doi:10.3849/1802-7199

Austria’s engagement in Chad as element of its neutrality policy

Gerald BRETTNER-MESSLER

The article provides an overview of the Austrian engagement in the EU military operation European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) and its historical and political background. Notwithstanding its neutrality, Austria has deployed the soldiers of the “Bundesheer” (Austrian Armed Forces, AAF) for more than forty years to international peace operations. Since becoming an EU member in 1995 Austria has been participating in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Austria’s position is that neutrality means refraining from military alliances, troop deployments on Austrian soil and participating in wars. Peace operations are part of its “active neutrality policy” and neutrality is the key for an active peace policy. As a neutral state Austria is a reliable intermediator in conflicts. To alleviate the plight of the refugees in Chad is the main reason for Austria to deploy troops to this country. The opposition criticises the deployment because in their opinion the soldiers are ill-equipped and neutrality could be violated if Austrian soldiers are dragged into the ongoing Chadian civil war. Certainly this operation is very demanding and therefore a challenge for the Austrian military. The success of the whole operation will be a test for European abilities to create safety and stability in Africa.

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Abstrakt
Článek je věnován rakouské účasti na vojenské operaci EU EUFOR v Čadu a Středoafrické republice a jejímu historickému a politickému pozadí. Přes neutralitu Rakouska se vojáci rakouských ozbrojených sil,. tzv. „Bundesheer“, již více než čtyřicet let účastní mezinárodních mírových operací. Od počátku členství v Evropské unii v roce 1995 se Rakousko účastní její společné zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky (CFSP) a Evropské bezpečnostní a obranné politiky (ESDP). Rakouský postoj k neutralitě spočívá v neúčasti ve vojenských spolcích, nenasazování vojáků na rakouském území a neúčasti ve válkách. Mírové operace představují součást jeho „aktivní politiky neutrality“, přičemž neutralita je klíčem k aktivní mírové politice. Jako neutrální země je Rakousko spolehlivým zprostředkovatelem v konfliktech. Hlavním účelem nasazení rakouských vojáků v Čadu je zmírnění tísně tamních uprchlíků. Opozice toto nasazení kritizuje; podle ní jsou rakouští vojáci nedostatečně vybaveni a navíc hrozí porušení neutrality, pokud budou zataženi do přetrvávající občanské války v Čadu. Operace je určitě náročná, a proto představuje výzvu pro rakouskou armádu. Úspěch celé operace je testem evropských schopností při budování bezpečnosti a stability v Africe.

Klíčová slova
Rakousko, Společná zahraniční a bezpečnostní politika, Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika, Evropská unie, Čad, Francie, neutralita, OSN.

Keywords
Austria, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, European Union, Chad, France, neutrality, United Nations.

INTRODUCTION

Austrian security policy has two important aspects: neutrality and the participation in international peace operations. One could believe that one excludes the other, but this assumption is not true. Both are the cornerstones of today’s Austrian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the more Austria is involved in various demanding peace operations the more the gap between reality and pretension is widening. The recent participation in the EU-mission in Chad is an example of such development.

The article describes the origins of Austrian neutrality and how it has been interpreted and handled in a changing political environment and what role it played in Austrian foreign and security policy. The mission in Chad, as the latest engagement of Austrian forces, is presented as an example how Austria connects neutrality with the deployment of soldiers to foreign countries. The reasons and the legal basis for sending soldiers to Chad are presented, but also the arguments of the opponents. The last part deals with the implementation of the mission itself, its problems and challenges, and gives information about the Austrian contingent, its composition, its duties, and also shows the perception of the mission by the Austrian public.

