

VLIV REGIONALIZACE NA ROZMÍSTĚNÍ MÍROVÝCH OPERACÍ

EFFECT OF REGIONALIZATION ON THE ALLOCATION OF THIRD-PARTY PEACE OPERATIONS

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Abstrakt

Cílem článku je zhodnotit a empiricky otestovat v rámci kvantitativní studie jaký je dopad společného působení OSN, regionálních organizací a ad hoc koalic na rozmístění mírových operací ve světě. Po konci studené války došlo k výraznému nárůstu mírových operací zasílaných do vnitrostátních konfliktů různými mezinárodními aktéry, nicméně otázkou zůstává, do jaké míry je břímě mírových operací rovnoměrně rozprostřeno mezi jednotlivé aktéry a zdali se OSN zaměřuje na regiony, které jsou spíše opomíjeny ostatními aktéry. Z provedené analýzy vyplývá, že mezi různými regiony jsou významné rozdíly, co se týče zapojení mezinárodních aktérů, a regionální organizace i ad hoc koalice ve skutečnosti posílají své mírové operace do stejných regionů jako OSN.

Abstract

The paper "Effect of regionalization on the allocation of third-party peace operations" aims to discuss and then empirically test on large-N data what is the effect of the joint activity of the United Nations, regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states on the allocation of peace operations in the world. It is argued that after the end of the Cold War, all the actors have become much more active in organizing peace operations in intrastate armed conflicts, but it remains rather unclear to what extent they actually share the burden of peace operations at the macro level and especially whether the United Nations focuses on the regions that are rather overlooked by the other actors. The analysis shows that there are remarkable differences among various regions as regards the involvement of international actors and in fact, regional organizations as well as the ad hoc coalitions of states tend to follow similar patterns in allocation of peace operations as the United Nations.

Klíčová slova

mírové operace, operace na udržení míru, regionalizace, Organizace spojených národů

Keywords

peace operations, peacekeeping, regionalization, United Nations

INTRODUCTION

Scholars and practitioners alike have in recent years begun to pay an extraordinary attention to the phenomenon of intrastate armed conflicts. While roots of these conflicts have been recognized as rather complicated,¹ international assistance can help suppress the high incidence of intrastate conflicts by various means.² The establishment of a peace operation³ by a third party is then one of the instruments of conflict management and it has been found that this type of international involvement positively contributes to solving a conflict and stabilizing a post-conflict area.⁴

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During the Cold War, the peace missions were organized rather on an *ad hoc* basis without any deeper considerations either at the strategic or tactical level.⁵ Since the end of the 1980s and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the number of international peace operations established in intrastate conflicts has rapidly grown and also the size, mandate and overall organization of these missions have changed and become more complex.⁶ However, the group of armed conflicts that would deserve such international assistance is presumably still much higher than the number of peace operations that have been established so far, but the pattern for allocation of peace missions is a puzzle to a certain extent. Moreover, the field of peace operations is affected by growing regionalization, i.e. higher involvement of actors other than the United Nations (UN) - regional intergovernmental organizations and *ad hoc* groups of states or even a single state. Although this trend is allegedly welcomed by the UN,⁷ the question arises of whether and how the fact that several third-party actors organize peace operations affects the overall geographical allocation of the missions. Is there really coordination among the UN and non-UN entities and has this trend helped the international community to evenly address the current intrastate armed conflicts? Or is the allocation of peace operations rather oriented towards the regions where regional actors are more active? And if this is the case, is the UN able to balance these deficiencies?

This paper aims to discuss and then empirically test how the trend of regionalization affects the territorial distribution of peace operations established in intrastate armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period, concretely in the period between 1990 and 2004. The study shall proceed as follows: first, a definition of peace operation, prior research in this field and typology of actors will be briefly outlined, then the research design will be specified and hypotheses to be tested will be formulated, and finally the findings will be summarized and interpreted.

