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ALTERNATIVY BOKO HARAM K SOUČASNÉMU MODERNÍMU NIGERIJSKÉMU STÁTU

Postmoderní chalífát, nebo teroristický semistát?

ALTERNATIVES OF BOKO HARAM TO THE CONTEMPORARY MODERN NIGERIAN STATE

The Postmodern Caliphate or the Terrorist Semi-State?

Daniel Svoboda^a

Abstrakt

Tento článek zkoumá alternativy Boko Haram k současnému sekulárnímu nigerijskému státu vestfálského stylu. Článek je zaměřen na analýzu vztahu mezi Boko Haram a sekulárním státem, který odmítají. Realita toho, co se Boko Haram v Nigérii podařilo vytvořit, odpovídá spíše teroristickému semi-státu (TSS) než chalífátu. Článek proto také provádí analýzu Boko Haram z perspektivy konceptu TSS.

Abstract

This article examines Boko Haram's alternatives to the contemporary secular Nigerian state of Westphalian style. This article is focused on analysing the relationship between Boko Haram and the secular state that they reject. The reality of what Boko Haram in Nigeria has managed to create, rather than a caliphate, corresponds to a terrorist semi-state (TSS). Therefore, the article also performs an analysis of Boko Haram from the perspective of the TSS concept.

Klíčová slova

Boko Haram; chalífát; teroristický semi-stát; vestfálský stát; islámský stát; Nigérie; terorismus.

Keywords

Boko Haram; the Caliphate; the Terrorist Semi-State; the Westphalian State; the Islamic State; Nigeria; Terrorism.

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INTRODUCTION

For nearly ten years, the region of north-eastern Nigeria¹ has been terrorised by the jihadist Salafist organisation Islamic State in West Africa, formerly known as *Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah People-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād*², known to most of the world as Boko Haram. One of the declared aims of this militant terrorist organisation is to combat the Western lifestyle, teaching, education, and government. The group aims to establish Islamic Sharia law throughout Nigeria (so far, Sharia applies to the northern states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, where Muslims³ live predominantly, while southern states are mainly inhabited by Christians) and to replace the modern Nigerian state with an Islamic state - thus, the creation of the *Caliphate*.⁴ The existence of a Nigerian state, which is built on the Western Westphalian-style model and is a legacy of colonialism, is unacceptable for Boko Haram. According to Boko Haram, Muslims should not live as subordinates in a non-Islamic state. Instead, they have declared a struggle for the establishment of the Caliphate and the implementation of Sharia law across all Nigeria.⁵

The article aims to analyse the three key figures of Boko Haram and their views on how to create a Caliphate in Nigeria and examines what strategies they want to use to achieve their goals and the results they have already achieved. The reality of what Boko Haram managed to create in the northeast of Nigeria, rather than the Caliphate, corresponds to the *terrorist semi-state (TSS)*.⁶ This work is structured into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the methodology and chapters II-IV are about the theoretical framework - state concepts. The fifth chapter includes the historical context and chapters VI and VII perform analysis.

The article first acquaints the reader with the Western (Westphalian) concept of the state and the Islamic concept of the state (Caliphate). Because of the nature of Boko Haram, the concept of the so-called TSS is also introduced. The following is a brief historical excursion through Nigerian modern history - it aims to map what state concepts have existed in the territory of present-day Nigeria in the last few hundred years, i.e., what types of state systems and state forms have a tradition here. Subsequently, the text focuses directly on the visions and ideas of Boko Haram (or its leaders) and on its ideology, strategy, practices, and tools by which the group seeks to realise its visions and ideas of

¹ Note: And later also northern Cameroon, south-eastern Niger, and western Chad.

² Note: In Arabic translation, "*People dedicated to promoting the Prophet's teachings and jihad.*"

³ Note: The implementation of Islamic Sharia law, however, is not due to Boko Haram, rather, it was implemented in 12 North Nigerian states before the establishment of Boko Haram.

⁴ ANYANWU, Simon O. - NWANAJU, Isidore. *Boko Haram: Religious Conflicts and Dialogue Initiatives in Nigeria*. Owerri: Edu-Edy publications, 2010; FOREST, James J. F. *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*. Florida: The JSOU Press, 2012; AGBIBOA, Daniel E. *The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram. Conflict, Security and Development*. 2013. Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1-29.

⁵ AKINBI, Joseph O. Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Quest for a Permanent Resolution of the Crisis. *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*. 2015. Vol. 3, No. 8, pp. 32-45; COMOLLI, Virginia. *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.

⁶ HONIG, Or - YAHIEL, Ido. A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 2019. Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 1210-1228.

changing the state system. Boko Haram cannot be perceived as an ideologically consistent organisation; it has also undergone and is still undergoing some development.

I. RESEARCH DESIGN

The article aims to analyse the relationship of the Salafist Jihadist organisation Boko Haram to the modern Nigerian Western-style state. Several research questions are related. Question 1: According to Boko Haram, what should be an alternative conception of a state instead of a Western (Westphalian) type of state? Question 2: Which ways Boko Haram use to achieve its goals of eliminating the contemporary Nigerian state and forming an alternative concept? Question 3: How does reality correspond to Boko Haram's theoretical concepts?

From the theoretical point of view, the article is based on the theory of the state, so it presents various state concepts. The analytical part is divided into two chapters or phases. The first of them is based on texts mapping the views and ideas of three Islamists from Boko Haram (two leaders and one ideologue) - Mohammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau, and Ja'afar Adam⁷ - about alternatives to the contemporary Nigerian state. In the case of this literature, fewer resources exist than in the case of literature generally aimed at the Boko Haram uprising and its armed struggle.⁸ The second chapter performs an analysis of Boko Haram from the TSS perspective.

The method is a diachronic comparative analysis of the relationship between Boko Haram and the current Nigerian state, which is performed through the mapping of the ideas and visions of Boko Haram's leaders and ideologues about the ideal state system for Nigerian Muslims, and the ways they wanted and want to use in order to achieve it.

II. CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The contemporary international system is based on a system of national states that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The Westphalian concept operates with the term of a nation-state, which is based on a government in a defined territory and on the right to enforce its laws in that territory, and no one else has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other state. A modern state, according to Max Weber, can be defined as a *"permanent political organisation whose administration successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force to enforce order"*⁹ or *"the human community that occupies a certain territory - because territory belongs to its features - and (with success) claims the monopoly of legitimate physical power."*¹⁰ According to the

⁷ Yusuf was the founder and leader from the group's foundation in 2002 until his death in 2009. He was replaced by his deputy Abubakar Shekau, who pledged allegiance to ISIS and declared Boko Haram as an Islamic State's Western Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015. Due to his extremely violent nature, Shekau was withdrawn and replaced, but he still leads his faction within Boko Haram. The third key figure is Ja'afar Adam, a prominent Nigerian Salafist scholar who was Yusuf's teacher or guru and also could be said to be an ideologue.

⁸ The primary sources are mainly sermons, video recordings and statements posted by Islamists, which are often in Arabic, Hausa, or other local languages.

⁹ WEBER, Max. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 54.

¹⁰ WEBER, Max. *Metodologie, sociologie a politika*. Praha: OIKOYMENH, 1998, p. 247.

Montevideo Convention, modern nation states, which are subjects of international law, must comply four main criteria: 1) a permanent population, 2) a defined fixed territory, 3) existence of state power, i.e., government and its apparatus, and 4) they must be able to enter into relations with other states.¹¹

In his book *State and International Relations*, Georg Sørensen mentions that three types of states exist in the contemporary international system. He disagrees with theorists who, like neorealists, place too much emphasis on homogeneity and put forward arguments against.¹² All three types of states, however, are ideal Weberian states according to Sørensen.¹³ It is the *modern state*¹⁴, the *post-colonial state*,^{15,16} and the *postmodern state*.¹⁷ The post-colonial type of state could include Nigeria, as well as most African states.

Robert Cooper in his book *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, comes with a similar division of contemporary states into three types (or division into systems). Cooper saw 1989 as an important milestone when he saw the collapse of the actual system of power balance that lasted in Europe since the Westphalian Peace.¹⁸ His types of states include the *pre-modern state*,¹⁹ the *modern state*,²⁰ and the *postmodern state*.²¹

III. ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Muslims derive the concept of an Islamic state from the historically first example of such a form of state, namely the Medina Caliphate founded by the Prophet Muhammad in 622. Thus, the Caliphate is the oldest of the Islamic forms of government, and it is a state system headed by the caliph, the title whereby the successors of the Prophet Muhammad and the head of the Muslim community were designated.^{22, 23} The title of the caliph concentrated both spiritual and secular power. Originally it was a political-religious title, and the original Caliphates were theocratic units.²⁴

According to the 18th century Islamic scholar Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, the Caliphate has a divine function. The Caliphate is originally associated with the Prophet and the purpose

¹¹ Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States. Montevideo, 1936. Available from: <https://bit.ly/3nv8Vsd>, [08.07.2019].

¹² SØRENSEN, Georg. *Stát a mezinárodní vztahy*. Praha: Portál. 2005, p. 89.

¹³ Ibid. p. 90

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 99-100

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 100

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 103

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 107-108

¹⁸ COOPER, Robert. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*. Rev. ed. London: Atlantic Books. 2004, p. 3.

¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 12-18

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 22-25

²¹ Ibid. pp. 26-32

²² Note: Muslim community = *Ummah*.

²³ JOFFÉ, George. States and Caliphates. *Geopolitics*. Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 505-524, pp. 506-507.

²⁴ VESELÝ, Rudolf. Politické myšlení v muslimských zemích. HEROLD, Vilém - MÜLLER, Ivan - HAVLÍČEK, Aleš. *Politické myšlení raného křesťanství a středověku*. Praha: OIKOYMENH, 2011. pp. 225-273 (specifically p. 225-235).

of the caliphs is to follow the Prophet Muhammad and his teaching. For its existence, the Caliphate needs two basic components: 1) the caliph as an authority and 2) his absolute control of the (Muslim) community and its unanimity in recognition of his government.²⁵ Unlike in the secular Western state, the authority of the caliphs is legitimised by divine guidance.²⁶

The purpose of the Caliphate is to control secular power among Muslims and to uphold the principles of Islamic faith, especially Islamic Sharia law. The main feature of the Caliphate is the role of power and its orientation towards solving various tasks of religious and political nature, but the form and structure of the state are not strictly defined.²⁷ Another purpose of the Caliphate is to avoid chaos and anarchy in state and public affairs.²⁸ The caliphs also had to protect the *ummah* from external threat and moral degradation.²⁹

As George Joffé notes, in terms of political organisation, however, one important difference emerged between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, namely, the concept of the nation-state, which reached its apogee in Europe during the nineteenth century. The concept of nationalism is something strange for Muslim societies, because religious belief alone provides political legitimacy.³⁰

Originally, the caliphates had a multi-ethnic and transnational character,³¹ but over the centuries, also several local Muslim state formations were formed in various parts of the world (mostly hereditary monarchies), which also declared themselves as caliphates.³²

Today's Islamists refer to the Caliphate as an alternative to secular nationalist post-colonial states that have formed across the Muslim world, including Africa. For them, the Caliphate is an ideal form of state governance to succeed.³³ The crucial for these states is the existence of Sharia law as the sole source of law.³⁴ Not necessarily every Islamic state must be a Caliphate. Nowadays, several states in the world are officially Islamic states according to their constitution and have partially implemented Islamic law in their legal system, but Islamic law is not the only source of law.³⁵

²⁵ AHMAD, Aziz. An Eighteenth-Century Theory of the Caliphate. *Studia Islamica*. 1968, No. 28, pp. 135-144.

²⁶ JOFFÉ, ref. 23, p. 507

²⁷ SYKIAINEN, Leonid. The Islamic Concept of Caliphate: Basic Principles and a Contemporary Interpretation. *Higher School of Economics Research Paper*. 2017. 72, pp. 1-13 (specifically p. 3).

²⁸ AL-MAWARDI, Ali. *Norms of Power and Religious Authorities*. Beirut: Dar al Kutub al 'ilmiyyah Publishing House. 1973 (specifically p. 5).

²⁹ JOFFÉ, ref. 23, p. 508

³⁰ Ibid. p. 509

³¹ AL-RASHEED, Madawi - KERSTEN, Carol - SHTERIN, Marat. *Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012 (p. 1).

