

## TRANSFORMACE NATO A SUMMIT V BUKUREŠTI. SMĚREM K ORGANIZACI KOLEKTIVNÍ OBRANY, KOLEKTIVNÍ BEZPEČNOSTI NEBO KOOPERATIVNÍ BEZPEČNOSTI?

### NATO TRANSFORMATION AND THE SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST. TOWARDS THE ORGANISATION OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY OR COOPERATIVE SECURITY?

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#### Abstrakt

*Text se zabývá summitem NATO v Bukurešti a hledá odpověď na otázku, zda se NATO transformuje v organizaci kolektivní bezpečnosti, kooperativní bezpečnosti nebo zůstává klasickou organizací kolektivní obrany. Autor dochází k závěru, že názory některých prominentních badatelů o přetváření NATO v organizaci kolektivní bezpečnosti nemají opodstatnění. Aliance nadále zůstává organizací kolektivní obrany. Nicméně kolektivní obrana je nyní pojata extenzivněji než v době studené války a je doplněna na kolektivní obranu proti novým bezpečnostním hrozbám. Ve vztahu k Rusku, Blízkému východu, zemím kolem Středozemního moře, Bosně a Hercegovině, Černé Hoře, Srbsku a některým zemím v Pacifiku a jeho okolí jsou nadále uplatňovány přístupy typické pro koncept kooperativní bezpečnosti.*

#### Abstract

*The text focuses on NATO Summit in Bucharest and tries to answer the question if NATO is being transformed into an organization of collective security, cooperative security or whether it continues to be a traditional organization of collective defence. The author believes that the conclusions of some prominent researchers that NATO is currently being transformed into an organization of collective security are not well-founded. NATO remains to be an organization of collective defence. On the other hand, today's NATO prefers a wider definition of collective defence than the definition used during the years of the Cold War. Nowadays NATO focuses on the collective defence against such new security threats as international terrorism, drug trafficking, spreading of WMD and means of delivery, etc. When dealing with Russia, the Middle East, Mediterranean countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and some countries close to the Pacific Ocean, NATO still applies approaches typical of the concept of cooperative security.*

#### Klíčová slova

Koncepty bezpečnosti, transformace NATO, summit v Bukurešti.

#### Keywords

Security concepts, NATO transformation, Bucharest Summit.

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#### INTRODUCTION

After the internal breakdown of former socialist states and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on the turn of 1990s, a question of the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was raised. Great expectations aroused by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was perceived by many as a suitable alternative of the (allegedly) obsolete NATO.<sup>1</sup>

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Many prestigious authors, especially from the school of realists and neorealists (e.g. Kenneth N. Waltz), anticipated the end of NATO due to the non-existence of a common enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been going through a permanent adaptation process that has changed NATO beyond recognition. If the Alliance had wanted to survive the Warsaw Pact, it did not have any other choice. As the beginning of the permanent NATO adaptation process, it is possible to regard the adopting of the 1990 London declaration.

Today's shape of NATO differs from its form in the Cold War substantially. The Alliance's tasks have been extended significantly, as well as its territorial range and number of its members. Rob de Wijk points out that successful adaptation of NATO to the new situation is an unprecedented event because traditional military alliances were dissolved together with the expiration of the reason for their existence in the past.<sup>3</sup> However, in this respect it is necessary to take into account that NATO has never been a purely military alliance of collective defence, based exclusively on strategic calculation and national interests defined via realism and neorealism.<sup>4</sup> Already in the period of the Cold War, it included features of security community according to Karl Deutsch.<sup>5</sup>

The aim of this article is to evaluate the impacts of the NATO summit in Bucharest on the adaptation process. Emphasis will be laid on the question of whether the summit moved NATO back to a pure organisation of collective defence or whether there is a continuing penetration of features typical of the concept of cooperative or collective security.

In particular, the issue of NATO transformation to an organisation of collective security was discussed by many prominent experts as early as in the second half of 1990s. They dealt with the problem of to what extent NATO can be successfully transformed to the organisation of collective security.<sup>6</sup> Henry Kissinger even reached the conclusion that NATO had become more similar to an organisation of collective security rather than a traditional alliance<sup>7</sup>. Furthermore, also Richard E. Rupp claimed that "*NATO transformed itself into an organisation that has more in common with collective security than collective defence*"<sup>8</sup> Therefore, It is advisable to pay attention to the issue of what direction the Alliance follows and whether NATO really tends to adopt features typical of collective security organisations.