DEFINING PEACE OPERATIONS

The main motive of this project is to analyze how the international community, understood as a set of different actors, responds to intrastate conflicts by organizing peace operations. Therefore, peace operation will be understood in this context as an active form of military (and civilian) involvement in an intrastate armed conflict or post-conflict situation by an international actor (i.e. the UN, a regional intergovernmental organization, an *ad hoc* coalition of states or a single state). A peace operation shall be neutral towards the parties of the conflict and its main purpose shall be to end ongoing hostilities and/or to prevent the resumption of violence and/or to help the parties of the conflict move toward a negotiation and peace. This conceptualization includes the following categories⁸:

- *Monitoring or observer mission*: the purpose of such a mission, based on a consent of the host state, is to “monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers”,⁹
- *Traditional peacekeeping*: operation based on a consent of the host state, which aims to separate the conflict parties, monitor ceasefire and maintain a buffer zone, i.e. facilitate the negotiated agreement;
- *Multidimensional (complex) peacekeeping*: operation based on consent of the host state, aiming to “implement a comprehensive negotiated peace agreement” and including additional “strategies for capacity expansion (...) and institutional transformation”,¹⁰
- *Peace enforcement*: UN-authorized military operation, aiming to “impose public order by force”,¹¹ theoretically without the consent of the host state.¹²

It shall be noted that in fact, there are other terms that have been used in the scholarly literature and cover almost the same concept. For instance, Doyle and Sambanis¹³ put the abovementioned categories under a common heading ‘peacebuilding’. Many authors then use the term ‘peacekeeping’ for the same or a very similar concept. This term, though, could be confused with the ‘traditional peacekeeping’, which is rather limited in its goals and has been typical for the Cold

War period. As Daniel and Wiharta¹⁴ assert, “the mushrooming of terms in the 1990s to replace ‘peacekeeping’ reflects the mushrooming of activities that ‘peacekeepers’ were asked to undertake”. Their advice, followed also in this paper, is thus to use the more neutral term ‘peace operations’ (also the term ‘peace mission’ will be used for the same concept).

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The field of peace operations is definitely not overlooked in the scholarly literature. Apart from a rather general literature on peace operations (peacekeeping) and their main trends and history¹⁵, some scholars have, for instance, analyzed the effectiveness of peace missions and determinants of their success.¹⁶ However, as Gilligan and Stedman¹⁷ point out, these studies in general often suffers from selecting on the dependent variable, i.e. focusing only on the cases where a peace mission actually took place. Thus, a closer look at the factors that affect the allocation of peace operations could provide additional understanding of further aspects related to this particular field.

Scholars who have touched upon this issue usually suggest that the allocation of (UN) peace operations is a result of great powers’ national interests and imperialist or neo-colonialist motives.¹⁸ However, the analyses mostly do not distinguish between Cold War and post-Cold War periods. On the other hand, some authors stress the importance of rather humanitarian motives,¹⁹ allegedly triggered also by the so-called ‘CNN effect’.²⁰

Gilligan and Stedman²¹ also warn of explaining peacekeeping solely on the basis of ‘national interests’ of the great powers or ‘humanitarian-idealistic motives’, because the indicators of either perspective might be similar. Instead, they suggest analysing directly observable features characterizing the states undergoing an armed conflict. Based on a quantitative empirical analysis, they found that UN ‘peacekeepers’ are more likely to be deployed in conflicts with a high number of casualties and smaller government military force and that there is also some regional bias, discriminating conflicts in Africa and Asia. Considering also the other actors (regional organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions or a single state), Mullenbach²² claims that a third-party mission is less likely to be formed when the target state is in a military alliance with a great power or when the target state is a major power itself, but it is more likely in the post-Cold War period (which he interprets as a result of the ‘humanitarian intervention norm’ that evolved in 1990s) or when a previous institutional involvement took place. This paper aims to follow a similar line of reasoning, not trying to explain what motivates the international actors to send peace operations to conflict areas, but instead focus on the overall pattern in organizing peace operations. Compared to Gilligan and Stedman,²³ also operations by non-UN actors will be included in the analysis, and in contrast to Mullenbach,²⁴ only the post-Cold War period will be considered, because the international environment and the context for organizing peace operations as well as the nature of the main actors are thought of as too different and hardly comparable together.

CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS: TYPOLOGY OF ACTORS

In general, the number of peace operations established in intrastate conflicts has rapidly increased after the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, the non-UN peace operations have even outnumbered the UN.²⁵ The aim of this part is to briefly characterize the actors who organize peace operations and the background of these operations.

