerned, Aquinas argued that “though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end.”[103] “It is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense,” he asserted.[104] In other words, the evil effects of war should be proportionate to the injustice to be prevented or remedied by war. Hence, the ultimate good achieved by war must be greater than the harm done.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND JUST WAR ETHICS

Deciding when it is just to wage a war is a complex and difcult task. When humanitarian intervention is under consideration, the decision is especially problematic. This is because armed intervention in the internal affairs of another state, even if it is undertaken on humanitarian grounds, is always viewed as an act of aggression from the perspective of just war theory, and international law respectively, as every such intervention entails the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, on whose territory the action takes place. As described earlier, there are two exceptions to this general perception shared by both the just war doctrine and international law, in what are the requirements of the legitimate authority and a just cause with respect to the former, and the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state with regard to the latter. The rst exception is the implementation of enforcement measures, on the part of a state or group of states, with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The second exception is the exercise of the right to the self- or collective defense as a response to an armed attack, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. However, if none of these exceptions is applicable: humanitarian crisis does not transcend borders and does not lead to an armed attack against another state–so, the recourse to Article 51 of the Charter is not available; and the Security Council cannot agree on the authorization of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, as it was the case during the Kosovo crisis for instance;[105] the intervention may easily be labeled as illegal and illegitimate. What should the society of states do when diplomacy fails in the face of increasing human suffering and the Security Council cannot act? Which principle– the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state or the protection of human rights–is more important under such circumstances?

THE QUESTION OF POLICY AND PRUDENCE

Bearing in mind the conditions humanitarian intervention has to satisfy to be considered justied, one may reasonably argue that a dogmatic insistence on the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state in the case of serious human rights violations makes the normative foundation of the just war doctrine rigid, inhumane and unjust, and that a revision of its theoretical assumptions should be undertaken in order to allow for a suspension of its rules under certain circumstances. However, there is a considerable risk associated with such revision. Whenever the general system of guidelines and principles like just war doctrine allows for a suspension of its rules under certain circumstances, the system itself becomes vulnerable, as any derogation puts its consistency and credibility in jeopardy.[106] Indeed, the guidelines and principles of the just war doctrine may, in conjunction with political, economic and geostrategic motives, result in questionable interpretation and application of the set of value standards that the doctrine represents. The just war doctrine is not a xed formula into which one can plug empirical factors for a given situation and thus generate an unambiguous conclusion. Rather, it is a broader set of value guidelines and principles that may be variously interpreted and applied. This is partially due to the sheer complexity of the issues involved, and partially to the mixed motives of the parties concerned.

In the case of humanitarian intervention, the credibility of the just war doctrine would be especially vulnerable, because, in addition to the usual complexities and mixed motives involved, the doctrine itself would allow for the suspension of its own principles and guidelines, posing a danger that the parties concerned would exploit these principles and guidelines to rationalize doing whatever they have otherwise decided to do. Therefore, it would not be desirable for such intervention to be justied, while remaining within the realm of the just war theory, as there is a danger of making the normative foundation of the theory weak and vulnerable concerning its consistency and credibility. The intervention then could not be justied but outside it, as an exception to the rule permissible under certain circumstances. Although such exception would literally still violate the set of value standards inherent to the just war doctrine, it would nevertheless bolster its utility, as it would allow for a broader interpretation and application of its principles and guidelines in practical settings. Indeed, if one accepts that the ultimate rationale of the just war theory is to provide legitimacy for a war which aims to defend good and to punish evil, as Aquinas argued, then the just war ethic should not be a hindrance to armed intervention in the case of serious violations of human rights, as long as there is no other alternative available, and provided that the goal of stopping serious violations of human rights would be regarded as good, while leaving such violations continued unabated would be considered evil. And nally, that such intervention will actually do more good than harm.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A JUSTIFIABLE EXCEPTION?

It may be argued that, even if humanitarian intervention is authorized by the United Nations, the action undertaken with legitimacy and moral sanction of the Security Council does not necessarily have a moral quality superior to that of a state or group of states acting unilaterally. Humanitarian intervention authorized by the Security Council as the enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter presumably has greater legitimacy than a unilateral action, but it is not clear whether it is any more just, as the politics of the United Nations is not more different in its character from that of its member states, and the decision to use armed force and intervene in the internal affairs of another state is always a matter of policy and prudence, regardless by whom and where such decision is made.