## **2. CONCEPTS OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY**

### **2.1 Concept of Collective Defence**

The concept of collective defence is a traditional tool for the analysis of security problems, frequently applied by countries in the past. At a theoretical level, this concept is based on the belief that the functioning of the system of international relations is best described by realist and neorealist theories.

Within the concept of collective defence aimed at the political and military dimension of security, emphasis is placed also on guaranteeing security of the countries in the system of international anarchy. The referent object of security policy within this concept is a state entering an alliance. Alliance membership is exclusive. The principle of collective defence lies in accepting the bond of providing all possible assistance, including military assistance, in case of a member state being attacked from the outside. Within the concept of collective defence, security of member states is not assumed to be threatened from the inside of the alliance. The alliance formed in this way is oriented towards an external enemy.

The main form of security threat assumed within the concept is a military attack from the outside. Elimination of non-military threats is beyond the alliance's competence. The concept of collective defence assumes the existence of long-term, mutually compatible interests of the states

involved. The more long-term interests of the organisation's members are fulfilled, the firmer and more vital the alliance is.

The concept of collective defence does not assume the building of an international regime authorising the use of military power only in situations of self-defence or collective action against an aggressor.

A unifying feature can be represented also by mutually shared values (ideologies) affecting the process of forming national interests of member states; however, it does not necessarily need to be so. If we expand the concept of collective defence by mutually shared values and principles, we talk of the concept of security community.<sup>9</sup> In the period of the Cold War, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were security communities. In case these values are represented by the principles of democracy and liberalism, it is a concept of pluralist security community.<sup>10</sup>

## 2. 2 Concept of Collective Security

The concept of collective security, too, belongs today to classical concepts for the analysis and solution of security problems. This concept was elaborated in the past by many thinkers and practical politicians. Undoubtedly, two of the classics are Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. However, the theoretical sources of the concept are not restricted only to idealism, as it can be found also in realism, liberalism and institutionalism.<sup>11</sup>

The concept of collective security concentrates on the political and military dimension of security. Within the concept of collective security, it is assumed that the only way to guarantee security is to do away with the anarchist character of the system of international relations and to build an international regime in which interactions between states would take place on the basis of clearly defined and delineated rules. Such rules would prohibit and sanction the usage of military force other than in self-defence. This regime is to guarantee the same degree of security to all states involved and as is claimed by James E. Goodby, flouting international norms is securitized.<sup>12</sup> This is a very important point, in which the concept of collective security is different from the concept of collective defence.

States participating in the system of collective security are obliged to respond collectively to the violator of peace by all means, including the use of armed force. As is stated by Hans Morgenthau, "*... what collective security demands of the individual nations is to forsake national egoisms and the national policies serving them. Collective security expects the policies of the individual nations to be inspired by the ideal of mutual assistance and a spirit of self-sacrifice which will not shrink even from the supreme sacrifice of war should it be required by that ideal.*"<sup>13</sup>

The threat of the use of armed force upon the aggressor is at least of the same importance as the use itself. Ideally, potential aggressors are aware of the fact that they will not benefit from the aggression because they would have to face the united force of all other states. As is emphasised by Wolfram F. Hanrieder, collective security requires diffusion in the distribution of power between the states in the system of international relations.<sup>14</sup>

Within the concept of collective security, security is understood as indivisible. Within this concept, it is the state that is the referent object. The concept of collective security is a priori inclusive; involvement of all states in the organisation is regarded as necessary. In other words, the concept of collective security anticipates participation of potential enemies in the organisation. All states are perceived as equal, which is a great difference compared to the concept of the concert of powers.