³² KADI, Wadad - SHAHIN, Aram A. Caliph, Caliphate. BÖWERING, Gerhard et al. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2013, pp. 81-86.

³³ JOFFÉ, ref. 23, p. 508.

³⁴ AL-RASHEED - KERSTEN - SHTERIN, ref. 31, p. 3

³⁵ Note: Such states include Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

IV. THE CONCEPT OF TERRORIST SEMI-STATES

To understand the concept of terrorist semi-states (TSS), we need to approach some basic divisions of terrorism. David Rapoport outlined four waves of terrorism - 1) anarchist, 2) colonial, 3) left-wing revolutionary, and 4) Islamist.³⁶ Although Jeffrey Kaplan admires Rapoport's work, he criticises it for being static towards the groups that have separated from these waves and, therefore, he comes up with the so-called *fifth wave of terrorism*, which is a redefinition of Rapoport's four waves.³⁷

As an example of such a group that separated from one of Rapoport's original four waves, Kaplan mentions the Khmer Rouge, who, according to him, separated from leftist revolutionary terrorist groups.³⁸ Kaplan sees the difference especially in their millenarianist desire for a new world. Their brutal ways of waging war were mainly aimed at destroying the old order and creating a radical new society.³⁹

Based on the study of the Khmer Rouge and the Ugandan Christian millenarianist LRA,⁴⁰ Kaplan presented some basic features for his fifth wave of terrorism, many of which are related to the conception of a state based on new tribalism and the utopian vision of a "perfect" society".⁴¹ Although Kaplan sees some connections between jihadist groups and some of the groups of the fifth wave of terrorism, because of their often international character he does not include them and claims that they have not separated from the Islamist (fourth) wave of terrorism. On the other hand, groups of the fifth wave of terrorism have autarkic tendencies. The fifth wave of terrorism was further developed by Anthony Celso, who included ISIS and Boko Haram here, arguing both groups differ from the fourth wave of terrorism by their relationship to those fellow believers who disagree with their particular visions. Both groups call them renegades from the faith and murder them.⁴² Celso classifies Boko Haram and ISIS as the fifth wave of terrorism based on ten attributes.⁴³

A new approach to the fifth wave of terrorism is the TSS concept.⁴⁴ Or Honig and Ido Yahel defined the TSS as a rebel group that *a) control portions of a weak state's territory, maintaining governance there, b) but still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states (TPVS)*. Boko Haram is one of those rebel groups that constituted semi-states.⁴⁵ Definition of TSS means two important differences from previous terrorist groups

³⁶ RAPOPORT, David. The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. CRONIN, Audrey - LUDS, James. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 2004 (pp. 46-73).

³⁷ KAPLAN, Jeffrey. Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2008. Vol. 2, No 2, pp 12-24; CELSO, Anthony N. The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups. *Orbis*. 2015. Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 249-268.

³⁸ KAPLAN, ref. 37

³⁹ Ibid.; CELSO, ref. 37, p. 252

⁴⁰ Note: Lord's Resistance Army.

⁴¹ KAPLAN, Jeffrey. *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave*. London: Routledge. 2010, p. 12.

⁴² Note: Muslims or Muslim organisations that accuse other Muslims of apostasy from the „true“ faith are called *takfiri*; CELSO, ref. 37, p. 256, 258

⁴³ Ibid. p. 265.

⁴⁴ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 1211

- TSSs exhibit state-like behavior with respect to all manner of domestic affairs. This includes establishing institutions of law and order, such as police forces, but also schools, healthcare infrastructure, and social organisations, etc. Second, *they engage in terrorism towards other states which are unrelated to the weak state, instead of focusing all their fire on the struggle against the remnants of the weak state.*⁴⁶

Further, referring to Honig and Yahel, full-fledged TSS must fulfill three conditions:

*“1) It must possess relatively exclusive military control over a continuous block of territory. Hence, just controlling enclaves within the weak state or having to share effective control with other significant forces (regardless if they are the weak state’s forces, an invading force, or even a force of a competing large terror group) would mean the entity is not yet a TSS (though complete Weberian monopoly of arms is not needed as some rogue groups or symbolic contingents of the weak state may be present in the territory). 2) The TSS must lack international legitimacy (which often happens due to its terrorist behavior and its establishment in the weak state’s sovereign territory) since otherwise, we are speaking about a normal state (which admittedly engages in terror). 3) The group must hold a revisionist and not just secessionist ideology in the sense of aiming to eradicate not just the weak state but the TPVS as well.”*⁴⁷

Finally, Honig and Yahel have outlined nine different dimensions of difference between the TSS and the regular Islamic groups belonging to the fourth wave.

*I) A religious self-identity or merely the attempt to exploit symbols for mobilization. II) The extent of the group members’ religiosity and the consequent strategic flexibility/pragmatism. III) The geographical spread of the TSS phenomenon. IV) Tactics. V) The devoted defense of and attachment to a certain territory (A “Homeland”). VI) The extent of self-funding and independence from sponsoring states. VII) The size of the group’s fighting force and its implication for its foreign/military policy. VIII) The identity of targets and what it means about the nature of the TSS’s motivation. IX) The importance of physical and visible assets for the TSS’s survival and their greater caution.*⁴⁸

A brief analysis of Boko Haram from the perspective of the TSS concept is provided in a later chapter.