NEUTRALITY AS THE KEY FOR THE STATE TREATY OF 1955

Austria declared its “permanent neutrality” on October 26, 1955 after signing the State Treaty on May 15, which gave Austria back its sovereignty. But before the Soviet Union agreed upon this treaty, the Austrian government had to assure the Kremlin in the Moscow Memorandum that Austria would become a neutral state according to the model of Switzerland. Right from the beginning Austrian neutrality was a part of a political bargain. The mentioning of Switzerland didn’t mean that Austria would have to follow the legal interpretation of neutrality by the Swiss, but to stay independent and non-allied like Switzerland. What the Soviets precisely wanted was Austria not to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But Moscow did not object to a UN-membership, which Austria gained in December 1955. The Swiss saw such a membership as contrary to their neutral status and did not become a member until 2002. With high probability the whole approach by the Soviets had only a peripheral link with Austria. It is believed that the policy towards Austria was mainly a bid to Germany: neutrality as barter for reunification (as we know today, the bargain failed). [1]

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY – FROM POLITICAL NECESSITY TO NATIONAL IDENTITY

All of this is mentioned here because it shows that the origins of neutrality have nothing to do with the current situation and discussion. Over the decades neutrality has transformed from a means to a political end to a part of the country’s identity. In 1955 the Social Democrats were very sceptic about neutrality; the “Verband der Unabhängigen” (Union of Independents, predecessor to the Freedom Party) voted against the Neutrality Act. Today these two parties are steadfast supporters of neutrality. The reasons for this change of mind are manifold: The close connection between neutrality and state treaty, the successful Austrian positioning between the Eastern and the Western block under the flag of neutrality.

Especially, the foreign policy of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s, when Vienna became the third UN headquarters besides New York and Geneve, contributed to that state of mind. Kreisky coined the term “active neutrality policy”, which was more active than neutral. This policy is inextricably intertwined with the person of Kreisky, who saw the development of Austria and Europe closely connected with the rest of the world. Therefore, he led the foreign policy of his country on a global stage. His aim was to use diplomacy as means of a small neutral country to contribute to peace and reconciliation in the world. What concerned him most was the Arab-Israel Conflict because he saw its broad implications for the international relations. This conflict affected Austria after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 indirectly by its impact on the US-Soviet relations and directly by the oil crisis. Kreisky became an internationally recognized intermediator in this conflict and stroke close contacts with Arab leaders like Yassir Arafat or Muammar al-Gaddafi. In Europe, he maintained close contacts with the socialist countries, but his political course was clearly west-oriented and he was an ardent follower of European integration. Together with like-minded statesmen he coined the free trade zone between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association in 1972. All this accounted for shaping the self-confidence and identity of a new post-war Austria, whose destiny had been long overshadowed by that of Germany. [2]

In those days Austria also gained an important role in the United Nations. Kurt Waldheim – later Austrian president – was Secretary-General from 1972-1981 and Austria for the first time a member of the Security Council in 1973/74. One important element of this foreign policy was an active participation in the United Nations, especially the contribution to peace missions, which Austria already began back in 1960. That year the “UN Operations in the Congo” was set off and – after some neutrality discussions – Austria decided to send a military hospital to Africa. The mission nearly ended in a disaster, when Austrians were captured by the Congolese and later freed by Nigerian troops. Foreign Minister Kreisky convinced the Defence Minister to keep the troops in Congo in order to prevent the loss of prestige. When the conflict in Cyprus broke out in 1964, Austria contributed again with a military hospital. The participation in the “UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus” (UNFICYP) has been Austria’s longest standing peacekeeping mission. It was extended significantly in 1972 when for the first time a contingent of Austrian infantrymen (not only medical personnel as before) was put under UN command. Since 1974 Austrian soldiers have been deployed to the Golan Heights with the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which today is Austria’s second largest mission. [3]

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE REVIVAL OF NEUTRALITY

In the beginning of the 1990s the geopolitical position of Austria changed. The Iron Curtain broke down and Austria moved from the verge of free Europe more and more to the centre. European affairs became more important than international ones. Russia tried to hinder too tight interfaces of Austria with a revamped Europe and to exert pressure by pointing to neutrality. But it had no longer the power to interfere decisively in European affairs. 1995 became a very important year for Austrian security politics. Austria joined the EU and the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Though the EU was developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in those days, Austria did not object and signified no compromise of neutrality in the Accession Treaty. It rather integrated itself during the following years in the new CFSP structures. The Neutrality Act stayed valid, but de facto Austria detached more and more from this status.

