

NOVÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÍ STRATEGIE A SOUČASNÉ PARADIGMA AMERICKÉ ZAHRANIČNÍ POLITIKY

NEW SECURITY STRATEGY AND CONTEMPORARY PARADIGM OF US FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstrakt

Hlavní zkoumanou tezí příspěvku je předpoklad, že zahraniční politika USA prochází zásadní proměnou. Text předkládá hypotézu, že jsme svědky posunu paradigmatu od generace, která zažila vítězství USA ve Studené válce a přesvědčila se o potřebě prvenství USA ve světové politice, k generaci, jež vyrostla během neúspěšné Války proti terorismu (v Afganistánu a částečně Íráku).

Abstract

The analysed thesis of this contribution is an assumption that the foreign policy of the USA is undergoing a significant change. We are witnessing paradigm shift from of generation, which experienced the victory of the USA in the Cold War and was convinced of the need to maintain American Primacy in world politics, to the generation which grew up during the unsuccessful War on Terror (in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq).

Klíčová slova

Cyklická teorie; americká zahraniční politika; Mnichov; Vietnam; paradigmatata.

Keywords

Cyclical theory; US Foreign Policy; Munich; Vietnam; Paradigms.

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INTRODUCTION

Ten years since the elections of Barack Obama and two years since the election of Donald Trump, it seems to be more than evident that the US foreign policy has been undergoing a process of transformation. Although the two major political parties hold conflicting visions of the United States and its role in the world affairs, one can easily find surprisingly large consensus among the Democrats and the Republicans in their foreign policy preferences. Not only there is clear continuity; there is above all sharp contrast with the way American foreign policy has been carried in the period between the end of the Cold war and presidential elections of 2008.

All US Presidents from the 90s up to early 21st century have actively campaigned for enlargement of democracy, human rights, free markets and free trade. At times, the United States has been ready to use armed forces for those goals. We have seen the largest contingent of US troops to be deployed in in the Persian Gulf in 1990 since the end of the Vietnam War, with clear vision of a *"world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order"*¹. Bill Clinton, for instance, used to claim that *"there can be no security where there is no hope of prosperity. We must continue to promote the spread of global markets in ways that advance economic growth, honour our values, and help alleviate economic disparity."*² It was believed that leading free nations and advancing liberty make America more secure. *"These inseparable priorities - fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting freedom as-as the alternative to tyranny and despair - have guided America for more than four years"*³, George H. W. Bush used to say in 2006.

More examples of assertiveness in the US foreign policy could be named. However, under President Obama and Trump American foreign policy has swung - for good or bad - in the opposite direction. US security interests and the need for stability matter more than spreading democracy. We have rarely heard about the active promotion of freedom or human rights in world affairs in the last ten years. Although American voters have always been more attracted to economic and social problems at home rather than democracy abroad, prosperity and security of the United States have been interpreted in the context of the environment around the globe in the post-Cold War period. Only recently, the head of the United States sees the position of his country reversed. President Trump calls for foreign policy doctrine based on the principal *"America First"*.⁴

In short, something fundamental has been going on with *American Foreign Policy* in the last ten years. We believe we are witnessing the birth of a new paradigm of American foreign policy. This text aims to offer a possible answer why has this been happening and why now. To do so, we have formulated two research questions. Firstly:

¹ After the War: The President; Transcript of President Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War. In: *The New York Times* [online] 7. 3. 1991 [cit. 2018-12-20]. Available from: <https://nyti.ms/2V15RGV>

² *A National Security Strategy of a New Century*, preface [on-line] 1999 [cit. 15. 1. 2018]. Available from: <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2000.pdf>

³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, [on-line] 2006 [cit. 15. 1. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2T2SNyX>

⁴ TRUMP, Donald. *Inaugural Address* [on-line] 20. 1. 2017 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2PS4ZAW>

How can we explain contemporary consensus among political elites of the United States in the critical areas of American foreign policy? And secondly: Is this consensus only coincidental phenomenon or can we instead expect it might hold for years to come?