Some experts say that various, mostly monotheistic religions, legitimise violence.⁴⁹ The issue of the legitimacy of violence, the justification of violence, and just war is a major issue for many political thinkers and policy makers. Religiously motivated violence, and violent jihad, in particular, have a long tradition in Nigeria and all over western Africa. Contemporary Boko Haram follows the historical legacy of the Sultan of Sokoto, Usman dan Fodio, in combination with contemporary radical Muslim visions,

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 1213

⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 1213-1214

⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 1219-1224

⁴⁹ STARK, Rodney. *One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001.

most often Salafist.⁵⁰ It opposes secularism by a militant, ideological and political religion, not by a traditionalist and conservative one. Paradoxically, the group is so modern, although they are outdated and anti-modern.⁵¹ It opposes Western civilisation and wants to purify Islam, even in those Nigerian states where Islamic Sharia law has been implemented, but not entirely according to the ideas of Boko Haram.⁵² Western societies, according to Boko Haram, are sinful and their forms of governance corrupt, and their secular style of government destroy Islamic values.⁵³

V. MODERN STATE UNITS IN THE TERRITORY OF PRESENT-DAY NIGERIA

Since colonial times, Nigeria has been divided by many conflict lines (ethnic, religious, linguistic, social), while borders have almost always reflected the division of the country to north and south. Africa's most populous state is also struggling with an unequal distribution of natural resources. For the time being, oil production takes place almost exclusively in the coastal areas of several southern states in the Niger Delta, which also affects socio-economic inequality between the northern and southern regions.⁵⁴ The religious division also corresponds to the north-south line. While in the south, there was direct colonial administration and Christian missions were introducing Western education, in the north, the British ruled indirectly through local Emirs and Western education had long been absent.⁵⁵

What state units existed in the territory of present-day north-eastern Nigeria in the last two hundred years, i.e., what types of states the Nigerians have a close historical experience with? Since the early Middle Ages, the area has been a place where Muslim states were formed. From the Middle Ages to the colonial period, there was the Kanem-Bornu Empire, whose monarchs, since the end of the 15th century onwards were titled as caliphs, beginning with Ali Gazi.⁵⁶ This area, from the Middle Ages to modern times, was also home of several Hausa sultanates, which, like the declining Kanem-Bornu Empire,

⁵⁰ THURSTON, Alex. Nigeria's Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State. *Islamic Africa*. 2015. Vol. 6., No. 1, pp. 109-134.

⁵¹ WALZER, Michael. *The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2015 (p. 28).

⁵² ABIMBOLA, John O. - ADESOTE, Samson A. Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency, Issues and Trends: A Historical Discourse. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*. 2012. Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 11-29.

⁵³ EVESLAGE, Benjamin S. Clarifying Boko Haram's Transnational Intentions, Using Content Analysis of Public Statement. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2012. Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 41-76; CELSO, ref. 37, p. 259.

⁵⁴ Note: Although the southern part is not plagued by the Boko Haram raids, it has problems with various militant groups from the Delta of Niger, which are opposed primarily to oil extraction and the ecologic and environmental devastation of the area, and to the exploitation of local people (AGHEDO, Iro - OSUMAH, Oarhe. Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprisings. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. 2014. Vol 50, No. 2, pp. 208-222 (specifically pp. 212-2019).

⁵⁵ Ibid. pp. 209-210

⁵⁶ LEVTZION, Nehemia - POWWELS, Randall. *The History of Islam in Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 2000 (p. 81).

were incorporated into the powerful Sokoto Caliphate, founded in 1804 by Fulani jihadists under the leadership of Usman dan Fodio.⁵⁷

The remnants of the Bornu Empire persisted until the end of the 19th century, and the Fulani Caliphate officially survived until 1903, when its resistance was finally broken by the British, who in 1900 declared two protectorates on its territory - Southern and Northern Nigeria (which incorporated both the Sokoto Caliphate and certain remains of the Bornu Empire and smaller local emirates and sultanates).⁵⁸

However, even under the British rule, the high autonomy of Islamic schools and traditions following the Sokoto Caliphate was preserved. It was the implementation of Western elements into the lives of Muslims in northern Nigeria that caused several conflicts that have had consequences until today. This is mainly related to the Western way of education and public administration, which is unacceptable for Boko Haram today, but also the replacement of the traditional Hausa by English.⁵⁹

VI. BOKO HARAM'S KEY FIGURES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES AND STRATEGIES

The group is commonly known as Boko Haram, although members prefer not to use the name. The name is composed of the Hausa word "*boko*" and the Arabic word "*haram*" and means "*Western education (or whole civilisation) is forbidden*". As Voll states, Mallam Sanni Umaru, the interim leader of Boko Haram in 2009 explained, "Boko Haram" is a description of its position, rather than the formal name of the group.⁶⁰ The organisation follows many of the reformist preachers and groups that have been operating in northern Nigeria since the 1990s. As one of these groups, Boko Haram was founded by student leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2002.⁶¹

Boko Haram arose at a time when the process of Islamisation of northern states culminated in Nigeria. This process meant primarily the implementation of Sharia law. The year 1999 marks the end of a series of military coups and junta governments, which were in power since 1970. During the reign of the first junta, there were conflicts between the Muslim North and the Christian South and the persecution of the majority Christian Igbos took place. Conflicts led to the secessionist movement in the southern region of Biafra, which declared independence in 1967, leading to a three-year civil war.⁶² In 1999, democratic elections were held in Nigeria, in which, paradoxically, the former army

⁵⁷ HIRIBARREN, Vincent. *A History of Borno: Trans-Saharan African Empire to Failing Nigerian State*. London: Hurst & Company. 2017, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁸ LOIMEIER, Roman. *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2013; ROBINSON, David. *Muslim Societies in African History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004.

⁵⁹ ABDURRAHMAN, Umar. Religion and Language in the Transformation of Education in Northern Nigeria During British Colonial Rule, 1900-1960. *Intellectual Discourse*. 2012. Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 165-188.

⁶⁰ VOLL, John O. Boko Haram: Religion and Violence in the 21st Century. *Religions*. 2015. Vol 6, No. 4, pp. 1182-1202 (specifically p. 1183).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² KALEJAIYE, Peter O. - ALLIYU, Nurudeen. Ethnic Politics and Social Conflicts: Factors in Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *The Journal of International Social Research*. 2013. Vol. 6, No. 27, 251-262 (specifically p. 255-258).

general and one of the leaders during the junta governments Olusegun Obasanjo won. Between 1999 and 2003, implementation of Sharia law occurred in 12 north Nigerian states⁶³ at various stages. According to some people, this was primarily a response to a return to civilian government, with concerns over the weakness of the central government in the north rather than an escalation of the demands of radical Islamists.⁶⁴ The primary goals of Boko Haram were non-violent, the organisation aimed to purify Islam and create a pure Muslim society in the northern Nigerian states, whose population is predominantly Muslim.⁶⁵

Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was connected to several important local Islamic scholars during his studies, but was later rejected by most of them for his radical Salafist vision of Islam. Thus, he founded a new mosque, which soon became a haven for other Salafist radicals. Yusuf himself preached literal adherence to the Qur'an, wanted to purify the state and society in its name and was inspired by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, on whose teachings the Saudi version of Salafism is based - *Wahhabism*.⁶⁶ The changes that Yusuf wanted to achieve were not only religious, but also political. He created a religious ideology that defined itself against all Western, non-Islamic, and modern. Moreover, the actions of his supporters became violent and he often came into conflict with police forces.⁶⁷

The ideology created by Yusuf was also very radical for many other Nigerian Salafists, but it managed to gain other followers. Some of his ideas about the organisation of the state and society led to a split with another of his former teachers and eminent Islamic scholars, Ja'afar Adam, a member of the Izala Society.⁶⁸ Yusuf highlighted two essential points that should be forbidden to all Muslims and which distinguished them from other Salafists, namely 1) modern Western (and thus secular) education and teaching, and 2) working for the secular Nigerian government.⁶⁹

Yusuf's views were based on strict observance of the *Sunnah* and *Hadith*.⁷⁰ He considered Western education to be an import of the British colonial administration, something which

⁶³ Note: Zamfara, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Gombe, Sokoto, Jigawa, Yobe, and Kebbi.

⁶⁴ MANDAVILLE, Peter. *Islam and Politics*. London: Routledge. 2014 (p. 272).

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 317.

⁶⁶ Note: Wahhabism was first brought to Nigeria by an Islamic scholar and preacher Abubakar Gumi, one of Yusuf's teachers who studied Islam in Saudi Arabia (WOODWARD, Mark, et al. *Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom. Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2013. Vol. 7, No. 6, pp. 58-78 (specifically p. 67-68); JANGEBE, Huzaifa. *Islamic Reform in Nigeria: The Contribution of Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 2015. Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 176-181 (specifically p. 181); VOLL, ref. 60, p. 1189

⁶⁷ VOLL, ref. 60, p. 1189

⁶⁸ Note: Izala Society or Jama'at Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna (JIBWIS) is a Salafi movement originated in Northern Nigeria, established to fight against practices of Sufi brotherhoods; MATFESS, Hilary. *Boko Haram: History and Context*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History. 2017.

⁶⁹ ANON. The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram. *Journal of Religion in Africa*. 2012. Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 118-144 (specifically p. 122); APARD, Élodie. The Words of Boko Haram: Understanding Speeches by Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau. *Afrique contemporaine*. 2015. Vol. 255, No. 3. pp 41-69.

⁷⁰ Note: The Sunnah is a set of statements and acts of Prophet Muhammad that constitute one of the sources of Islamic law, the Hadiths forming part of the Sunnah.

is in contradiction with the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and as such must be rejected. Acceptable knowledge according to Yusuf, comes only from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Subjects⁷¹ taught following the standard of the British colonial administration (i.e., *boko*) were to be forbidden (i.e., *haram*).⁷²

Neither did Yusuf accept any form of state that does not follow Islam. According to some Muslim scholars, the difference is to work for a secular government in areas such as the social services, which they consider acceptable, and in areas such as legislative and law enforcement, which are areas that are incompatible with Islamic law. Yusuf, however, went much further, as he said that *any* work for the secular government was *haram*.⁷³

It was also because of his extreme opinions why he did not even accept the current Sultan of Sokoto, who is widely regarded as the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims and the heir to the historical Sokoto Caliphate. According to Yusuf, the current Sultan of Sokoto did not follow the Islamic style of governance. Yusuf had an even greater problem with the federal Nigerian government - following the Qur'anic verse that Muslims were obliged not to surrender to the "godless" monarchs,⁷⁴ and to vigorously remove them and replace them with the Islamic form of government.⁷⁵

The views and ideas of Yusuf's teacher Ja'afar Adam on the relation of Muslims to Western education and the contemporary secular Nigerian state were quite different. The latter considered rejecting and proclaiming both to be forbidden and illegal as pure ignorance, which in his view had no support and origin in the Qur'an or hadiths. Although some particular things may be wrong, knowledge of these things is not harmful according to him and may be useful to Muslims as a result.⁷⁶

Adam formulated his thoughts into two main counterarguments - intellectual and moral. He already built on the fact that Yusuf, who had never studied even an elementary school, lacked sufficient knowledge of Islam, and was not respected by Islamic authorities, had no legitimacy. Adam emphasised the necessity for young Muslims to learn modern secular things, such as medicine, engineering, or economics, face to face new challenges. As examples and inspiration, Adam cited Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, none of whom had an Islamic religious education but all three had modern secular education, thanks to which they could better wage their struggle to defend Islam and Muslims against the Western aggressors led by the United States. According to Adam, they all have taken advantage of the Western aggressors by learning modern secular knowledge and not only using it but also adapting it to their environment, which Americans often paid for during their engagement in the Middle East.⁷⁷

On the issue of the Nigerian state, Adam's views were largely identical to Yusuf's - according to Adam, both the military and democratic regimes that had ruled Nigeria before were something unknown to Islam. Adam adhered to the Islamic style of government, i.e., the Caliphate founded by the Prophet Muhammad. But it is necessary

⁷¹ Note: Yusuf considered such subjects as agriculture, biology, chemistry, engineering, geography, medicine, physics, sociology, or the English language.

⁷² ANON., ref. 69, p. 124; APARD, ref. 69

⁷³ ANON., ref. 69, p. 126; APARD, ref. 69

⁷⁴ Note: Arabic term *ṭāghūt*.

⁷⁵ ANON., ref. 69, p. 127; APARD, ref. 69; MATFESS, ref. 68

⁷⁶ ANON., ref. 69, pp. 131-132; MATFESS, ref. 68

⁷⁷ ANON., ref. 69, pp. 132-133

to obtain modern education, and subsequently, work for the government and change it from the inside. Regardless of a purely pragmatic reason, if Muslims work for a non-Muslim government, they will both avoid anger towards themselves and, by participating in power, they may prevent total control of the state by non-Muslims.⁷⁸

Adam's goals for establishing an Islamic government were not so different from those of Yusuf, but they differed significantly in the methods used to achieve it. Adam preferred gradual steps to assume political power and change the style of government, rather than dying as a martyr in violent clashes with repressive forces. He sought inspiration from the Prophet Muhammad, who also for years consistently and patiently "worshiped" the pagan gods in Kaba to conquer Mecca and eventually achieve his goal.