United Nations

The legal basis for UN peace operations is the UN Charter, concretely Chapter VI and VII. In the past two decades, the UN peace operations have been granted more complex mandate and the use of force (under the Chapter VII) has been explicitly allowed in several operations addressing

intrastate conflicts (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 or East Timor 1999). This would have been unthinkable in the Cold War international environment, in which UN peace operations were tasked to ‘keep’ rather than ‘enforce’ peace and the UN only rarely dared to intervene in an internal conflict.²⁶

Despite the optimistic expectations that the UN will after the Cold War finally bear the full responsibility for ‘maintaining international peace and security’ and be able to respond to various crises in the world, some point out that due to internal problems, especially among the Security Council permanent members, the UN has – after the initial wave of ‘activism’ at the beginning of 1990s – gradually become unable to meet the high demand for peace missions.²⁷ One of the consequences was that also other international actors have come to the stage of peace operations.²⁸

Regional organizations

The UN Charter encourages regional arrangements to contribute to pacific settlement of international disputes and maintenance of international peace and security. Any use of force (i.e. peace enforcement) must be approved by the UN Security Council, but ‘traditional peacekeeping’ (under Chapter VI), which is based on the consent of the host state and in which force can be used only in self-defence, can be conducted by regional agencies without prior authorization of the UN.

In general, the importance of regional organizations has grown a lot after the Cold War. Many such organizations have been established and the scope of their activities has broadened, including also the sphere of peace and security.²⁹ Thus, as already indicated, the UN now tries to coordinate the conduct of peace operations with regional (and sub-regional) organizations and build a “regional-global security mechanism”.³⁰ Several high-level meetings between the representatives of regional organizations and the UN have already taken place and the intention to cooperate more was also expressed at several reports³¹ and at a resolution by the UN Security Council.³²

Ad hoc coalitions and individual states

‘Coalitions of willing’, or even a single state, can also establish a peace operation.³³ The legal background is the same as for regional organizations, i.e. only enforcement actions must be approved by the UN and otherwise the legality of such missions depends on the consent of the host state. While potential advantages of these operations are their efficiency and flexibility, these missions could be seen as lacking legitimacy, since they hardly represent the will of international community, and could be accused e.g. of neo-colonialism.³⁴

HOW DOES REGIONALIZATION AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF PEACE OPERATIONS?

In the field of peace and security, regionalization is perceived “as a complimentary mechanism to the UN”.³⁵ Leaving aside many important theoretical aspects related to this trend, one could ask quite pragmatically: does this ‘division of labour’ work? Should we perceive the decentralization and networking in the field of peace operations as an attempt to make the multilateral approach to international conflict management more effective, or is it rather a shift to unilateralism and ‘only in my backyard’ approach to peace operations?

As outlined above, there are three different types of actors active in organizing peace operations and the aim of this paper is to assess their joint action, focusing on the territorial dimension of peace operations. In general, there exists no key according to which it could be predicted where the UN or a regional organizations is likely to establish a peace mission. As for the UN, it decides on a case-by-case basis, but by its very nature, it shall act as a global organization, addressing the most serious threats to international peace and security and not biased towards any region or a specific group of states. However, as discussed above, some scholars doubt this view and several empirical analyses have already shown that there actually might be some bias in the

UN conflict management policy. On the other hand, there are several reasons for more optimism with regard to the UN's capacity to organize peace operations where they would be most needed. First, some claim the norm of non-intervention is losing its relevance as a result of the growing negative externalities produced by civil wars³⁶ and also due to increased humanitarian considerations. Second, according to recent data, the structure of contributors to UN peace missions changes (from Western to African, South Asian and Latin American countries) and becomes more diversified – not only geographically, but also regarding contributors' characteristics such as income, regime type etc.³⁷ This should challenge the sceptical view that UN peace operations are organized only in the areas of great powers' interests by their allies. Finally, and from the point of view of this paper most importantly, the UN now claims to cooperate with other international organizations, willing to conduct peace operations on their own. Therefore, the allocation of UN peace missions might be geographically biased, but this bias could be caused by the fact that other agents are already involved in other regions.

On the contrary, the logic behind the peace operations by regional organization and *ad hoc* coalitions is obviously different. These actors can be assumed to intervene in intrastate conflicts in their own region (or close neighbourhood), mostly in order to ensure regional stability or to strengthen their role in the region.³⁸ It could be also argued that the non-UN actors have the capacity to act more flexibly and respond more quickly to the conflicts, since they are not hindered by as many political and bureaucratic obstructions as the UN. Heldt and Wallenstein even theorize that “regional actors initially attempt to manage conflicts, and when they fail the conflicts are referred to the UN”.³⁹

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that although the past two decades have experienced growing regional integration, this trend is not reflected in all parts of the world. Regional integration is a geographically uneven process and consequently, some parts of the world might be a priori denied the opportunity of a regional conflict management. For instance, while there are several European regional arrangements capable of organizing peace operations, in East Asia, there is none.⁴⁰ Moreover, the very existence of a regional organization does not mean that it will be willing and able to get involved in an intrastate conflict of one of its members or even non-members (consider the role of interstate disputes, power relations, political culture and threat perception in the region etc.). Except for peace enforcement, the consent of the host state is also necessary.