The thesis of this contribution is that we may better understand the current transformation of American foreign policy - and answer both research questions - when we follow the framework of the cyclical theory. We argue that we are witnessing alternation of cycles of the moods of the majority of American citizens. Cyclical theory of American foreign policy tells us that the same transformation, in principle, American underwent some 50 years ago.

CYCLICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The cyclical theory does not represent one particular body of knowledge. It is preferably a group of attitudes from various authors who see history as a sequence of fluctuating patterns in politics. Initially, the theory has been introduced by American historian Arthur Schlesinger senior⁵ in the 30s of the 20th century and later developed by his son⁶. They both believed that the history of their country is shaped by shifting cycles of liberal and conservative national moods. Their papers remain very influential, although the cycle theory has been extended by several authors⁷ since then. Dynamics of the US foreign policy through the perspective of cyclical theory was originally developed by Dexter Perkins in 1951⁸ who claimed that American foreign policy oscillates between inward and outward-oriented attitudes, realist and moralist approaches and between the process of executive and legislative domination.⁹

Our thesis is based upon publications of Frank L. Klingberg (1952, 1970 and 2014 with Jack E. Holmes¹⁰) and Michael Roskin (1974). Klingberg analyzed how the behaviour of the US government and Congress manifested themselves in the foreign policy, noted "events such as treaties, wars, army expeditions, annexations, diplomatic warnings, Presidential messages" - and/or public opinion - e.g. creation of "political platforms, election results, the contemporary writers and speakers".¹¹ Klingberg belonged among the few of those who predicted that by the second half of the 1960s, there would be,

⁵ SCHLESINGER sn., Arthur. *Paths to the Present*. New York: Macmillan 1949.

⁶ SCHLESINGER jr., Arthur. *The Cycles of American History*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company 1999.

⁷ STRAUSS, William - HOWE, Neil. *The History of America's Future 1584-2069*. Harper-Collins, 1992; PEREZ, Carlotta. *Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages*. Edward Elgar 2002; WILLIAMS, Roy H. - DREW, Michael R. *Pendulum. How Past Generations Shape our Present and Predict Our Future*. Vanguard Press, 2012.

⁸ PERKINS, Dexter. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*. Harvard University Press, 1962 (first edition printed in 1951).

⁹ PERKINS, Dexter, Chapter 6. Compare to: NYE jr., Joseph S. *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*. Yale University Press New Haven and London, 1984, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰ KLINGBERG, Frank L. The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy. *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1952, pp. 239-273; Historical Periods, Trends, and Cycles in International Relations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1970, pp. 505-511; HOLMES, Jack E. - KLINGBERG, Frank L. *The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign*. The University Press of Kentucky 2014.

¹¹ KLINGBERG, ref. 10, p. 241

what he called, alternation of national mood from "extroversion into introversion".¹² Extroversion refers to "a nation's willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations, to exert positive pressure (economic, diplomatic, or military) outside its borders"¹³ On the contrary, introversion is characterised by the unwillingness of the United States "to exert much positive pressure upon other nations"¹⁴ and a desire to concentrate on domestic concerns. Klingberg identified seven alternations of national moods since 1776: extrovert averaging twenty-seven years, while introvert phases only twenty-one years.

One of the academics who continued research into the cyclical nature of American foreign policy was Michael Roskin. His contribution in the study of the cyclical nature of American foreign policy is two-fold: in part, he focused in particular after the end of the Second World War (i.e. at the time when Klingberg ended his research), but also offered a method for understanding those factors causing the alternating cycles. Roskin is convinced that "the most fruitful approach" to the cyclical phenomenon of US foreign policy "is the generationally linked paradigm, which helps explain both the changes in orientation and their spacing in time".¹⁵ Each generation, according to Roskin, is created by its global opinion - "conventional wisdom" or "paradigm"¹⁶ - which is based on circumstances that it has experienced or knowledge it has acquired during adolescence.