With this as a background, is the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds justied, concerning its exceptional character and humanitarian necessity it responds to? In his discussion of the question of the morality of war, Walzer argued that:

•Humanitarian intervention is justied when it is a response... to acts ‘that shock the moral conscience of mankind.’ The old-fashioned language seems to me exactly right. It is not the conscience of political leaders that one refers to in such cases. They have other things to worry about and may well be required to repress their normal feelings of indignation and outrage. The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired in the course of their everyday activities. And given that one can make a persuasive argument in terms of those convictions, I don’ think that there is any moral reason to adopt that posture of passivity that might be called waiting for the UN (waiting for the universal state, waiting for the messiah...).[107]

Although it is not clear how much “shock” is required to trigger humanitarian intervention and to make it justied, the application of Walzer’s line of reasoning, considered in the context of the argument developed above, might imply that using armed force on humanitarian grounds is justied when responding to “acts ‘that shocked the moral conscience of mankind,’”[108] that is, as an exception from the rule because of special circumstances surrounding its commencement. However, such conclusion may be premature, if one does not take into account the conduct of the action itself, which should be the case, bearing in mind the requirements of discrimination and proportionality, the two additional constrains imposed upon the manner in which a just war is to be waged that Aquinas identied.

The separation of means and ends is a necessary part of any moral appraisal of war, for that if the conduct of a war fails to satisfy the requirements of discrimination and proportionality, then the war is unjust, no matter how just it might be for a state or group of states to initiate it. In other words, not all ends can justify the resort to the use of armed force, and not even the best ends can justify the use of all means. As Terry Nardin put it:

• Although the criteria of justice in war have traditionally allowed the pursuit of certain ends as a lawful ground for using force, it is a misconception to think that force is justied if it is used for a good end. An act of war, like any other act, is just or unjust in relation to considerations of a moral practice, not in relation to its instrumental utility for the relation of desired ends.[109]

As the presented inquiry demonstrates, humanitarian intervention requires a multifaceted ethic, because morality does not lie in one place in this case. From the just war perspective, for a war or intervention to be justied both means and ends must be equally just. Here lies the greatest strength and at the same time the greatest weakness of the just war theory. The problem is not so much the required coherency of all conditions that have to be satised for an action to be justied, although it is rarely achievable in reality. The difculty rather comes, when one has to judge an action with conicting moral qualities like situations when good solutions bring bad results or bad practices produce good effects. For theologians and moralists, the resolution of this problem may be banal, as good and evil is inherently good and evil and no transformation or metamorphosis of a given quality is possible, except for the situation when the principle of double effect applies. Even if one would accept such explanation, how can one cope with a situation when, for example, the intervening state or group of states deliberately destroyed major industries, infrastructure, main land and river transportation links, as well as facilities that sustain civilian life such as the electricity, heating and water supplies, causing enormous economic and social hardship of the civilian population throughout the country in which the intervention took place, and justied the action on the grounds of actual necessity to disrupt the ability of governmental forces to commit atrocities and conduct violent attacks against civilian population of that country? Because of these fundamental circumstances, no clear line of moral inference can be persuasively drawn, leaving the comparison of the good sought and actually achieved the primary variable of the moral appraisal of any given instance of humanitarian intervention.

In the light of these considerations, one may reasonably conclude that while the just war theory may offer broad guidance to moral considerations of humanitarian intervention, it can hardly provide an absolute answer in relation to its moral standing. Whether a particular case of humanitarian intervention, not to mention the intervention in Iraq, is justied, is always a question of empirical analysis that should take into account political, moral as well as legal perspectives on the particular circumstances surrounding such intervention. In doing so, the just war ethic can help, but the burden of making the moral judgment on a particular action belongs to each of us.

CONCLUSION

Probably no recent international relations theory issue is more controversial than the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds known as “humanitarian intervention.” Humanitarian intervention, however, is a sensitive issue, fraught with difculty and not susceptible to easy answers. The challenge of a moral appraisal of humanitarian intervention arises from the intersection of two competing ethical demands: the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state on the one hand and the objective of stopping massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law on the other. This inquiry recognizes the moral dilemma and suggests when humanitarian intervention can be justied.