The concept of collective security is internally oriented. States are expected to respond together to aggressive behaviour of the members of the system of collective security. The main form of threat for the security within the concept of collective security is a military attack or threat of military attack; similarly to the concept of collective defence, non-military threats are not securitized. Within the concept of collective security, existence of mutual interests is presupposed

but they can be very general and do not have to be (but can be) based on mutually shared values. The aim of collective security is to guarantee a status quo.<sup>15</sup>

As a part of the discussion on reconceptualization of collective security after the end of the Cold War, considerations appeared in the background of armed conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus that under certain conditions it should be possible to make interventions into intrastate conflicts on a collective basis.<sup>16</sup> James E. Goodby defined four essential conditions for such an intervention: 1. The conflict has a potential to spread; 2. A possible significant impact on international regulating rules for the employment of force in order to change borders; 3. Large-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed; and 4. The survival of democratic government is at stake<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless, this expansion of collective security substantially changes the traditional image of the concept and for the time being, it indicates only a little that it would be generally accepted. Thinking of this issue it is necessary to keep in mind that older approaches to collective security stressed non-intervention into intrastate matters.<sup>18</sup>

The United Nations is typical of implementing collective defence concepts features.

### **2. 3 Concept of Cooperative Security**

In comparison with traditional concepts of collective defence and collective security, the concept of cooperative security is still relatively young. The origins of its formation can be traced back to 1970s and it boomed in 1990s. Among its main theoreticians, there were Ahton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbrunner<sup>19</sup>, Janne E. Nolan<sup>20</sup>, Olav F. Knudsen<sup>21</sup>, Richard Cohen, Michael Mihalka<sup>22</sup> and Heinz Vetschera.<sup>23</sup>

Cooperative security is conceptualised very precisely by Heinz Vetschera, who clarifies the principles of cooperative security by comparing them to non-cooperative approaches to security. Traditional non-cooperative security policy (collective defence and collective security) is, in his opinion, characterised by efforts to guarantee state's security against external aggression (security dilemma). An important role in the processes of guaranteeing security is played by deterrence.

According to Vetschera, political strategy based on the concept of cooperative security is typical of efforts to prevent from arousal of hostility and outbreak of conflict, or to restrict its escalation that could lead to the deployment of armed force. The main method used is cooperation with the potential adversary. The cooperative approach to security is based on improving the predictability of states' behaviour, elimination of misunderstandings and attenuation of a conflict in its prenatal stage by means of consultations and negotiations. International relations are primarily viewed as a nonzero sum game, which can bring profit to all participants. Security is not guaranteed against other participants but together with other participants. All states are assumed to perceive the logics of international relations in this way, and they are ready to strive for guaranteeing security together with others.<sup>24</sup>

Vetschera does not regard the concept of cooperative security (just as concepts of non-cooperative security) as a totally universal means of guaranteeing state's security and he agrees with its historically conditioned applicability. According to Vetschera, non-cooperative security policy is based primarily on repression against the violator of peace. In his opinion, this style of policy can fail in case of being confronted with conflicts arising out of misunderstandings or false evaluation of security participants' intentions. According to Vetschera, the cooperative security strategy is to reduce the risk of an outbreak of a conflict due to a wrong evaluation of the situation, as the cooperation with potential enemies as well as the high degree of transparency in security issues generally restrict space for a false calculation of mutual intentions. However, Vetschera also points out the Achilles' heel of the concept of cooperative security lies in its limited possibilities to eliminate intentional aggression on the part of the state that does not intend to employ cooperative approaches to guaranteeing security and rather than increasing security, the state wants to intensify its security at the expense of other states. Cooperative and non-cooperative security concepts can complement but not substitute each other.<sup>25</sup>

A wholly different view of the concept of cooperative security was introduced by Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka. Their concept moves conceptualisation of cooperative security away from the direction followed by the authors mentioned above. Cohen and Mihalka's view of cooperative security assumes principles of concepts of collective defence and collective security and enriches them with new features. In their view, these concepts are completed and extended by components of individual security and spreading stability into the surrounding environment. Cohen and Mihalka identify individual security with guaranteeing fundamental human rights and liberties in a liberal point of view. As spreading stability outside the system of cooperative security, Cohen and Mihalka regard the stabilisation of critical regions where there is a massive violation of human rights. Since Mihalka and Cohen view as an indelible part of the concept of cooperative security guaranteeing individual security, the system of cooperative security must lean on the core of liberal democracies. Only these states are able to provide the protection of human rights which are, in this view, perceived as a fundamental building stone of the whole concept.<sup>26</sup>

If we generalise the approaches of Ahton Carter, William Perry, John Steinbrunner, Janne E. Nolan, Olav F. Knudsen, and Heinz Vetschera and if we do not take into account Cohen's and Mihalka's model, we can reach the following conclusion when conceptualising cooperative security.