Each generation tries to learn from the failures of its predecessors and to propose a formula for the solution that best corresponds to their best awareness and conscience. However, there is no general agreement what makes people from one generation to accept new paradigm (or to alternate from one period into another). There have been a variety of explanations¹⁷: from cultural, geopolitical to institutional or explanation that stresses the alternation between political parties. According to Schlesinger jr.:

*"the explanation must be primarily internal (...) A true cycle...is self-generating. It cannot be determined...by external events. War, depressions, inflations, may heighten or complicate moods, but the cycle itself rolls on, self-contained, self-sufficient and autonomous."*¹⁸

In the end the result it is not decisive how the "objective" world appears around us, but how these external factors (e.g. threats or challenges from abroad) are perceived and interpreted by us.¹⁹ Technically, if two different generations could face the same international challenges, each of them would do it in a specific way. While the generation of the extrovert cycle would call for action, introvert one would rather be defensive and leave the solution on others. One might expect that international crisis

¹² KLINGBERG, ref. 10, pp. 240, 249

¹³ Ibid, p. 239

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 239

¹⁵ ROSKIN, Michael. From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 3, 1974, p. 586.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 578

¹⁷ NYE jr., ref. 9 pp. 3-4

¹⁸ PERKINS, ref. 9, p. 27

¹⁹ ROSKIN, ref. 15, p. 578

*“is peremptory and leaves national leaders little room for choice”, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. explains. “This is not quite so. The nation will react one way to external challenge in a phase of introversion; very different in a phase of extroversion.”*²⁰

Table 1: Cycles of US Foreign Policy

Frank L. Klingberg (1952, 1970, 2014)	Michael Roskin (1974)
1798 - 1824: Extrovert	-
1824 - 1844: Introvert	-
1844 - 1871: Extrovert	-
1871 - 1891: Introvert	1870s, 1880s: non-interventionism
1891 - 1919: Extrovert	1890s - 1910s: interventionism
1919 - 1940: Introvert	1920s, 1930s: non-interventionism
1940 - 1867: Extrovert	1940s - 1960s: interventionism
1967 - 1987: Introvert	1970s - ? : non-interventionism
1987 - 2014: Extrovert	-
2014 - ? : Introvert	-

Regarding the fact that on average every 21 years (introvert mood) to 27 years (extrovert mood), a generational modification occurs as people from different generations tend to see things differently within this period. Roskin marks this as a "paradigm shift": manifestations that occur when political and social elites from the younger years form and gradually supplant the generation of their parents and their global opinion, or "paradigm", if you will.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

If we follow the development of American foreign policy from the second half of the 20th century, we can identify overall two primary turns from extrovert mood (interventionism or globalism) to introvert mood (non-interventionism or isolationism). The first occurred approximately at the corner of the 1960s and 1970s - what Roskin calls paradigm shift “From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam” - and the second we are experiencing now - since 2014 according to Klingberg²¹; we will call it paradigm shift “From the Cold War into Iraq”.

By “foreign policy paradigm” we mean conventional wisdom about the interests of the United States that should be represented and stood for in the world politics. Foreign policy paradigm results from the prevailing mood of American citizens. To identify which mood it is, special focus is put on major foreign policy speeches

²⁰ PERKINS, Dexter, ref. 9, p. 44.

²¹ ROSKIN, ref. 15, p. 581; See also POLLINS, Brian M. - SCHWELLER, Randall L. Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1790-1993. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1993, pp. 431-464.

of the US presidents, members of his administration and official documents that define foreign policy doctrine, such as *National Security Strategy of the United States*. However, in more general terms, “mood” can be expressed not only by political leaders but also social elites as well, which could be any person “*relevant to foreign policy - both in and out of government, the latter including such opinions leaders as professors and journalists - who structure the debate for wider audiences.*”²² It is this “community of practitioners” who defines what matters to for American national security.