As a primary source and the main point of reference, the proposed inquiry employs the just war ethic. Along with Thomas Aquinas, the inquiry outlines presumptions against the use of armed force and species conditions under which the presumptions can be overridden as morally justied exceptions. These exceptions are dened in terms of criteria of the just war ethic, which may be broadly summarized as jus ad bellum principles, namely legitimate authority, just cause and rightful intention, dening conditions under which armed force can be used; and jus in bello principles, that is, discrimination and proportionality, both of which set limits on how armed force can actually be employed.

The article commences with the description of the meaning of humanitarian intervention. The notion of “legalist paradigm” and the relevance of the United Nations Charter are then sketched as a basis for an account of the changing nature of conicts and the idea of “military humanitarianism.” In doing so, a reference point is provided for a subsequent analysis of Aquinas’s doctrine of just war, including the discussion of the signicance of legitimate authority and just cause in Aquinas’s writing and its contemporary relevance. The theoretical background of the notion of the rightful intention in Aquinas’s moral analysis of war, along with an account of the concept of discrimination and proportionality, follow. The article concludes with a section devoted to the scrutiny of the question when humanitarian intervention is justied.

It will be argued that humanitarian intervention meets some of the requirements of the just war doctrine, but not all of them, lending credence to a conclusion that the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, considered in its full aspect, is questionable at best. However, because contradictory ethical principles are inescapably at the heart of humanitarian intervention–the observance of proportionality and discrimination principles, the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state except for defense against armed attack and enforcement measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter; and the objective of stopping serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law–there could hardly be a denitive moral answer. The just war doctrine can provide principles and guidelines, but not always absolute answers.

LITERATURE

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NOTES
1. See Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Central Intelligence Agency, September 2004) (https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html [last accessed January 2007]); and Thomas Cushman, ed., A Matter of Principle, Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). See also James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004); and Laurie Mylroie, Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror (New York: Regan Books, 2003). As a writing guide for this article, the author used University of Chicago Press Staff, ed., The Chicago Manual of Style (15th ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

2. See Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique (3rd ed.; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 467—71; Michael J. Glennon, “Legitimacy and the Use of Force,” a paper submitted in the preparation of the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats and Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York, United Nations, 2004) (http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Glennon_paper_legit_use_of_force.pdf [last accessed February 2007]); and Allain Pellet, “Legitimacy, Legality and the Use of Force,” a paper submitted in the preparation of the Report of the Highlevel Panel on Threats and Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (http://www.unglobalsecurity.org/pdf/Pellet_legit_use_of_force.pdf [last accessed February 2007]).

3. See ibid. See also André-Jean Arnaud, J.-G. Belley, J. A. Carty, M. Chiba, et. al., Dictionnaire encyclopédique et théorie et de sociologie du droit (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, E. J. A., 1993), pp. 342—5.

4. Throughout this article the term “society of states” is used as dened by Hedley Bull, who considered the international system as being based on sovereign states that primarily pursue their own interest but also recognize norms and institutions constraining their behavior. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 65—74.

5. See Arnaud, J.-G. Belley, J. A. Carty, M. Chiba, et. al., Dictionnaire encyclopédique et théorie et de sociologie du droit; Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique, pp. 467—71; Glennon, “Legitimacy and the Use of Force;” and Pellet, “Legitimacy, Legality and the Use of Force.” See also Edward H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1918—1938: An Introduction to Study of International Relations (London: Harper Perennial, 1964), pp. 170—80.

6. Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 19.

7. With regard to humanitarian intervention see, e.g., Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1984); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Stanley Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Francis Ko Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Richard B. Lillich, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973); Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemas of Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 1998); Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conict: a Reconceptualization (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1996); Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (3rd ed., Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 2005); Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Nicolas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

8. See J. Bryan Hehir, “Military Intervention and National Sovereignty: Recasting the Relationship,” in Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemas of Humanitarian Intervention, pp., 32—34.