The concept of cooperative security is focused mainly on the political and military dimension of security. The referent object within the concept of cooperative security is the state or possibly a group of states. States are assumed to have non-identical interests. Security is perceived as indivisible and it cannot be guaranteed for one state at the expense of others. The concept of cooperative security is based on the idea of involving other states into the process of cooperation when dealing with security problems with the aim of reducing the security dilemma and avoiding an outbreak of hostility. The main idea of the concept of cooperative security is not to strive for security of a particular state but, in cooperation with other state participants, guarantee security for all. It is not essential for the states cooperating within the concept of cooperative security to be characteristic of mutually shared values.<sup>27</sup> Even countries whose value orientation is different can act towards each other on the basis of political strategies stemming from the concept of cooperative security. According to this concept, political processes in international relations follow the logics of nonzero sum games. Within this concept, it is assumed that via cooperation with partners (potential opponents), the following situation will be prevented in which one of the participants would view another state as a potential enemy and regard it as suitable to enforce and defend its interests against it by military means, or build up military tools in order to do so. The main idea of the concept of cooperative security regarding military is to prevent a situation, via cooperation with partners and transparency in the military area which enables launching of successful aggression and preparation to do so. There are neither security obligations nor guarantees resulting from the participation in organising cooperative security (such as OSCE), as opposed to the membership in organisations of collective defence and collective security.

The following table summarises the similarities and differences between the above mentioned concepts as manifested in international organisations.

**Table 1: Comparison of ideal types of security organisations**

Concept	Referent object	Main aim	Security guarantees	Ambition to build an international regime	Nature of membership	Examples of application in international relations <sup>28</sup>
Collective Defence	State	Defence against military attack from outside the system	Yes	No	Exclusive	NATO
Collective Security	State	Defence against military attack from inside the system	Yes	Yes (Permission to use military force only in the case of self-defence and collective action against an aggressor)	Inclusive	UN
Cooperative Security	State	Prevention of hostility by institutionalized political cooperation and transparency in military sphere	No	Yes (Armament regulation and transparency in military sphere)	Inclusive	OSCE

### 3. NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST<sup>29</sup>

#### 3. 1 Symptoms of Inclination towards Collective Security

Some prominent researchers mentioned above conclude that NATO is being transformed into an organisation of collective security. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to start with examining whether there were tendencies characteristic of collective security at the NATO summit in Bucharest.

If we stem from the concept of collective security itself, it is possible to distinguish the following symptoms of adopting its principles by a particular international organisation: 1. Attempts at inclusiveness, i.e. including the greatest number of states possible into the system of collective security; 2. Organisation's ambitions attempting to build a regime sanctioning the deployment of military force in other situations than in self-defence or collective action against an aggressor; and 3. Last but not least, internal orientation. It is these features in particular that make the concept of collective security different from the concept of collective defence.

A significant part of the Bucharest summit agenda was the issue of enlargement. Launching of accession talks with Croatia and Albania is the climax of a long-term cooperation process of these countries with NATO. Disputes between Greece and Macedonia are nothing new and the Greek veto in the issue of launching accession talks with Macedonia due to country's name could be expected. The Ukraine and Georgia gained hope for the future launching of cooperation within MAP. The Alliance is at odds about the prospective Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO. The advocates of these countries are the United States and Great Britain, but the attitude of France, Germany and Spain has been detached for a long time. The position of "sceptics" is not generated only by the questionable state of preparedness of the Ukraine and Georgia for membership; however, it is also affected by their opinions on the optimal role of NATO in the European security architecture, as well as the strategic culture and national interests generated by it, and, last but not least, also willingness to yield to Russia. Therefore, their reserved attitude is understandable and not unsubstantiated. Without Ukrainian public's support to join NATO, the Ukraine's accession could have a destabilising impact on the region of Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is very important that the Ukrainian pro-NATO political parties assume a positive referendum as

an inevitable step on the Ukrainian way to NATO. The final conclusions of the summit in Bucharest mean confirming open-door policy having a great stabilising effect for democratic regimes in post communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Due to the existence of relatively strict criteria for candidate states set by the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995), the process of NATO enlargement drawn at the summit cannot be interpreted as an attempt at inclusive involvement of the highest number of states possible. Furthermore, also Article 10 of the Washington Treaty definitely means that further enlargement is possible only by European countries. The further aim of NATO is not to build a global, universal and inclusive organisation striving for including all states on the Earth. From the perspective of the membership, a certain degree of exclusiveness is anticipated, typical of collective defence organisations.