For this paper, a foreign policy paradigm will be deduced from three questions that must be addressed to the community of practitioners:

- What is the main threat or challenge for the security of the United States?
- What is the role of the United States in world affairs?
- How should the United States deal with its enemies?

By answering these questions, we may expect that different political paradigm based on the introvert (or non-interventionist) mood of Americans will put more emphasis on the internal problems of the United States (rather than external). It will call for less active foreign policy (by that we mean efforts to overseas commitments) and will prefer diplomacy and direct negotiations with adversaries rather than the use of force. On contrary, from extrovert (interventionist) mood of Americans can be expected more efforts to export American values on others, mainly to extend the number of countries with democratic regime and free market economy. Also, it will be more pro-active foreign policy (that is a willingness to extend foreign policy commitment) and less hesitation to use of armed forces against dictators or terrorists that pose some threat to American security.

“Introvert Americans” would see themselves primarily as “citizens of the United States”, some very proud, some more critical, but they would share a consensus that their country serves as a “lighthouse”, not “crusader” of democracy. On the contrary, “Extrovert Americans” will think of themselves as “citizens of the world”. They believe that the American political system is exceptional because it speaks for “universal values” and therefore is good for everybody.

Three above questions do not address tools how should main goals of American foreign policy be achieved (unilaterally or multilaterally), nor does it expect that neither of the two foreign policy moods would be fixed to any philosophical school of international relations (realism or idealism). These “items” can vary with every new administration to provide a new perspective on how to solve old problems. It does not speak about a change of foreign policy mood. In other words, one can imagine American government, whose conventional wisdom stems from introvert mood, would cut its foreign policy commitments by entering a partnership with other countries so the burden would not be on Americans only. However, the next government with the same “mood” its mind, may try to achieve the same goals (less foreign policy commitments) by withdrawing from existing alliances and partnerships. And so it can be with theoretical background.

²² ROSKIN, ref. 15, p. 565

FIRST PARADIGM SHIFT: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO VIETNAM

The first paradigm shift in the second half of the 20th century reflected the clash of two generations, whose foreign policy ideas mirrored opposed to experience. These were those who had experienced the collapse of the Versailles peace system and the explosion of the Second World War and those who on the other hand had grown up in a period of relative calm of the 1950s and 1960s.

The first named generation came to a universal agreement that the primary cause of the failure of the interwar arrangement was the isolationist policy of the USA and the policy of appeasement of the Western powers, which by their lax approach enabled the rise of non-democratic regimes in Europe and the world. For this reason, in the first order, we are talking about the “Pearl Harbor Paradigm” or also the “Munich Paradigm”. The generation born after the Second World War, sometimes called “Baby Boomers”, matured to precisely opposite beliefs because the main foreign policy theme from the period of their adolescence was the failure of American intervention in Vietnam and the search for ways to “get out” of it. Therefore their “global opinion” we can mark as the “Vietnam Paradigm”.²³

There was a vast consensus among both generations that the main threat to American security was communism represented by and exported from the Soviet Union. However, both generations interpreted this ideology and the threat it has posed in different ways. For those who shared the *Pearl Harbor Paradigm*, communism appeared like a monolith. It was believed that the Soviet Politburo orchestrated communist Parties all around the world (from Tito in Yugoslavia to Mao in China or Ho Chi Min in Vietnam) and everything was organised by and controlled from the Moscow. Joseph Stalin was a dictator with ambitions to dominate the world just like Adolf Hitler before the Second World War. He must have been stopped. There existed a relatively broad consensus that this indeed is the only method to prevent aggressors from spreading their destructive ideologies: that means to come from a position of strength and not to negotiate with them or to retreat from them. The mission of the USA should be for the state to defend free world anywhere in the world because one country lost to the communists would unleash a domino effect.²⁴ This is well documented in many official statements or programs: starting with the Truman doctrine or perhaps even more illustrative, the NSC - 68²⁵ that called for massive increase in the military budget, including aid to American allies and the development of a hydrogen bomb.