In 1997 the “Petersberg tasks” were included in the Amsterdam Treaty and in 1998 integrated in the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, Article 23 f). Those include the “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. When Yugoslavia broke up and the international community intervened, Austrian soldiers were put under NATO command in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Implementation Force, IFOR, later Stabilization Force, SFOR, since 2004 European Union Force Althea) and Kosovo (Kosovo Force, KFOR) – the latter with 698 troops Austria’s largest international mission. In this respect the participation in NATO’s PfP is of high value for Austria because it can engage in stabilizing its political environment in a very effective way. And because most European partners are NATO members, the participation of Austria in PfP also reinforces the ESDP in the same way and ensures that Austria keeps up with its partners. This makes Austria a more reliable partner. (After the countries of East-central Europe had become NATO members, this circumstance gained even more importance.)

There was a lot of discussion in the 1990s about further development of Austrian security politics. In the leading circles of the country it was clear that in a unifying Europe Austria could not abstain from common security structures, especially because the most arduous source of instability lay right in front of Austria’s borders: the Balkans. A wide range of options for the future was considered. Even NATO membership and the abolition of neutrality were up for discussion, but both not realized. In 2001 the Austrian Parliament passed a new Security and Defence Doctrine with the votes of the representatives of the governing parties (Austrian People’s Party and Freedom Party), in which Austria was described as non-aligned and NATO membership was named as an option. This was a bold step forward, but the withdrawal followed.

The NATO discussion faded away completely, partly because the political climate in Austria had changed, partly because NATO had lost its interest. Social Democrats and Greens had never been real supporters of NATO, the Freedom Party changed its course from NATO friendly to critical and the People’s Party had no rationale for warming up this topic alone. [4] After 9/11 the likelihood of NATO members to be drawn into the increasing unpopular wars of an increasingly unpopular US President grew. Traditional anti-American sentiments were spured by the feeling that the USA as the world’s and NATO’s largest military power would use that power not in a benevolent way but rather like an empire, defending its interest with no respect for others.

Against this backdrop it was common sense in Austria to stay outside NATO. So the comeback of neutrality was completed. The Treaty of Lisbon meets these reservations and stipulates notwithstanding the “obligation of aid and assistance” in case of an “armed aggression”: “This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” [5] The passage relates inter alia to Austria and its neutrality. Austria’s political leaders can now claim that nobody could drag the country into a conflict. So it seems that Austria’s decisions concerning its security and defence politics are absolutely autonomous. A very popular stance in Austria! According to an opinion poll in 2007 neutrality is one of the Austrian traits that has gained most in importance with the Austrian population over the last three decades. [6] But these self-imposed restrictions do not affect the country’s readiness to take part in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to all intents and purposes. Austria is clearly committed to a common European approach in security affairs and this commitment never caused major political bickering. So Austria’s security policy is to a certain extent janus-faced because it combines abstinence via neutrality with the engagement via EU, NATO’s PfP etc.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR THE CHAD MISSION

The order of the day from October 26, 2007 (national holiday) by the Austrian Minister of Defence, Norbert Darabos (Social Democratic Party), offers a good description of the current Austrian security policy. It states that as a neutral state Austria is obliged to abstain from military alliances and troop deployments on Austrian territory – these obligations together with the non-participation in wars are often referred as “core neutrality” or “rest neutrality”. Neutrality is considered as a “key for framing an active peace policy”, which opens the chance for mediating between conflicting parties. So the peace missions of the Austrian Bundesheer (Austrian Armed Forces, AAF) are a function of neutrality policy. These missions and also the participation in European security and defence structures are expressions of a humanity and solidarity based Austrian policy. [7]