Moreover, the Bucharest summit has not brought along ambitions to build a universal international regime regulating and sanctioning unjustified deployment of armed forces. NATO promoted the primary responsibility of the United Nation Security Council in maintaining international peace and declared its faith in the UN principles (paragraph 12). Further on, it expressed willingness to support the work of the UN in maintaining international peace and security.

Even after the summit in Bucharest, consensual decision-making apparatus remains unchanged, which means no change in the organisation's external orientation. The threat for member states' security is further expected from the outside, i.e. outside the NATO membership. Due to consensual decision-making process, the Alliance cannot be used as a tool for elimination of an aggression launched by a member of the organisation against another member.

To sum up what was mentioned above, the NATO summit in Bucharest did not move the Alliance towards an organisation of collective security. The Alliance has no intention of inclusive membership, building a universal international regime regulating and sanctioning the deployment of armed forces or giving up its external orientation. Because of that, it is possible to dismiss opinions evaluating NATO's adaptation process as a final move towards a collective security organisation.

Therefore, does it mean that NATO is moving towards its traditional role of the tool of collective defence? Not necessarily. The analysis of the past adaptation process of NATO has shown that the Alliance had adopted a lot from the concept of cooperative security.<sup>30</sup> That's why it is necessary to pay attention to the issue of to what degree these approaches were present at the Bucharest summit.

### **3. 2 Application of the Approaches of the Concept of Cooperative Security**

It was concluded in the text above that the main idea of the concept of cooperative security is to prevent an outbreak of hostility by cooperation in security issues. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to NATO conclusions in Bucharest creating conditions for deepening and widening of cooperation with non-NATO countries.

Since being founded, the Russian Federation has been a prominent partner of NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been paying great attention to building a cooperative partnership with Russia and it has built a large network of institutions enabling such cooperation. NATO declared this policy to be continued also in Bucharest. The Alliance tried to persuade Russia that the open door policy, effort of building an allied missile defence and fight against spreading of WMD and means of delivery are not directed against Russia.

From the perspective of the concept of cooperative security, the current key issue between NATO and Russia is the future of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). The treaty codifies a substantial reduction of the number of limited kinds of arms and introduces control and inspection mechanisms, which closed up the process of quantitative

conventional armament in Europe. In the past years, the treaty's application substantially reduced the risk of an outbreak of a global military conflict in Europe.<sup>31</sup> Even rationally thinking Russian experts, such as Anatoly Tsyganok, acknowledge that due to this treaty no state in today's Europe is under a direct military threat.<sup>32</sup>

NATO further associates the ratification of the adapted treaty with the fulfilment of Russian obligations concerning Georgia and Moldova.<sup>33</sup> The Russian withdrawal from the treaty, should it be final, dissolves the well-elaborated inspection and notification system that made it very difficult to launch an unexpected attack in Europe, and thus it destroys one of the fundamental building stones of cooperative security in Europe. Nevertheless, NATO has only a few possibilities how to persuade Russia about the importance of this treaty and it is solely up to Russia whether it changes its attitude and meets its obligations, or whether the withdrawal from the treaty will be irrevocable. But it is necessary to keep in mind that NATO expressed in the Bucharest Summit Declaration (article 42) that *"the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely."*

In addition, NATO would like to strengthen cooperation with Russia in the area of missile defence (article 38). This NATO policy can be regarded as an example of applying cooperative security strategy because NATO tries to avoid any misunderstanding with Russia regarding NATO missile defence.

NATO should keep in mind that the application of principles of the concept of cooperative security towards Russia is a suitable strategy only if Russia does not take the direction of an intentional confrontation with NATO. As it is concluded by Heinz Vetschera, the concept of cooperative security is suitable only for the prevention of non-intentional and not intentional conflicts.<sup>34</sup> If Russia accepts confrontation with NATO as the basic principle of its relationship with NATO, it may be necessary to re-define the Alliance's policy towards this country and fulfilling the CFE Treaty obligations. The final end of the CFE Treaty could be interpreted as a symptom of the Russian intention to adopt a confrontation policy against NATO, as the ultimate breakdown of the inspection and notification regime would result in a situation in which Russia would have better conditions for preparing a surprising successful military aggression towards the West. The fact that the current Russian army is not in a state enabling such a policy does not mean that it remains like this forever.