On the other hand, Americans from the so-called “baby boom generation” who in their adolescence experienced only one case when there occurred a successful communist overthrow (in Cuba in 1958), did not understand why the United States should use its soldiers everywhere around the world. At the latest since the death of Joseph Stalin, it was universally known that not every communist leader was managed or controlled from Moscow. On the contrary, many of the representatives of the “Third World” were

²³ ROSKIN, ref. 15, pp. 575-577. See also: RECORD, Jeffrey. A Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy Munich, Vietnam and American use of Force Since 1945. Occasional Paper No. 4., Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College, 1998.

²⁴ KAPLAN, Robert D. Foreign Policy: Munich Versus Vietnam. The Atlantic [on-line], 2007, [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2CpRZPr>

²⁵ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.

inspired by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism only because they saw in these ideas a method for liberating themselves from foreign oppression.²⁶

The entry of a new generation invoked a great debate as to how the United States should represent its interests so that the previous failure would not be repeated. Far more than the expansion of communism, the younger generation feared nuclear weapons and the inability or unwillingness of American politicians to negotiate with the enemy. The arguments of younger Americans were based on a different logic than their parents shared. They ceased to believe that their country is that “unique” that they are suitable for “export” abroad and that the victory of communism at the peripheries of the globe represents a real threat for the security of the United States.

Generally, it is possible to say that the political and social elites who established themselves in opposition to the war in Vietnam began to be less moralising in their statements than their parents as they ceased to believe in the ideals of “American Exceptionalism”. Rather than in the insufficient non-democratic regimes in the world, they showed the insufficiency of democracy itself in the USA and thus were quite repulsed even in their concept of foreign policy. More emphasis was placed on the use of diplomatic means (than military power), they were convinced that the “world” would manage to go on even without the USA, the pressure in international relations was considered as the last of possible solutions.²⁷

The conflict between “young” and “old” generation grew gradually and was expressed in many forms: from the Movement for Civil Rights, Feminist Movement or activism for the rights of gay and lesbians. However, it was not until the war in Vietnam escalated at the end of the 60s that brought all these groups together. At that point, Richard Nixon belonged to those politicians who understood that if he wanted to succeed in politics, he must introduce something fundamentally different. And so he promised “*an honourable end to the war in Vietnam*”²⁸ during his presidential campaign in 1968. And once elected he declared in his inaugural speech: “*After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.*”²⁹

SECOND PARADIGM SHIFT: FROM THE COLD WAR TO IRAQ

The second paradigmatic shift since the end of the Second World War from the extrovert into introvert mood has barely begun. As mentioned earlier, according to Frank L. Klingberg, it was the year 2014 when “Post-Cold War Paradigm” passed away, and it is currently being replaced by “Iraq War Paradigm”. As in the transformation of paradigms some 50 years ago, we can still recognise two “camps”

²⁶ JOHNSON, James. A. The New Generation of Isolationists. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1970, pp. 136-141.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 141-143

²⁸ NIXON, Richard M. “*Peace with Honor*”: A speech to describe the Paris Peace Accord to end the Vietnam War. 23. 1. 1973.

²⁹ NIXON, Richard M.. *Inaugural Address* [on-line] 20. 1. 1969 [cit. 10. 8. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2Bt0qrs>

of conventional wisdom with opposing ideas about what constitutes main threat, what is the role of the United States and how to deal with enemies.

The first mentioned paradigm started with the end of the bipolar conflict and the end of the war in the Persian Gulf. American political scientist Francis Fukuyama interpreted collapse of the Eastern Bloc as “*the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government*”.³⁰ Without regard to the fact of whether or not Fukuyama's notion prevailed, his words very well illustrate the period in which they were written: a period of full satisfaction of the American political elites over the fact that bi-polarity had ended with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA³¹, not NATO or OECD.