When the Main Committee of the National Council (first chamber of the Parliament) decided on November 9, 2007 to send Austrian soldiers to Chad, the main reason was the humanitarian plight of refugees and civilian persons caused by armed conflicts between various factions in the border region of Sudan (Darfur), Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR). From Sudan the conflict in Darfur had spilled over to the neighbouring country with about 240,000 refugees crossing the border. Chad is also shattered by a civil war. Rebel groups like the “Union of Forces for Democracy and Development” try to topple the regime of President Idriss Déby, resulting in 180,000 internal refugees. In South Chad there are additional 45,000 refugees from neighbouring CAR, from where people are fleeing the civil war in the north. [8]

The representatives of the governing parties – Social Democratic Party and Austrian People’s Party – voted for the deployment, the representatives of the opposition, the Green Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Alliance for the Future of Austria against it. The practical argument against the mission was that the AAF lack the appropriate equipment, the theoretical argument that such a mission violates neutrality. The latter was especially evoked by the EU-critical Freedom Party, whereas the Greens mentioned it indirectly by hinting at the role of the former colonial power France. France would be too closely connected with Chad’s government and the EU operation, so its participation could impair the whole mission. Despite their criticism the Greens declared their commitment to pro relief missions in principal. All representatives of the opposition questioned the appropriate equipment of the Austrian soldiers. Such lack would make the operation an unforeseeable risk. Minister Darabos rejected the accusations of the opposition. The Austrian contingent would be well equipped and neutrality would be no problem because of the mandates by UN and EU. He saw the operation in the context with the ESDP. If one likes to give humanitarian relief, paying lip service is not enough, the minister stated. [9]

The Austrian decision rests on a resolution of the UN Security Council and a Joint Action of the Council of the EU. In the Resolution 1778 from September 25, 2007 the UN Security Council determined that the situation in the mentioned region constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore approved the establishment of a multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic. As part of this presence it authorized the EU to deploy an operation to support the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). The goal of the operations is:

  • (i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
  • (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
  • (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel. [10]

On October 15, 2007 in accordance with this resolution the Council of the EU decided to establish a military bridging operation in Chad and the Central African Republic under the name EUFOR Chad/CAR. General Lieutenant Patrick Nash, an Irish, was appointed the operation commander. Force commander is the French Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia. The headquarters are located in Mont Valérien near Paris. The duration of the operation was limited to twelve months from the date of Initial Operation Capability. [11] The whole operation will include about 4,000 troops. Contributing countries are amongst others: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. [12] France participates with 2,100 soldiers, Ireland and Poland with 400 each and Sweden with 200. [13]

Initially it was a problem to start the operation due to logistical shortcomings. Ten desert proof helicopters and a field ambulance were lacking, so the beginning of the operation had to be postponed several times. As a consequence Minister Darabos considered to upgrade up to eight Austrian helicopters for use in desert terrain, so that AAF are prepared for future missions in such regions. Eventually, France provided nine additional helicopters and Italy the field ambulance. [14] Finally, the operation was launched on January 28, 2008. [15]

CHAD: AUSTRIAN ARMED FORCES’ LATEST ENGAGEMENT

The Austrian contingent comprises 160 troops. The deployment is limited till June 30, 2008 with an option for prolongation. [16] Two months before the deployment/redeployment additional fifty soldiers can be sent, especially engineers for construction works. Thirty soldiers are foreseen for preparation and support. Most troops are from the Special Forces (Jagdkommando), the remainder is constituted by logistics and reconnaissance elements, military surgeons and medics as well as staff officers in the headquarters in France and Chad. An important and very demanding task for the Special Forces are reconnaissance missions in order to get accurate information about the situation, especially upcoming threats, in the area of operation (AO). [17] The commander of the Austrian contingent, Colonel (General Staff) Heinz Assmann was assigned commander of the entire Special Forces in Chad from April 15 onward. [18] Austrians are responsible for food safety and hygiene of the drinking water for the whole mission. [19]