Therefore, it could be assumed that if there is a real interest of the international community in helping to solve an intrastate conflict in the absence of a regional arrangement, then other actors – especially the UN, but also the ‘coalitions of willing’ – shall step in. As Diehl⁴¹ notes, “[w]ith the relative weakness of regional organizations in some regions, one might have expected the United Nations to fill the institutional void.” Heldt⁴² is in this regard even more optimistic and claims that “the UN picks its cases and sends peacekeepers to intrastate conflicts in regions where the need is greatest.” Does this mean that the UN tends to establish peace operations in the most violent conflicts? Or is it more involved rather in the ‘overlooked’ regions? The following analysis aims to shed some light on these questions. Before that, however, the conceptualization of regions for the purpose of this paper shall be briefly explained.

Diehl⁴³ writes that “any attempts to generalize about conflict management must take into account the essential contextual elements that are largely defined by region,” since every region is specific as regards threat perception as well as policy responses. Based on the categorization used by Heldt and Wallenstein,⁴⁴ five regions can be recognized: Europe (including also the states of the former Soviet Union), Middle East, Asia (and Pacific), Africa, and Americas. In terms of regional security architecture, the regions can be briefly characterized as follows:⁴⁵

- *Europe*: The security architecture in Europe is definitely the strongest one, compared to other regions. There are several actors theoretically capable of establishing peace operations – European Union (and Western European Union), North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and, as for the states of the former Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent Nations.

- *Middle East*: Due to the security situation within the region and hostility among some regional actors, Middle East has perhaps the least developed structure of institutions that could organize peace missions. The League of Arab States could be theoretically capable of performing such tasks, but given the regional political context and involvement of external actors, it seems rather ill-suited to do so.
- *Asia*: No strong regional institution with security competences exists in this part of the world. Although there exists for instance the sub-regional organization Association of Southeast Asian Nations, it is not primarily concentrated on security agenda and has also rather restricted membership.
- *Africa*: Despite the number of internal problems, Africa could be perceived as a region with relatively well-developed institutions aiming to conduct regional security management and the trend of growing regional integration is notable there. The most important organizations are the African Union (previously Organization of African Unity), Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Community etc.
- *Americas*: The Organization of American States, encompassing all independent countries of American, is a leading regional institution in this region. It is built on collective security principles and theoretically shall deal also with internal security challenges.

HYPOTHESES

The key proposition which shall be further put on the test could be broadly formulated like this: in the field of peace operations, international actors (i.e. UN, regional organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions) balance actions of each other and together they evenly address intrastate armed conflicts across the regions; however, due to its specific nature and its responsibility to ‘maintain international peace and security’, the UN is more engaged in the most violent intrastate armed conflicts. In order to achieve better interpretable results, this statement will be translated to several testable hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Peace operations by regional organizations are more likely to be established in the regions with strong regional institutions.

Compared to Middle East and Asia, Europe, Africa and America could be seen as regions with relatively developed regional security architecture and institutions that have the capacity to organize peace operations if necessary. Therefore, it will be tested whether the proportion of peace operations established by regional organizations is different in regions with and without strong regional institutions.

Hypothesis 2: Peace operations by ad hoc coalitions are more likely to be established in the regions where regional organizations are less active.

It could be argued that in the absence of an active regional organization, other (regional) actors could be interested in sending a peace operation to the conflict area and thus helping solve the conflict that might have negative impact on them as well (e.g. in the form of refugee flows, unavailability of resources, trade losses etc.). Therefore, the regions in which regional organizations are less active will be determined based on the information provided by summary statistics, and then, the two types of regions will be compared.

Hypothesis 3: The UN evenly addresses the conflicts in various regions.

Is there a regional bias in the behaviour of the UN concerning the organization of peace operations? On the one hand, the UN as a global organization should theoretically not discriminate any type of states or regions. On the other hand, some scholars have found that there might be some bias towards Asia⁴⁶ and Africa too.⁴⁷ The hypothesis may actually be looked at from two

perspectives: first, all conflicts can be perceived equally relevant and only the involvement of the UN in various regions could be tested, and second, the distribution of UN peace operations might be put to a broader framework, when controlling for the effect of other potentially relevant factors.

Hypothesis 4: The UN is more likely to be involved in the regions where non-UN actors are less active.