A potent effect on the re-evaluation of the American foreign policy paradigm was also felt by the intervention in the Gulf (1991). It led to the minimal loss of life of American soldiers, and the enemy was utterly defeated over not quite two months. President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) himself commented on the result of the war in words that express profound relief: “*It's a proud day for America. And, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.*”³²

In the period when the Eastern Bloc, as well as the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist and Germany reunited, Americans had to pose similar questions as they had in the period of the Second World War: *Where should we draw a new line for American security interests? What is the mission of the USA in the world where the main threat has ceased to exist?* While following the Second World War, the political elites had managed to agree, after the end of the Cold War questions regarding the foreign policy of the USA remained the subject of extensive debates without a definite conclusion.

The debate about a new “Grand Strategy for a Post-Cold War World” copied the process of a shift from passive (introvert) to active (extrovert) cycles. Without regard to the fact of who governed following the end of the Cold War, the White House or Congress, Americans supported the maintenance of such a strategy in which the United States had to remain the most potent global player. A consensus existed in the fact that the USA should not withdraw into isolation and that it should strengthen relations with states of the former East Bloc (including former enemy states like the Soviet Union, or Russia, China or Vietnam).

However, no specific competitor was on the “horizon”. George H.W. Bush came up with the vision of a *New World Order* (1991), in which the “*United States (...) would be obligated to lead the world community (...) within a framework of the concert with our friends and the international community*”.³³ Bill Clinton (1993-2001) while still a student he had protested against the war in Vietnam and who even during his presidential campaign (1992) gave the impression that he would devote himself primarily to a renewal of the American economy. In the course of the 90s he actively

³⁰ FUKUYAMA, Francis. *The End of History? The National Interest*, Summer 1989, p. 4.

³¹ The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

³² BUSH, George H. W. *Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council* [on-line] 1. 3. 1991 [cit. 10. 8. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2CqK056>

³³ BUSH, George H. W. *Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit* [on-line] 11. 9. 1990 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2JZ3HBQ>

defended the expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe, interventions in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999) and Iraq (1998) for failure to adhere to obligations arising from resolution the UN Security Council, or Sudan (2000) for support of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Not surprisingly to “community of practitioners”, his Secretary of State - Madeline Albright - famously declared in a TV interview with Matt Lauer: *“If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall, and we see further than other countries into the future (...)”*³⁴.

George W. Bush, for example, rejected such a concept for the role of the USA in the world. Clinton's foreign policy according to Bush was arrogant and weakened the position of the United States in the world: *“If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll [other nations] welcome us (...)”*, he asserted in the pre-election presidential campaign (2000) of George W. Bush and simultaneously noted how he envisioned foreign policy if he were elected president: *“I just don't think it's the role of the United States to walk into a country and say, we do it this way, so should you.”*³⁵ However, the same George W. Bush, a few years later in the role of president of the USA (2001-2009), initiated sending soldiers into Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and laid out an even more ambitious goal for expanding democracy and human rights than Bill Clinton or George H.W. Bush.

Presently we are experiencing the rise of a new generation of Americans for which the critical moment of their maturity was not victory in the Cold War but the inability of the USA to achieve satisfactory results in the war on terror. This was begun on September 11, 2001, and formally ended with the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014). But in neither of these cases did this lead to the building of stable regimes and in both cases, the security of the situation did not improve too much. While the Islamic State in Iraq arose after the withdrawal of American units, the official government of Afghanistan year after year controls less territory.

And in the debate over foreign policy's unsuccessful past, a new paradigm has begun to emerge. The new paradigm is still in the process of formation. Even so, some of its “contours” are already clearly visible now. We may have seen a broad consensus that global terrorism and various jihadi groups still pose great danger for American interests. However, a new generation of Americans is exhausted by war losses as well as military expenditures “swallowed up” by the war on terror.