On January 30, 2008 twenty soldiers left Vienna to prepare together with their Swedish, Irish and French comrades the arrival of the main contingent. So the Austrians stood on the forefront of the mission. On February 26 further fifty soldiers were deployed to the capital N’Djamena, where the National Support Element will be stationed during the whole mission. [20] Another seventy troops arrived on March 4. [21] The AO is the region of Abéché – 800 kilometres east from the capital. In an area of 350,000 square kilometres with only 500 km paved roads logistics is the biggest challenge. A case in that point was the transport of cement from Europe to Abéché for building a tarmac. Helicopters and planes are essential for rapid deployment. Lt. Gen. Nash referred at the outset of the operation to the pressing lack of those assets.

The second challenge is a political one. The French participation is to some extent a burden, but also a necessity. France is the former colonial power (till 1960) and as a player in the interior politics of Chad has sided with the government of President Déby. Chad is of economic importance because of its oil reserves. Since 1976 France and Chad have had a defence agreement. About 1,200 French soldiers have been in the country. In 2006 Déby stayed in power thanks to the attacks on the rebels by the French air force. All this raised fears the EU operation could fail because the rebels would consider it as a pro-government force in disguise. Accusations emerged that the EUFOR Chad/CAR is merely a cover for pursuing the interests of the governments of France and Chad. Critics of the mission opine that the parallel presence of the EU force and the French force blurs the distinction between both. These allegations were backed by Chadian rebels and in doing so they evoked echoes in Europe, where the opponents of the operation used them as an argument. In spite of this criticism one has to bear in mind that the operation could hardly forgo French experience. The French soldiers have excellent knowledge of the land and the people and thus the French participation is of a crucial importance for success. At a press conference Lt. Gen. Nash said the set off of the operation would have been impossible without French logistic assistance. He also declared that the operation “will be conducted in a neutral, impartial and independent manner”, using the same wording as the EU Council, which announced that one of the cornerstones of the operation is to stay “impartial and neutral”. The European soldiers would use their weapons only if they or their wards would be attacked. [22]

One reason to hope for a positive development is a speech by President Sarkozy in South Africa in the end of February. There, he announced a revision of French relations with Africa in order to lift the reputation of France as neo-colonial power. In this context he wants to renegotiate the defence agreements with African states. This could weaken the position of President Déby if France withdraws the legal basis for the military aid of his regime and puts him under pressure to cooperate with the EU and negotiate with the rebels. “It is unthinkable that the French Army should be drawn into domestic conflicts“, Sarkozy stated. Instead, France should assist in building African security structures. [23]

A further delay for the operation was caused by a fast and sudden rebel raid on N’Djamena from East Chad in the beginning of February. This time France did not interfere so bluntly and concentrated on evacuating French citizens and other Europeans. For the operation the upheaval meant another delay. An Austrian Hercules loaded with equipment could not proceed with its flight to Chad from Tripolis, where it had stopped over for refuelling.[24] Meanwhile, the Austrian soldiers – only lightly armed with Steyr Sturmgewehr (StG) 77 AUG rifles and Glock pistols – took their position in the Kempinski Hotel, from where the situation was observed and further events were awaited. An Austrian surgeon provided first medical care for wounded members of the Saudi Arabian embassy. Later, the Austrian soldiers moved to the French Camp Cossei. [25] In the end, the rebels failed due to controversies between various rebel factions. There were also reports of logistic help for the government by the French. [26]