9. See ibid.

10. See, especially, Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812—1822 (London: Phoenix Press, 2000); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), as two works at the opposite ends of the realist spectrum; and Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (5th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), as a middle ground between these two. See also Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1918—1938: An Introduction to Study of International Relations; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

11. See, especially, John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” in Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicolas Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 486—493.

12. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (3rd ed., New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 61—63.

13. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, p. 61.

14. See Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: United Nations, 1997), p. 6.

15. See Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., p. 7.

16. See Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., pp. 32—33.

17. See Articles 2(4), 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., pp. 6, 27—28.

18. Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., p. 3. With regard to the philosophy of the travaux préparatoires of the Charter of the United Nations, concerning the primary objective of the Charter, that is, the prohibition of war, see Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Article 2(4),” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 117—118.

19. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, p. 5. With regard to the commentary on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Chapter I. Purposes and Principles,” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, pp. 49—56.

20. Article 24(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, p. 20.

21. See Article 23(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., p. 19.

22. See Article 27(2), (3) of the Charter of the United Nations. Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

23. With regard to the interpretation and application of actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches to the peace, and acts of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, see Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (2nd ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan, 1951), pp. 88—108.

24. With regard to the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War see, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and John Lewis Gaddis and John Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

25. See Stephen Ryan, The United Nations and International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (3rd ed.; Boulder: Westview Press, 2001). See also David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

26. The most commonly cited examples of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War include the intervention of India into East Pakistan to protect the ethnic Bengalis during the civil war in Pakistan (1971), which led to the creation of the state of Bangladesh; the intervention of Vietnam troops into Kampuchea (Cambodia) to terminate the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge (1978); and the intervention of Tanzania that caused the overthrow of Idi Amin’s erratic dictatorship in Uganda (1979). Neither of these actions, however, were ofcially justied in terms of humanitarian intervention. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, “rticle 2(4),”in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, p. 124.

27. With regard to the era of MAD, see David Goldscher, “ethinking the Unthinkable after the Cold War: Towards Longterm Nuclear Planning,”Security Studies, vol. 7 (Summer 1998), pp. 128—157.

28. Until 1990 the Security Council of the United Nations decided on enforcement measures under Article 41 of the Charter only with respect to Rhodesia (1968) and South Africa (1977). See Jochen A. Frowein, “Article 41,” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, pp. 625—626.

29. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Article 2(4),” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, pp. 117—118.

30. See Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, p. 27.

31. With regard to the interpretation and application of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, see Jochen A. Frowein, “Article 39,” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, pp. 605—616.

32. See Pascal Teixeira, The Security Council at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: To What Extent Is It Willing and Able to Maintain International Peace and Security? (Geneva: United Nations, 2003), pp. 5—8.

33. See e.g., Ko A. Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations, 2000), pp. 43—48; and Report of the High-level Panel on Threats and Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf [last accessed February 2007]), pp. 31—39.

34. See Ko A. Annan, Preventing War and Disaster: A Growing Global Challenge, 1999 Annual Report of the Work of the Organization (United Nations: New York, 1999), p. 19.

35. With regard to the recurrent pattern of internal conicts and related international response, see, e.g., Roderic M. Alley, Internal Conict and the International Community: Wars without End? (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); and Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 1991—2004 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Michael E. Brown, ed., Nationalism and Ethnic Conict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); and Barbara Harff and Ted R. Gurr, Ethnic Conict in World Politics (2nd ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 2004).

36. See ibid.

37. See e.g., William J. Lahneman, Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-rst Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 2004); Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman, eds., Human Rights and Military Intervention (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002); and Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (2nd ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).

38. With regard to these and other particular cases of intervention on humanitarian grounds, see, e.g., John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994—1997 (Westport: Praeger, 1998); Berdal and Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 1991—2004; Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (New York: Oxford University Press/SIPRY: 2007); and Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.

39. With regard to human rights as a phenomenon of international relations, see e.g., Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Paul G. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (2nd ed., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).

40. With regard to “hard” and “soft” factors in the context of human rights protection, see, e.g., Fen O. Hampson, Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Holly Reid, and Todd Marting, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Janne H. Matlary, Intervention for Human Rights in Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

41. With regard to the doctrine of preemption, see e.g., Michael E. O’Hanlon, Susan E. Rice and James B. Steinberg, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” Policy Brief, no. 113 (December, 2002), pp. 1—8; and Alexander T. J. Lennon and Camille Eiss, eds., Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).