These were two fundamental visions of transforming the contemporary secular Nigerian state, which came from the heads of prominent Nigerian Islamists related to Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf was killed in 2009 in a clash with the Nigerian repressive forces. Ja'afar Adam was shot in his mosque two years earlier.⁷⁹ After Yusuf's death, his deputy Abubakar Shekau became the new leader of Boko Haram. With Shekau in lead, the violent practices of Boko Haram have increased significantly, which some experts have referred to as religious violence.⁸⁰

Boko Haram chose violence and terror as a tool to achieve its goal of overthrowing a secular Nigerian state and replacing it with the Caliphate. The chosen tactics also resulted in cooperation with several other jihadists and Salafists connected to terrorist organisations. At first, Boko Haram cooperated extensively with the West African branch of Al Qaeda called AQIM,⁸¹ and since 2015 Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to ISIS,⁸² whose goal is to establish a global caliphate.⁸³

In August 2016, ISIS announced the change in the group's leadership and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the eldest surviving son of Mohammed Yusuf, was appointed as a new leader. The main reason for this change was that Shekau was considered too radical for ISIS, which, for example, rejects Shekau's tactics of attacking fellow Muslim civilians (although this may seem paradoxical because ISIS does the same). This change was not accepted by Shekau, which led to a split within the Boko Haram into two factions, resulting in armed clashes between them (although both remained loyal to ISIS).

⁷⁸ Ibid. pp. 133-134.

⁷⁹ Note: There are three possible suspects of Adam's assassination - Sufis, Kano politicians, and Boko Haram (and maybe former members of the Nigerian Taliban) (ZENN, Jacob. Case Not Quite Closed on the Assassination of Nigerian Salafi Scholar Shaikh Jaafar Adam. 2020. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available from: <https://shorturl.at/atGX1>

⁸⁰ VOLL, ref. 60.

⁸¹ Note: Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb; ZENN, Jacob. A Primer on Boko Haram Sources and Three Heuristics on al-Qaeda and Boko Haram in Response to Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, and Alex Thurston. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vol. 12, No 2. pp. 74-91.

⁸² Note: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

⁸³ BBC. Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State. BBC News. [on-line]. 2015. [cit. 2020-02-24]. Available from: <https://bbc.in/3pYtlpq>; ZENN, Jacob. The Islamic State's Provinces on the Peripheries Juxtaposing the Pledges from Boko Haram in Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group in the Philippines. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2019. Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 87-104 (specifically p. 91).

In the same year, Nigerian armed forces announced that Shekau was killed in action, but this later proved to be wrong. Since 2015, the tactics of child suicide bombers have increased, although suicide bombing has never been one of the main tactics of Boko Haram. Although Boko Haram continues with raping, kidnapping and massacres of civilians, clashes with the army and attacks on military targets have increased in recent years, due to the group's significant losses as a result of the military offensive. Since 2019, to extensive losses, the speculations about replacing al-Barnawi as the head of its faction within Boko Haram is emerging.

Both Yusuf's and Adam's attitudes towards a secular Nigerian state were negative and they did not recognise it as an authority and appropriate state for Muslims. In this respect, they were not particularly different from other Nigerian Salafists. However, the strategies for achieving these goals were different. While the uneducated Yusuf refused anything Western, secular, and modern as something non-Islamic, impure, and demonic, Adam wanted to take advantage of this knowledge. Yusuf demanded the prohibition of everything that has no support in the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Hadith.⁸⁴

Contrary, the more tactical and pragmatic-minded Adam understood the necessity for modern secular knowledge for a more efficient and effective struggle with the abandoned West, referring, among others, to the most wanted terrorists associated with the September 11 attacks. Similarly, Yusuf disagreed with Adam about the possibility of involving Muslims in the work for the Nigerian government. For Yusuf, any form of work for a non-Islamic government should have been forbidden to Muslims. Vice versa, Adam hoped for a gradual infiltration of the non-Islamic government by Muslims and its subsequent transformation into an Islamic state. He also saw other, purely pragmatic benefits - better involvement of Muslims in the majority society (in terms of avoiding hostility to Muslims, if they shun others) and preventing total control of all posts in the country by Christians.

Both died before the outbreak of the biggest wave of violence of the insurgency.⁸⁵ The subsequent development shows which path Boko Haram is taking. The group's current leader, Abubakar Shekau, chose the path of extreme violence and terror, kidnapping of women and children, their enslavement, raping, torturing, and murdering. Terror is not limited just to Christians; it has also turned against Muslims who disagree with Boko Haram. Moreover, the alliance with ISIS has only confirmed the group's inclination to the phenomenon known as the fifth wave of terrorism. Despite significant losses in recent years, Boko Haram has been able to create something that Honig and Yahel call the terrorist semi-state (TSS).

⁸⁴ Note: Perhaps, paradoxically, although he forbade it himself, Yusuf, for example, liked watching sports and movies, which he considered *haram*. His hypocrisy and profligate lifestyle were further reasons for Adam's criticism.

⁸⁵ Note: It broke out just after Yusuf's death.

Table 1: Comparison of three key figures of Boko Haram

	Ja'afar Adam	Mohammed Yusuf	Abubakar Shekau
Islamic scholar	Yes	No	No
Rejection of Western-style state	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ideal form of state	Caliphate	Caliphate	Caliphate/TSS
Use of Western education	Yes	No	No
Work for secular government	Yes	No	No
Violence	Non-Violent	Violent	Extremely violent
Attacks on Muslims	No	Partially	Yes
Allies	Izala Society	AQIM; other local Islamist groups	ISIS

Source: Author, based on cited literature.

VII. ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM FROM THE TSS PERSPECTIVE⁸⁶

Boko Haram fulfils two main principles of the TSS definition. The group has established a state-like entity on the occupied territory of the Nigerian Borno state, which is the group's home state, and since 2013-2014, it has gained control over portions of its territory. According to Zenn, Boko Haram rule and govern there in a Taliban-like style.⁸⁷ On the subjugated territory, the group maintains governance, including practicing Sharia law and

⁸⁶ Parts of this chapter were used in a conference paper at the Security Forum 2020, the 13th Annual International Scientific Conference in Banská Bystrica, and in conference proceedings.