On the other hand, NATO could also, in case of an ultimate end of this treaty, prepare more easily a surprising military attack against Russia. Therefore, if Russia lays the treaty definitely to rest, its policy can be interpreted in the way that it does not fear any NATO military assault. Thus it is possible to conclude that the NATO post-Cold-War strategy towards Russia based on the cooperation security concept was successful.

In the past, the Alliance developed intensive security cooperation with countries in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and even with countries associated within the African Union. NATO has stressed the importance of this form of cooperation in Bucharest as well. These activities can be interpreted as an application of the concept of cooperative security. The aim of this cooperation is not the preparation of these countries to join NATO in the future; however, it means a mutual solution of security problems, elimination of deep-rooted mistrust and building partnerships.

The continuing cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia mentioned in the Bucharest Summit Declaration can be interpreted more likely as an application of the concept of cooperative security than collective defence. For the time being, the issue of membership of the states mentioned above is not the issue of the day. The aim is to help these countries in the transformation process and dissolve the distrust between them and NATO, stemming from historical events connected with the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the cooperation with Macedonia, the Ukraine and Georgia has an entirely different dimension. The declared aim of these countries is not to cooperate with NATO but to enter the Alliance and thus obtain security guarantees established by Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty. Thus, cooperation conceived in this way cannot be interpreted as an application of the concept of cooperative security, but as an application of the concept of collective defence. Macedonia has a real chance to launch accession talks as soon as it solves its disputes with Greece and also the Ukraine and Georgia do not have, according to the conclusions of the summit, closed doors to MAP, which is understood as another necessary stage on the path to NATO membership both by these states and the Alliance.

An important task of NATO is to build cooperation with other world's countries situated geographically outside the traditional area of interest of the Alliance but sharing mutual interests and values with NATO. The cooperation with countries in South-East Asia (Japan, South Korea and Singapore) and the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand) (article 35) may be also interpreted as a result of thinking about security within the concept of cooperative security rather than the application of the concept of collective defence.<sup>35</sup> The question of obtaining security guarantees on the part of these countries by accession to NATO is not on the present agenda and the aim of NATO is to discuss the best ways of solving security problems and continue the mutually beneficial cooperation in foreign and security policy. NATO is ready to go on with this policy.

The proclamation of close security cooperation with the UN, the European Union and other international organisations also conforms to the principles of the concept of cooperative security, which a priori anticipates close cooperation of relevant participants while maintaining security.

### **3. 3 Continuing Reconceptualisation of Collective Defence in NATO**

Collective defence was NATO's traditional task in the era of the Cold War. Even after it was over, the Alliance proclaimed this task several times and thus it is no surprise that the principles of the concept of collective defence are included even in the conclusions of the NATO summit in Bucharest. On the one hand, it is a rather banal and easily foreseen finding. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account also the fact that at present, NATO perceives collective defence quite differently from the Cold War period; moreover, this different conception occurred also at the Bucharest summit.

At the Bucharest summit, the process of rethinking of collective defence goes on. The extension of the range of security threats (international terrorism, spreading of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, spreading of instability and organised crime from failed countries, loss of access to natural resources, attacks against information systems, etc.) included in the collective defence is typical of this process. Defence against military aggression from the outside against a members' territory (a traditional NATO task) is not the only contemporary dimension of collective defence within NATO.

The practical consequence of such an extended view of collective defence is a global engagement of NATO in various types of military operations of crisis management, which was proclaimed by the Alliance in Bucharest once again. This is the only way how to make conditions suitable for stabilizing critical regions and thus eliminate new security threats at the very beginning. Quite expectedly, in the Bucharest Summit Declaration the emphasis was placed on Afghanistan and Kosovo (article 6 – 14).

Furthermore, NATO promised to operate in Kosovo within KFOR based on the SC UN resolution 1244 (article 7). But it is useful to keep in mind that at present, NATO's crucial task is the stabilisation of Afghanistan (article 6). Within the traditional concept of collective defence, it would be enough to destroy the Taliban regime assisting the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, and the stabilisation of this country could be regarded as a redundant task. The substantiation of this assumption is self-evident. Afghanistan troubled by instability and a civil war is not capable of a military attack against the territory of the allied states and does not represent a security threat provided one thinks about security in the framework of the traditional collective defence concept. However, in the new conception of collective defence, extended by defence against new security

threats, the stabilisation of this country is inevitable, as instability in Afghanistan can have an impact on the security of NATO member states.