42. See Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy,” in Holzgrefe and Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas; Verna V. Gehring, ed., War after September 11 (Lanham: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 2003).

43. See the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/ [last accessed February 2007]).

44. See the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/ [last accessed February 2007]).

45. See the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/ [last accessed February 2007]).

46. See the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/ [last accessed February 2007]).

47. See “Letter Dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” enclosure, S/1999/1257 (UN Security Council, December 16, 1999) (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]).

48. Since the early 1990s a substantial amount of literature has been devoted to these issues. For recent additions, see Ko A. Annan, The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1999); David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Michael Keren and Donald A. Sylvan, eds., International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002); Anthony F. Lang Jr., ed., Just Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner, eds., The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman, eds., Human Rights and Military Intervention; and Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent, eds., From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004).

49. See Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond (3rd ed., Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), pp. 400—401.

50. See ibid.

51. Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 214.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. See Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius (London: S.P.C.K., 1965), pp. 21—22.

59. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 214.

60. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, pp. 59—62.

61. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 214.

62. A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 146—161.

63. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, pp. 59—62.

64. Article 1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, p. 5.

65. Article 24(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, ibid., p. 20.

66. See James T. Johnson, “The Just-War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,” in J. Carl Ficarrotta, ed., The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), pp. 111—119.

67. See Richard J. Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 20—34.

68. See Johnson, “The Just-War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,” in J. Carl Ficarrotta, ed., The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, p. 117.

69. See Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, p. 8.

70. See James A. Barry, The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 15.

71. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 214.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. See Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius, p. 22.

75. See Johnson, “The Just-War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,” in J. Carl Ficarrotta, ed., The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, pp. 116—117.

76. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, p. 62.

77. See ibid., pp. 51—53, 62.

78. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, pp. 32—33. With regard to the scope of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, see Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Article 51,” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, pp. 661—678.

79. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, pp. 86—108.

80. See Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases, p. 69.

81. See “Resolution 770 (1992),” S/RES/770 (1992) (UN Security Council, August 13, 1992)
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/379/66/IMG/N9237966.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]);
“Resolution 794 (1992),” S/RES/794 (1992) (UN Security Council, December 3, 1992)
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]);
“Resolution 929 (1994),” S/RES/929 (1994) (UN Security Council, June 22, 1994)
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/260/27/PDF/N9426027.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]);
“Resolution 940 (1994),” S/RES/940 (1994) (UN Security Council, July 31, 1994)
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]);
and “Resolution 1272 (1999),” S/RES/1272 (1999) (UN Security Council, October 25, 1999)
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/312/77/PDF/N9931277.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed February 2007]).

82. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, pp. 51—53, 62.

83. See Johnson, “The Just-War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,” in J. Carl Ficarrotta, ed., The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, p. 117.

84. See Coates, The Ethics of War, pp. 146—161.

85. See Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, pp. 45—87.

86. See ibid., pp. 112—218.

87. See Coates, The Ethics of War, pp. 156—161.

88. See ibid.

89. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 214.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., pp. 214—215.

92. Ibid., p. 215.

93. Ibid.

94. See Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 162.

95. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 40, Of War, First Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 215.

96. See Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 162.

97. See Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 64, Of Killing, Sixth and Seventh Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, pp. 215—220.

98. Ibid., pp. 215—216, 218.

99. Ibid., p. 218.

100. Ibid.

101. See Barry, The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics, pp. 15—16.

102. See ibid., p. 16.

103. Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae,” II-II, Question 64, Of Killing, Seventh Article, in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, eds., International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, p. 218.

104. Ibid.

105. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Ruth Wedgwood, Jonathan I. Charney, et. al., Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 93 (October 1999), pp. 824—847, 857—862; Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo,” Survival, vol. 41 (Autumn 1999), pp. 102—123; and Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,” European Journal of International Law, vol. 10 (1999), pp. 1—22.

106. With regard to the system dynamic, system effects and types of feedback, see Robert Jervis, System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

107. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, p. 107.

108. Ibid.

109. Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 278.