Lurid reports by Austrian tabloids presented a negative picture of the operation’s conduct. The daily “Österreich” spoke of soldiers scared stiff, who had “fled” to the French camp. [27] Such press coverage provoked fierce criticism by the military: instead of backing the troops in a difficult mission some journalists would raise uncertainty, especially with the relatives at home. Rumours of Sudanese troops having crossed the borders and supporting the rebels aroused fears of a war between Sudan and Chad that could threaten the whole operation. These developments lead to new attacks from the opposition. Freedom Party leader Heinz Christian Strache demanded a “retreat from the cauldron” and the resignation of Defence Minister Darabos and Foreign Minister (“war ministers”) Ursula Plassnik (Austrian People’s Party). [28] Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer (Social Democratic Party) said that EUFOR Chad/CAR has to abide strictly by neutrality in case of a conflict between government and rebels. [29]

On March 10, 115 Austrians left the capital for Abéché by road and arrived there three days later without any problems. The official beginning of the twelve-month operation was on March 15, when the Initial Operation Capability was reached. According to Lt. Gen. Nash eleven of the seventeen participating states already had troops in the country. [30] Reports of rebels recovering strength showed that risks would not diminish and fulfilling the mission would be a hard task. This would be true not only from the military perspective but also from the political. Attacks of rebel forces and especially Austrian casualties would lead to increased pressure on the government to cancel the mission.

CONCLUSION

EUFOR Chad/CAR shows that Austria, in spite of its neutral status, is engaged in the CFSP in a constant manner. The Austrian position has changed insofar as Austrian soldiers are for the first time engaged in an ongoing conflict, where – contrary to other missions – no agreements between the conflicting parties exist and there are no clear lines which have to be protected. The important lessons learned for Austria will be how under these circumstances cooperation with other forces works and how Austrian soldiers cope with the challenge of operating in a remote area far away from Europe, where the cultural and geographical environment is widely unknown to Austrians.

In the past as in the present Austria’s engagement led to political arguments on the domestic stage. So the example of Austria, having always insisted on its independence in security matters, especially demonstrates that – silently and to a certain degree unnoticed – the EU is more and more willing and able to react independently from other powers. The finalization of this process will probably take a long time.

For the time being the ability is limited and the willingness is the result of a consultation process, where faltering members have to be persuaded. From this point of view the glass is half empty, but if one looks back to the outset of the CFSP in 1992 and assesses now what has been accomplished, the glass is half full: there is a legal basis for military operations, there are structures (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff) and there are soldiers operating under the EU flag. The EU still lacks one integrated force and rather has to deal with 27 individual armed forces of its member states. The forerun of the Chad mission has shown how difficult it is to form a coherent force out of multinational assets whose level of integration is inadequate. It will be essential to overcome shortcomings that are a result of this inner European military disparity. For demanding missions the EU still requires the participation of the big member states like France. The more the European forces would be integrated the easier it would be for politicians to reach decisions for deployments (from the point of technical feasibility). If the assets would match the tasks, the willingness of the member states to deploy soldiers would be higher because it would be more cost-effective (“more bang for the buck”).

The political decision to go or not to go will always be a question of measuring risks against gains. This assessment will be very important in March 2009, when the mandate of EUFOR Chad/CAR expires. The conflicts in the area will not be solved in a year and refugees will still dwell in camps. EUFOR Chad/CAR is a bridging mission and the intention is to hand over its tasks to a UN mission. If this does not occur, the EU would have to reach a decision about the future of the mission. Will the Europeans stay or leave? If they leave, the loss of credibility and trustworthiness will be enormous, if they stay, they will have to stay for a long time and tackle all the problems in this respect (overstretch of forces, costs, political pressure in Europe, etc.). So this decision could become a test for European steadfastness and readiness for engagement.

NOTES

[1] Rolf Steininger, Der Staatsvertrag. Österreich im Schatten von deutscher Frage und Kaltem Krieg 1938-1955, pp. 139-142.

[2] Homepage von Peter Jankowitsch [online].

[3] See: Erwin A. Schmidl, Im Dienste des Friedens. In the Service of Peace (bilingual).

[4] See: Gunther Hauser, Österreich – dauernd neutral?

[5] Institute of European Affairs, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon) [online], p. 28.