As already explained, the UN can be assumed to be more involved in those regions where the non-UN actors (i.e. regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states) are less active. Naturally, this proposition would contradict the previous hypothesis. In order to find out whether the UN reflects the activity of the other actors, it will be also distinguished between the conflicts in which the UN or non-UN entities are involved separately and in which together. This shall help explain whether these types of actors are dependent on each other in establishing peace missions.

Hypothesis 5: The UN is more likely than non-UN actors to establish peace operations in the most violent conflicts.

Does the UN hold the primacy over the peace mission addressing the most violent conflicts in the world? Since the non-UN actors are assumed to be involved primarily in the conflicts in their neighbourhood, they might not address the most serious crises. Does the UN then send peace operations to the states undergoing the most violent conflicts, as some suggest?⁴⁸

METHODOLOGY

The outlined hypotheses will be tested on large-N data using descriptive statistics and basic inferential methods (concretely, logit models, which are suitable for analysing dummies on the dependent variable). The dataset used for the purpose of this project is based on three main sources: UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2010 (for the selection of conflicts), Graham (for the selection of peace enforcement operations),⁴⁹ and Heldt and Wallenstein (for the selection of other types of peace operations).⁵⁰ This means that only missions that have actually fulfilled – and not only proclaimed – the goals of ‘peacekeeping’ (as defined by Heldt and Wallenstein)⁵¹ or peace enforcement are included in the dataset. The data cover the period from 1990 till 2004. Furthermore, some information in form of new variables was added to the dataset, e.g. the type of the third party organizing the operation, the region in which the mission took place was added etc.⁵²

Since this paper primarily aims to focus on how the international community responds to intrastate political violence, the basic unit of analysis is a state undergoing one or more internal armed conflicts. Therefore, the understanding of ‘conflict’ is different than in standard definitions. To capture the overall dynamics of sending peace operations to states undergoing internal violence, the data on intrastate conflicts were clustered into single unites, representing all conflicts in one state within an uninterrupted time period. The data characterizing the conflicts were then aggregated: battle deaths were counted up and an annual average was calculated. For this purpose, the dataset UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2010, version ‘conflict year’ and types ‘internal’ and ‘internationalized internal’ armed conflict was chosen because it is based on a definition of armed conflict that is open also to low-intensity conflicts.⁵³

In order to link the conflicts with the peace operations, two models will be used: Model 1, including only the peace operations that were established during the conflict, and Model 2, including also operations that have begun within two years after the conflict ended. If a peace operation has been organized in a state undergoing a conflict, it is assumed that the operation addresses the ongoing conflict. The two-model approach was chosen in order to cover two different dynamics of sending peace operations, which vary in terms of their sensitivity to the conflict occurrence. While Model 1 includes only direct responses of the international community to the conflict, Model 2 takes account also of the immediate post-conflict phase, in which the conflict might recur, and thus the peace missions organized in this time could be seen to still address the conflict. The post-conflict operations are assigned to the latest conflict period. Since the dataset on

conflicts includes data since 1989, the states in which a conflict ended in 1989 were also added to the dataset – this allows incorporating the post-Cold War peace operations that might have reacted to the conflicts that ended before the analyzed period (in Model 2).

Unfortunately, some peace operations had to be excluded, because they cannot be assigned to any conflict. They were either established before a conflict started or more than two years after it ended, or they were sent to a state that is not at all reported in the dataset on intrastate conflicts. In order to be included, the definition of conflict (i.e. the unit of analysis) would have to be adjusted, which would perhaps be even more problematic, and thus the abovementioned solution was chosen. Another disadvantage is that the data on the dependent variable, i.e. peace operations, covers only the period between 1990 and 2004 and thus, the whole dataset had to be adjusted accordingly. Other problems are that the causality between a conflict and a related peace operation is rather assumed than tested and for the reason of simplicity, the concrete types of peace operations are not distinguished and are thus treated equally (regardless their heterogeneity in terms of their mandate, size of personnel, length etc.) Moreover, only missions that were established after 1990 are taken into the account, even though some peace missions that begun before 1990 are probably still in operation and also their nature and mandate could have changed in the analyzed period. Their inclusion would also require changing the research design, so that it could be controlled for the existing operations and their development. Due to the lack of suitable and comprehensive data, these operations are not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, these limitations shall be born in mind, especially for the interpretation of results.

FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1 (accepted): Peace operations by regional organizations are more likely to be established in the regions with strong regional institutions.