NATO faces a serious problem in this country. The mission performed by ISAF has gradually developed from an assistance operation into a military operation and NATO became one of the participants in the conflict. The real aims of the operation, i.e. establishment of a secure environment for the country's peaceful stabilisation<sup>36</sup>, absolutely do not comply with NATO capacities. Last but not least, the Afghan engagement makes a dividing line in NATO between states that are willing to risk their soldiers' lives and deploy them in areas where it is absolutely necessary, and the others. The public support for the continuation of the operation in many NATO member states is weak.

The conclusions of the Bucharest summit anticipating an intensified military engagement of NATO in this country may seem to be a step in the right direction. At present, the Alliance has 47,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan within ISAF. There are 19,000 American soldiers in this country. The deployment of several more thousands of soldiers does not have a significant impact on the strategic situation, as it does not reduce the contradiction between the aims of the operation and available sources. If the density of the Alliance's military presence in this country should reach the same extent as in the case of the early stages of NATO engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO would have to deploy 600,000–700,000 soldiers. Evidently, this is impossible. Nevertheless, if the reconstruction of this country should go on, it is necessary to provide civil experts with at least a minimal degree of security and the results of their work at least a minimal persistence. From this point of view, intensification of the NATO military engagement in Afghanistan by several thousands of soldiers on the basis of the conclusions of the Bucharest summit is not sufficient and it does not make a significant improvement to NATO's strategic situation. Not even with an increased contingent will it be possible to control the country militarily in such an extent that it would be possible to reconstruct and stabilise it.

The only long-term alternative of an increased allied engagement is to continue the building of Afghan security forces, which is a task that the Alliance has been setting for itself since 2003. In fact, it is a strategy enforced for a long time by the present American administration of George Bush. There would be nothing worse for the future of NATO than if the Afghan government was dependent on the Alliance's military presence on a long-term basis.

If NATO sees the present collective defence differently from the Cold War period, it is necessary to adapt to the new conception also the military capacities of member states as well as NATO's military capacities. According to the conclusions of the Bucharest summit, the adaptation process of the Alliance on the military level is to be further continued and emphasis should be placed on building NATO Response Force, applying latest results of Revolution in Military Affairs and adapting to NATO Command Structure. Stress has been put on purchasing military capabilities suitable for deployment in military crisis management operations out of NATO area.

The NATO summit in Bucharest commented on the issue of missile defence due to the plans of the USA, Poland and the Czech Republic, and Russian objections.<sup>37</sup> The adopted conclusions may be interpreted in the way that the Alliance has no major objections to the planned steps of the USA, the Czech Republic and Poland, and that the future linking of the planned systems with the allied missile defence is not only possible but also desirable from the perspective of NATO. In my opinion, the future of the allied missile defence is, in any way, determined by the fate of the American missile defence.<sup>38</sup> Without the American leadership, it is far from probable that NATO would be capable of a really functional missile defence on all levels, as this programme is highly functionally, technically, and politically demanding. It is often underestimated that no other country in today's NATO has the potential to negotiate consensus concerning this issue. Building the NATO missile defence is only a logical consequence of the application of approaches typical of the concept of collective defence. Contrariwise, if NATO abandoned the allied missile defence, this step could be interpreted in such a way that collective defence against this security threat is not regarded as politically desirable and that every state should take care of it itself.

## CONCLUSION

If we sum up the results from the NATO summit in Bucharest, it is possible to reach the conclusion that the opinions of some prominent above-mentioned experts on transferring NATO into an organisation of collective security are not substantiated. NATO has no ambitions to become an alliance including all states on the Earth, build a universal international regime regulating the use of military force or obtain tools enabling to face the aggression on the part of one NATO member against another. Therefore, it does not become a collective security organisation.

The Alliance further remains an organisation of collective defence. Nevertheless, the threats for the security of member states to which collective defence should respond are viewed much wider than in the Cold War period. At present, they do not include only an armed attack against a member state but also international terrorism, spreading of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, spreading of instability and organised crime from failed states, loss of access to natural resources and attacks against information systems of NATO members.