[6] Umfrage: Worauf Österreicher stolz sind.

[7] Nationalfeiertag 2007. Tagesbefehl des Herrn Bundesministers, p. 1.

[8] EU force on risky Africa mission, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7213551.stm

[9] Parlamentskorrespondenz/02/09.11.2007/Nr. 848 [online].

[10] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007) [online], pp. 2, 4.

[11] Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007; European Union, Council Secretariat, Background. EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic [online], p. 3.

[12] Force Strength in the field by Nations [online], p. 1.

[13] EU-Einsatz. Rettung für Tschad-Mission, p. 9. The figures vary depending on the source. These deviations might depend on the date the source was published and reflect various (planning) stages of the operation.

[14] Tschad-Einsatz des Bundesheeres dürfte bald starten, p. 8; Paris rettet EU-Mission im Tschad, p. 1.

[15] Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP of 28 January 2008.

[16] The deployment of Austrian contingent has already been prolonged until the end of the year 2008.

[17] THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm, Elite-Truppe hat einen „Fernspähauftrag“, p. 8.

[18] Österreich leitet Mission, p. 7.

[19] Wissen: Groß-Operation Tschad-Mission, Wiener Zeitung, p. 3.

[20] Irish soldiers deploying to Chad will continue our proud tradition.

[21] Österreichs Bundesheer, Tagebuch aus dem Tschad [online].

[22] MORAVEC, Michael, Noch immer zu wenig Material für Tschad-Einsatz, p. 3; BBC News, EU force on risky Africa mission [online]; ORF, Ö1 Abendjournal, Eufor - Einsatz im Tschad beginnt, 19. 03. 2008; European Union, Council Secretariat, Background. EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic [online], p. 2.

[23] BERGER, Sebastien, France renegotiate African defence agreements; France to overhaul policies toward Africa; THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm, Sarkozy “europäisiert” die Politik in Afrika, p. 6.

[24] BALMER, Rudolf, SCHNEIDER, Wieland, Bundesheer-Flieger musste umkehren, p. 9.

[25] Österreichs Bundesheer, Tagebuch aus dem Tschad [online].

[26] THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm, Rebellen vor Großangriff, p. 6.

[27] FELLNER, Wolfgang, Holt Soldaten zurück und helft direkt, p. 5.

[28] Opposition fordert vehement das Ende des Tschad-Einsatzes, p. 4.

[29] Gusenbauer mahnt Paris zur Neutralität im Tschad, p. 8.

[30] ORF, Ö1 Abendjournal, Eufor - Einsatz im Tschad beginnt, 19. 03. 2008; Österreichs Bundesheer, Tagebuch aus dem Tschad [online]; Startschuss für Mission im Osten, p. 5.

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Books

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[7] Force Strength in the field by Nations [online]. Council of the European Union –EUFOR TCHAD/RCA - Background, 2008 [cit. 2008-05-19]. 1 p. Available on WWW: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080430-EUFOR_TCHAD-RCA-Force_Strength_by_Nations.pdf.

[8] Institute of European Affairs, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon) [online]. Institute of European Affairs – Publications & Articles, 2008 [cit. 2008-03-26]. 35p. Available on WWW: http://www.iiea.com/images/managed/publications_attachments/TEU_2008.pdf.

[9] Parlamentskorrespondenz/02/09.11.2007/Nr. 848 [online]. Republik Österreich – Parlament, 2007 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/PR/JAHR_2007/PK0848/PK0848.shtml.

[10] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007) [online]. United Nations – Security Council, 2007 [cit. 2008-03-26]. 6 p. Available on WWW: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/516/15/PDF/N0751615.pdf?OpenElement.

Articles

[11] BALMER, Rudolf, SCHNEIDER, Wieland. Bundesheer-Flieger musste umkehren. Die Presse. 02. 02. 2008, p. 9.