While George W. Bush considered the continuation of the American presence in both countries mentioned above as a security priority of the United States, at the end of his second term (2005-2009), it was already clear that to continue in the current course was unsustainable. The method of managing the war on terror was also criticised by the Republican John McCain, who was nominated by the Republican Party as the presidential candidate for the presidential campaign in 2008. Far more energetic was the candidate for the Democratic Party, Senator Barack Obama, who emphasised

³⁴ ALBRIGHT, Madeleine. *Interview on NBC-TV “The Today Show” with Matt Lauer*. Columbus, Ohio. 19. 2. 1998 [cit. 10. 8. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2GyiqIq>

³⁵ BUSH, George W. *Presidential Debate Excerpts: Gov. George W. Bush vs Vice President Al Gore* [on-line]. 11. 10. 2000 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2LtbvgP>

that if elected, he would withdraw all American soldiers within one year. As far as Afghanistan goes, Obama was willing initially to partially increase the American presence, while at the same time he established a deadline for gradual termination of this mission.³⁶

Parallel with this, like Richard Nixon acted at the end of the 1960s, Barack Obama in the first decade of the 21st century offered directly: both candidates rejected to be witness to American defeat and continued to believe that it would be possible to reach a successful end to the war in Vietnam or Afghanistan and Iraq. Both, however, felt pressure from public opinion in which anti-war mood began to predominate. And as soon as the decrease in soldiers started, the process continued regardless of the worsening security situation.

While America was fighting wars in the Middle East, new great competition has slowly emerged. According to Fareed Zakaria and his book "Post-American World" (2008) - we have just entered a new power shift that leads to "the rise of the rest".³⁷ Among "the Rest", China seems to be the most ambitious, partly because its economy may become the largest in the world and surpass the United States around the year 2030.³⁸

There is a new consensus among Democrats and Republicans that the United States should focus more attention on the situation in Asia. Hillary Clinton, as Obama's Secretary of State, claimed in her Foreign Policy article in October 2011 that "The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action."³⁹ So was the argument of Barack Obama during his visit to Australia in November 2011.⁴⁰

It is also confirmed by the National Security Strategies of the United States (NSS) of 2015 and 2017. We may have noticed one extraordinary change: the chapters in the NSS 2015 devoted to Europe have been shifted to second place behind the chapters on Asia-Pacific.⁴¹ While all American presidents since the end of the Second World War have emphasised cooperation of the USA with European powers, Obama became the first who changed the order of these priorities. Donald Trump confirms this direction of foreign affairs, though with minor modification. According to the NSS 2017, the priority region of American foreign policy will be Asia-Pacific, while

³⁶ Obama's foreign policy speech. In: *The Guardian* [online]. 16. 7. 2008 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2hsXbd6>

³⁷ ZAKARIA, Fareed. *Newsweek: The Rise of the Rest* [online]. 12. 5. 2008 [cit. 10. 10. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2EzZnZR>

³⁸ China's Economic Outlook in Six Charts. *International Monetary Fund*. [online]. 25. 7. 2018 [cit. 10. 10. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2UTuSUu>

³⁹ CLINTON, Hilary. *America's Pacific Century*. [online]. 11. 10. 2011 [cit. 10. 10. 2018]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/25G3XhC>

⁴⁰ OBAMA, Barack. *Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra* [online]. 17. 11. 2011 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2BHeBth>

⁴¹ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2015*. [online]. [cit. 10. 8. 2017]., pp. 24-25. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2QFS9Lc>; Compare with *National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010* [online]. [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2T4IYkn> and *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011* [online]. [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2LuTFtd>

Europe remained in the second place⁴². Also, both presidents agree in their NSS's that the number of US troops in this area needs to be increased and that the defence budget must not be cut.