⁸⁷ ZENN, Jacob. Demystifying al-Qaeda in Nigeria: Cases from Boko Haram's Founding, Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2017. Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 173-189 (specifically p. 181).

strict Salafi doctrine.⁸⁸ According to estimates, in 2015, Boko Haram controlled around 50,000 square kilometres, which is approximately comparable to the area of Slovakia. At the same time, in recent years Boko Haram has lost much of its controlled territory. This trend began in 2015 with the loss of its capital Maiduguri as a result of the offensive of the Nigerian Armed Forces.⁸⁹

The second point of the TSS definition is also present. Although Boko Haram has controlled a non-negligible part of the Nigerian territory, the group continued to launch terrorist attacks against TPVS - neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, which are, alongside Benin and Nigeria, members of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), a regional multinational military coalition targeted on counter-terrorism operations and supported also by some leading Western states. Providing governance and public services distinguish the TSSs from the traditional Islamic terror groups (e.g., from the fourth terrorist wave) as the TSSs can claim to uphold Sharia and thus seem even more Islamic than their predecessors.⁹⁰

Further, Honig and Yahel presented three conditions for TSSs. The first condition is quite similar to the first point of definition and is fulfilled. The second condition is the TSS's lack of international legitimacy. Because Boko Haram is designated as a terrorist organisation by many states and also by the United Nations, it lacks international recognition, like other TSSs, incl. ISIS. Boko Haram also fulfils the third condition, having not just secessionist, but also a revisionist ideology, which is based on Salafi Jihadism. Its main goal is to purify Islam from modern and Western elements and practice Islam based on the Qur'an and the life of Prophet Muhammad. Boko Haram also tends to destroy the secular Nigerian state of a Westphalian type, as a relic of Western imperialism and colonialism, and replace it with an Islamic state - the Caliphate.

Finally, Honig and Yahel introduced the nine dimensions by which TSSs differ from Islamic groups belonging to the fourth wave.

I) Boko Haram's behaviour, practices, and attacks are often in direct conflict with Islamic teaching. They use religion as a tool to gain power, dominate others, and spread fear and terror against all who are labelled as faithless or apostates.⁹¹ Boko Haram lacks the religious authority of many Nigerian Muslims, both Islamic scholars and ordinary Muslims, and even many Nigerian Salafists.^{92, 93, 94} The deeds of Boko Haram are condemned by various Islamic scholars. Saudi Arabia's grand mufti, Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, declared Boko Haram was "set up to smear the image of Islam", while Shamsi Ali, an American Imam, called Boko Haram leaders "blasphemous". It supports Honig's and Yahel's argument that the real question about the TSSs is to what extent the religious doctrine

⁸⁸ Ibid.; ZENN, Jacob. Boko Haram's Conquest for the Caliphate: How Al Qaeda Helped Islamic State Acquire Territory. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 2020. Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 89-122.

⁸⁹ ADELAJA, Adesoji O. - LABO, Abdullahi - PENAR, Eva. Public Opinion on the Root Causes of Terrorism and Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study. 2018. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vol. 12, No. 3., pp. 35-49.

⁹⁰ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6, p. 1213

⁹¹ Note: *takfirism*.

⁹² ANON, ref. 69, pp. 118-144

⁹³ CELSO, ref. 37, p. 256-258

⁹⁴ VOLL, ref. 60, p. 1189

actually dictates the group's behaviour (or whether religious symbols are cynically used to mobilise and get more resources).⁹⁵

II) The second dimension is quite similar to the first one. Boko Haram members are mostly recruited from among frustrated, poor young Nigerians, rather than deeply believing Muslims. This phenomenon also corresponds to the well-known theory of greed and grievance.⁹⁶ The reasons and motivations of recruits are socioeconomic rather than ideological (religious). The group's members are less religiously devout than the devout members of the groups of the fourth wave. Both Yusuf and Shekau are not clerics, and, as well as regular group members, they tend to abuse religion to justify their controversial acts.

III) Although Honig and Yahel argue that this condition is the weakest point of their concept, it seems to be the weakest only in the perspective of distinction from the fourth wave terrorist groups. TSSs occur de facto exclusively in Muslim areas, most often in the MENA area. This form of governance is less attractive for non-Muslim terror groups, because of the efforts of Muslim terror groups to succeed Prophet Muhammad by establishing Caliphate.⁹⁷ However, the geographical spread of TSSs is real, as evidenced by examples from sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Boko Haram or Al Shabaab) or Southeast Asia (e.g., Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group). Thanks to the alliance with ISIS, many regional terrorist groups have gained new opportunities to spread terror. This makes the TSS phenomenon global. In addition to predominantly Muslim areas, it also occurs in non-Muslim countries with a significant Muslim minority (e.g., the Philippines).

IV) Tactics of sub-Saharan African TSSs are quite different from the tactics of other TSSs. Although ISIS uses predominantly suicide attacks (same as the fourth wave terror groups), the sub-Saharan TSSs (e.g., Boko Haram and Al Shabaab) focus much more on armed attacks. Their tactics include mixed conventional and guerrilla fighting, shooting raids, kidnappings, raping, and massacres of civilians.⁹⁸ According to the Global Terrorism Database, Boko Haram's suicide attacks constituted only 25% of the group's attacks, compared to 46% of armed assaults.⁹⁹

V) This dimension is quite similar to the first point of the TSS definition and the first condition. Like other TSSs, Boko Haram has its homeland, located in the north-eastern Nigerian state of Borno and situated mainly around the city of Maiduguri, which the group considers being its capital. According to Honig and Yahel, a question arises whether the TSS's forces become more similar to patriotic armies of a state defending their homeland (which would mean another feature and attribute of a state-like behaviour).¹⁰⁰

VI) Because the majority of natural resources, especially oil, are situated around the Delta Niger, located in the coastal zone in the Christian south of Nigeria, Boko Haram's income comes mainly from taxes. Thanks to the profits from their territories, TSSs have far greater self-funding capacities than fourth wave terror groups, and taxes represent their main source of income, along with looting. After possessing new territory, almost all TSSs

⁹⁵ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6, p. 1219

⁹⁶ COLLIER, Paul - HOEFFLER, Anke. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. 2004. *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 563-595.