Regarding Russia, Mediterranean, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Montenegro, Serbia and some Pacific countries, approaches typical of the concept of collective security are further applied and NATO tries to solve the current security problems by intensifying the talks and to eliminate misunderstandings and negative stereotypes in perceiving the partners which were established in the past.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> KAPLAN, Lawrence S., *NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance*, pp. 109–110.

<sup>2</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth N., NATO's Expansion: A Realist's View, pp. 23–38.

<sup>3</sup> WIJK, Rob de, Towards a new political strategy for NATO, pp. 14–18.

<sup>4</sup> More HAUSER, Günther, Die NATO – die Grundlage des euro-atlantisches Sicherheitsverbundes, p. 268.

<sup>5</sup> DEUTSCH, Karl et al, *Political community and the North Atlantic Area*.

<sup>6</sup> HILLEN, John, NOONAN, Michael P., The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement, pp. 28–29.

<sup>7</sup> MEYER, Steven E., Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> RUPP, Richard E., NATO Enlargement: All Aboard? Destination Unknown, p. 342.

<sup>9</sup> DEUTSCH, Karl et al, *Political community and the North Atlantic Area*.

<sup>10</sup> More MÖLDER, Holger, NATO's role in the Post/Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region, pp. 10–12.

<sup>11</sup> See BENNET, Andrew, LEFGOLD, Joseph. Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict, pp. 213–237.

<sup>12</sup> GOODBY, James E, Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War, p. 319.

<sup>13</sup> MORGENTHAU, Hans J, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for the Power and Peace*, p. 420.

<sup>14</sup> More WOLFRAM F. Hanrieder, International organizations and international systems. p. 299.

<sup>15</sup> More BENNET, Andrew, LEFGOLD, Joseph, Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict, pp. 215–216.

<sup>16</sup> GOODBY, James E., Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War, pp. 309–312.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

<sup>18</sup> WOLFRAM F Hanrieder, International organizations and international systems. p. 300.

<sup>19</sup> CARTER, Ashton B., PERRY, William J., STEINBRUNNER, John D., *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*.

<sup>20</sup> NOLAN, Janne E., The Concept of Cooperative Security, p. 3–18.

<sup>21</sup> KNUDSEN, Olav F., *Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region*.

<sup>22</sup> COHEN, Richard, MIHALKA, Michael, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*.

<sup>23</sup> VETSCHERA, Heinz, Grenzen und Möglichkeiten kooperativer Sicherheitspolitik in Europa am Beispiel der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE), pp. 93–127.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97–102.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103–106.

<sup>26</sup> COHEN, Richard, MIHALKA, Michael, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*.

<sup>27</sup> Regarding this issue, Cohen and Mihalka have a different opinion.

<sup>28</sup> Real security organisation will usually be different from the ideal type.

<sup>29</sup> Bucharest Summit Declaration is used as main source of information for this chapter.

<sup>30</sup> See KRÍŽ, Zdeněk, *Adaptace Severoatlantické aliance na nové mezinárodní bezpečnostní prostředí. Aplikace přístupů konceptu kooperativní bezpečnosti*.

<sup>31</sup> HODGE, Carl Cavanagh, *Atlanticism for a New Century. The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO*, p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> See TSYGANOK, Anatoly D., NATO's Istanbul Summit and Problems of the Russia-NATO Council, pp. 205–209.

<sup>33</sup> Russia promised to fulfil these obligations in the negotiations on the adapted treaty. The adapted treaty was signed in Istanbul in 1999.

<sup>34</sup> VETSCHERA, Heinz, Grenzen und Möglichkeiten kooperativer Sicherheitspolitik in Europa am Beispiel der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE), p. 103–106.

<sup>35</sup> The Singapore case is a bit complicated because this country is not a democracy. On the other hand, Singapore and NATO countries share common interests.

<sup>36</sup> As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concludes „We must continue to help Afghanistan to become a stable, democratic, and properly governed nation that no longer exports terrorism, crime and drugs to our nations and the rest of the world.“ SCHEFFER, Jaap de Hoop, Bucharest: a milestone in NATO's transformation.

<sup>37</sup> For more on this issue, see SUCHÝ, Petr, Americká protiraketová obrana a ruský pocit nejistoty.

<sup>38</sup> A similar view is supported by KOHL, Radek , ŠULC, František, *Protiraketová obrana*, p. 4.

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