We have also observed that current and previous administrations of the United States are far less convinced that the United States has been chosen to liberalise and democratise other governments. It seems the will to do so has reached its limits under George W. Bush. Barack Obama in his final speech at the United Nations emphasised that he does not think "*America can, or should, impose our system of government on other countries.*"⁴³ In the same way, Donald Trump reiterated that Americans "*do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone.*"⁴⁴ Such voices from the White House would not be heard in the years after the end of the Cold War. Today they became a norm. Donald Trump, during his primary campaign, declared that America should concentrate primarily on itself than on export of democracy and freedom abroad. In his inaugural address, among other things, he declared: "*We've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; Subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; We've defended other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own (...)*"⁴⁵ Such a formulation from the mouth of the head of state in the USA fundamentally departs from the statements of previous presidents of the USA who experienced victory in the Cold War and believed that America has a clear mission: to expand "universal" values of democracy, freedom and human rights.

Also when it comes to the question how should America deal with its enemies, we can also see that there is far more willing to negotiate with enemies that it was in the past. The difference is which of them should be addressed. When Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, he spoke openly about the necessity to negotiate with representatives of all states in the world, including those from so-called rogue countries (e.g. Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea), without establishing any preconditions in advance. Such behaviour would be - for good or for bad - understood by the previous generation as an example of an "appeasement".⁴⁶

Of all American presidents who occupied the White House after 1945, in this regard was Obama most similar to Richard Nixon. While Nixon accepted the concept of "detente" and was the first to open diplomatic relations with China, Obama became the first American president to visit China within the first year after inauguration. Obama will also be first to renew diplomatic ties with Cuba, and Donald Trump became first to meet the leader of North Korea.

⁴² *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* 2017 [online] [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. pp. 45-47. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2LuTftD>

⁴³ OBAMA, Barack. *Address to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly* [online] 20. 9. 2016 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2xf1KNE>

⁴⁴ TRUMP, Donald, ref. 4

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ George W. Bush during his visit of Knesset on May 15, 2008, declared: "*We have an obligation to call this what it is - the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.*" In: *President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset* [online] 15. 5. 2008 [cit. 10. 8. 2017]. Available from: <https://bit.ly/2QHntVk>

Finally, we need not mention, that disagreements over foreign policy between president previous and current president of the United States exist. One of those issues where Obama and Trump strongly disagree to which extend to cooperation with American allies and other states necessary. However, Obama favoured some multilateral agreements and argued against any restrictions to trade and investment. On the other hand, Donald Trump vigorously campaigned against both. One of his first foreign policy steps he did after inauguration was withdrawal from the “Iran Nuclear Deal”, “Paris Climate Change Agreement” or “Trans-Pacific Partnership”. Within one year in office Trump also imposed tariffs on China and enforced a revision of NAFTA.

CONCLUSION

Available data about contemporary American foreign policy suggests that the United States is undergoing a transformation from the extrovert (interventionist) mood and proceed to a period of introversion (non-intervention). It would not be the first time the United States has undergone such transformation: it happened twice only in the 20th century. This process is cyclical, self-generating and therefore it is predictable to a large extent.

We believe that we may speak of a new paradigm because we can see a consensus on three critical issues of American foreign policy. Firstly, the community of practitioners generally agrees that the primary challenger for the United States in the 21st century will be located in Asia. Secondly, the role of the United States will be less active. Support for enlargement of democracy has already been significantly lower than in approximately 25 years after the end of the Cold War. Finally, there is also consensus that enemies can be negotiated and that diplomacy should have priority over the deployment of armed forces into conflicts overseas.

These three essential priorities are not going to be changed with the new administration in the White House, even if the current president will lose elections in 2020. The cyclical theory of American foreign policy suggests that the United States will return to an extrovert mood approximately in the middle of the 2030s. If we start from the previous experience - about the length of the individual period - a new generation of Americans who will be at the transformation to a pro-interventionist foreign policy are currently being born. Their view of the world will be influenced by critics who will demonstrate the too passive United States and will demand a more significant connection to international politics. Simply said, the world we live today is already forming new Americans, whose apprehension of the US role in the world will be modified upon failures and deficiencies of the world today. As the majority of the American public and political elites are currently sceptical, because of failures of the war against terror, the future generation will call its leaders for more involvement.