[12] BERGER, Sebastien. France renegotiate African defence agreements. Telegraph [online]. 01. 03. 2008 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/02/29/wsarko129.xml.

[13] BBC News, EU force on risky Africa mission [online]. 2008 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7213551.stm. [14] “Endlich geht’s los!”. Wiener Zeitung. 31.1.2008, p. 7.

[15] EU-Einsatz. Rettung für Tschad-Mission. Die Presse. 12. 01. 2008, p. 9.

[16] FELLNER, Wolfgang. Holt Soldaten zurück und helft direkt. Österreich. 05. 02. 2008, p. 5. [17] France to overhaul policies toward Africa. International Herald Tribune [online]. 28. 02. 2008 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/28/africa/france.php.

[18] Gusenbauer mahnt Paris zur Neutralität im Tschad. Die Presse. 07. 02. 2008, p. 8.

[19] Irish soldiers deploying to Chad will continue our proud tradition. The Irish Times. 21. 02. 2008. Available on WWW: http://www.military.ie/overseas/ops/africa/chad/article.htm.

[20] MORAVEC, Michael, Noch immer zu wenig Material für Tschad-Einsatz. Der Standard. 30. 01. 2008, p. 3.

[21] Nationalfeiertag 2007. Tagesbefehl des Herrn Bundesministers. Der Soldat. 2007, no. 20. – 23. 10. 2007, p. 1.

[22] Opposition fordert vehement das Ende des Tschad-Einsatzes. Kurier. 05. 02. 2008, p. 4.

[23] Österreich leitet Mission. Wiener Zeitung. 10. 04. 2008, p.7.

[24] Paris rettet EU-Mission im Tschad. Der Standard. 12./13. 01. 2008, p. 1.

[25] Startschuss für Mission im Osten. Der Standard. 14. 03. 2008, p. 5.

[26] THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm. Elite-Truppe hat einen „Fernspähauftrag“. Kurier. 02. 03. 2008, p. 8.

[27] THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm. Sarkozy “europäisiert” die Politik in Afrika. Kurier. 14. 03. 2008, p. 6.

[28] THEURETSBACHER, Wilhelm. Rebellen vor Großangriff. Kurier. 14. 03. 2008, p. 6.

[29] Tschad-Einsatz des Bundesheeres dürfte bald starten. Die Presse. 10. 01. 2008, p. 8.

[30] Umfrage: Worauf Österreicher stolz sind. Die Presse [online]. 24. 04. 2007 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/299638/index.do.

[31] Wissen: Groß-Operation Tschad-Mission. Wiener Zeitung. 30. 01. 2008, p. 3.

Websites

[32] Österreichs Bundesheer, Tagebuch aus dem Tschad [online]. 2008 [cit. 2008-03-26]. Available on WWW: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/eufor_tschad/aktuell.php. [33] Peter Jankowitsch, Homepage [online]. 2008 [cit. 2008-05-16]. Available on WWW: http://www.peter-jankowitsch.net.

Transcript

[34] ORF, Ö1 Abendjournal, Eufor - Einsatz im Tschad beginnt, 19. 03. 2008.


Title in English:

Austria’s Engagement in Chad as Element of Its Neutrality Policy

Title in Czech/Slovak:

Rakouská účast v Čadu jako prvek politiky neutrality - bezpečnostní politika na pomezí zdrženlivosti

Author(s):

Gerald Brettner-Messler

Type:

Article

Language:

English

Abstract:

English / Czech

Journal:

Obrana a strategie (Defence & Strategy)

Publisher:

University of Defence

ISSN:

ISSN 1214-6463 (print) and ISSN 1802-7199 (on-line)

DOI:

10.3849/1802-7199.08.2008.01.081-091

Issue:

Volume 8, Number 1 (June 2008)

Pages:

81-91

Received: 31 March 2008

Accepted: 11 April 2008

Published online: 15 June 2008


Created 21.6.2008 8:49:56 | read 15446x | Gavendova

Discussion

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