⁹⁷ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6, p. 1220

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 1211, p. 1220

⁹⁹ Global Terrorism Database, available from: <https://shorturl.at/gqzC2>.

¹⁰⁰ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6, p. 1221

started to collect taxes and even imposed new taxes, such as Boko Haram and its „Islamist tax“, a fee pushed on non-Muslims because considering them to be second-class citizens.¹⁰¹

VII) Another significant difference between the fourth wave terror groups and the TSSs lies in the size of the group's fighting forces. According to Rapoport's estimates, the largest of the fourth wave terror groups, Al Qaeda, had around 5,000 fighters.¹⁰² According to estimates, TSS's armies are much bigger. At the time of its greater expansion, ISIS had almost 32,000 fighters, based on the CIA estimates. The strength of Boko Haram is estimated between 9,000 (by CIA) and 15,000 (by Amnesty International) fighters in its peak in 2015.¹⁰³ Despite the split in 2016 into Shekau's and Barnawi's factions, Boko Haram still has a total strength of several thousands of active fighters.

VIII) While the fourth wave terror groups' attacks have aimed at almost exclusively on Western targets and against Christians and Jews, TSSs commonly and often attack also fellow Muslims. In the case of Boko Haram, this is a very common phenomenon. The group commonly attacks Muslims who refuse to submit to a strict interpretation of Sharia law or refuse to attack Christians or even protect them. In other cases, the group attacks anyone who rejects the domination of Islamists or does not want to pay their taxes, which seems more like a protection racket.

IX) According to Honig and Yahel, *“the TSSs are far more vulnerable to a sweeping military operation than are the fourth wave terror groups.”*¹⁰⁴ One of the main reasons for this is the very nature of TSSs, whose strength is largely dependent on the physical territory. As in the case of regular states, its survival depends on its physical existence. If they lose it, they can theoretically become „mere“ terrorist groups once again. But this situation is undesirable for TSSs, as they do not want to give up their real power they have once had over the territory, wealth, and people, which makes TSSs closer to establishing the Caliphate and enforcing Sharia law than any other terror group.

Table 2: Analysis of Boko Haram from the TSS perspective

Definition of the TSS	
State-like behaviour	Yes
Attacks on the TPVS	Yes
Conditions of the TSS	
Possess military control over a continuous block of territory	Yes

¹⁰¹ CHUMLEY, Cheryl K. Boko Haram Slaughters 20 over Nonpayment of Islamist Tax. 2014. *The Washington Times*. Available from: <https://shorturl.at/sSZ15>

¹⁰² RAPOPORT, ref. 39, p. 63

¹⁰³ HONIG - YAHIEL, ref. 6, p. 1222

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 1223

Lack of international legitimacy	Yes
Revisionist ideology	Yes
Dimensions (difference from the fourth wave terror groups)	
Religious self-identity or exploiting of symbols for mobilisation	Exploiting of symbols
The extent of the group members' religiosity	Low, rather flexibility and pragmatism
The geographical spread of the TSS phenomenon	Connection to global terror groups
Tactics	Mixed conventional and guerrilla fighting
Devoted defence of and attachment to a "Homeland"	Yes, Maiduguri, Borno state
The extent of self-funding and independence from sponsoring states	Yes, taxes and looting
Size of the group's fighting force	9,000-15,000 fighters (2015)
Identity of targets	Christians and also fellow Muslims
Importance of physical and visible assets for the TSS's survival	Yes, very important

Source: Author, based on cited literature.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In its inception, Boko Haram had two paths, two directions it could take. The non-violent path of Ja'afar Adam, whose strategy to create a caliphate in Nigeria was both to gradually infiltrate government institutions and adopt Western education to fight Western influence more effectively and efficiently - we could say the path of evolution. Contrary, Mohammed Yusuf promoted a violent path and strategy to ban Western education and work for the secular government altogether. His strategy was an armed conflict and violent takeover of power in the country, a kind of Islamist coup - the path of revolution. In his footsteps, Abubakar Shekau continues, significantly escalating violence perpetrated against armed forces, civilians, and even fellow Muslims. At the same time, however, he is attacking outside Nigeria, thus pursuing a strategy of permanent struggle. What Boko

Haram has managed to create corresponds to the definition of TSS according to the criteria of Honig and Yahel.

In particular, the millenarian tendencies of Boko Haram and similar organisations seem to be clear examples of the new religious opposition in the 21st century and the rise of religiously motivated violence against traditional Westphalian states.¹⁰⁵ Boko Haram's move away from "old-style" terror groups of the fourth wave and the move towards ISIS also entails new tools and possibilities for spreading the group's influence and ideas.

Is this a new phenomenon? Boko Haram is far from being the only rebel group that has been able to dominate a large territory of a state and create a semi-state form of government. With new waves of terrorism and new methods of waging war, we may increasingly encounter such semi-states in the future, which would also imply a necessary reflection of established state theories.

TSSs, such as ISIS or Boko Haram, control a large part of the state's territory and establish their institutions on it, but at the same time engage in constant armed struggle with the state and often international armed forces. It is the creation of some state-like entities¹⁰⁶ that are among the biggest achievements of these groups.

Nowadays, sometimes referred to as the post-Westphalian age, we notice the development of so-called *multiple modernities*, in which modernities have many different social, cultural, political, as well as religious forms.¹⁰⁷

This development brings not only new forms of political power, but also new forms of opposition. Boko Haram exactly represents such a new form of opposition. Modern history has seen a struggle against Western "imperialism" through revolutions - whether nationalist, Marxist, or later Islamic. But they all operated with nation states as constituted by the Westphalian system. Even the Islamic Revolution in Iran has not tried to change the existing system, but has taken over control and Islamised it.¹⁰⁸ This is the specificity and originality of semi-state entities, such as Boko Haram.

¹⁰⁵ VOLL, ref. 60, p. 1194.

¹⁰⁶ Note: In the case of the Islamic State, for example, some scholars speak about the so-called *jihadi proto-states* (LIA, Brynjar. Understanding Jihadi Proto-States. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2015. Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 31-41.

¹⁰⁷ EISENSTADT, Shmuel N. Multiple Modernities. *Daedalus*. 2000. Vol. 129, No. 1, 1-29.

¹⁰⁸ VOLL, ref. 60, p. 1193.