Comparing the number of peace operations established by a regional organization in intrastate armed conflict in regions with strong and weak regional institutions respectively, it can be concluded that the difference between these two means is positive and statistically significant (at the 95% confidence level) when applied both to the Model 1 and Model 2. Table 1 confirm this result.

As can be seen, regional organizations are most active in Europe, especially when including also the two-year post-conflict period. African regional organizations have been involved in 26% of intrastate conflicts (28% when including the post-conflict period), which is also a relatively high number. Interestingly, the EU also got involved in one conflict in Africa. However, no American conflict has been addressed by a regional organization, which contradicts the original assumption. One of the possible explanations might be the quite specific nature of the American conflicts – actually, in six cases, the period when a country went through an internal conflict was only one year and the level of casualties was relatively low, which might indicate that the conflicts were solved in short time and consequently, the demand for peace operations might not have been so high.

Table 1: Peace operations by actor and region

Actor/Region	Europe		Middle East		Asia		Africa		Americas		Total	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
UN	37.5%	47.1%	0%	0%	17.4%	17.4%	27.1%	28%	15.4%	25%	22.7%	25.9%
Reg. org.	25%	52.9%	0%	0%	4.3%	4.3%	27.1%	28%	0%	0%	16.4%	20.7%
Ad hoc	12.5%	11.8%	0%	0%	4.3%	13%	6.3%	6%	7.7%	6.25%	6.4%	7.8%

Note: Cell entries represent the percentages of intrastate conflicts within a region in which a given third-party has established at least one peace operation. The first figure in each cell represents the value for Model 1 and the second figure the value for Model 2.

Hypothesis 2 (rejected): Peace operations by ad hoc coalitions are more likely to be established in the regions where regional organizations are less active.

At first, this hypothesis was tested using the same method as in the previous hypothesis, i.e., testing the means of the number of peace operations organized by an *ad hoc* coalition in two types of regions – where the regional organizations are more active and less active, respectively. This categorization of regions can be made with regard to Table 1 and Table 2, according to which regional organizations in Europe and Africa seem to be much more active (involved in more than 25% of all regional conflicts) than in other regions. However, neither of the models indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e. equality of means) could be rejected. Statistically significant dependence of the peace operations organized by *ad hoc* coalitions on the missions by regional actors thus cannot be confirmed.

Alternatively, this hypothesis could be tested against the background of the existing peace operations. This means that the relative importance of peace operations by ad hoc groups of states will be assessed only within the group of peace operations in each region. The test of proportions is thus applied only to the data representing the peace operations relevant for Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. The statistically significant difference in favour of this hypothesis (at the 95% confidence level) is observable only in case of Model 2.

The result could be interpreted as a failure of *ad hoc* coalitions to balance the inactivity of regional organizations in absolute terms. However, if we test the relative importance of peace operations by *ad hoc* actors within the framework of all peace operations in the two types of regions (with more and less active regional organizations), then it seems that the ‘coalitions of willing’ are relatively more active than regional organizations in those regions that are generally typical for lower incidence of peace operations. Nevertheless, this holds true only for Asia and Americas, since Middle East has undergone no peace operation in the observed time period. The hypothesis thus will be rejected.

Hypothesis 3 (reservations): The UN evenly addresses the conflicts in various regions.

As can be seen from the Table 1, the UN apparently does not address the conflicts in various regions equally. It has established relatively most of its peace operations in European states, undergoing an internal conflict, and quite a lot of attention has been paid to Africa as well. On the contrary, the UN has been relatively less turned to Americas and Asia and as mentioned, no new mission has been sent to the states of the Middle East. Nonetheless, when controlling for the number of battle-related deaths and two additional control variables, the regression models (see Table 2) do not show that the inequalities among regions would be statistically significant. Therefore, the validity of this hypothesis will be perceived with reservations.

Table 2: Logit analyses of the establishment of UN peace operations

<i>Variable</i>	<i>UN 1 (Model 1)</i>	<i>UN 2 (Model 1)</i>	<i>UN 1 (Model 2)</i>	<i>UN 2 (Model 2)</i>
Constant	-5.690** (1.501)	-7.138** (2.017)	-4.365** (1.216)	-4.862** (1.527)
Deaths	0.688** (0.208)	0.691** (0.222)	0.598** (0.187)	0.575** (0.192)
Incompatibility		a		a
- over government	—	1.421* (0.932)	—	0.648 (0.758)
- over gov. and territory	—	1.228 (1.193)	—	0.863 (1.110)
Previous conflicts	—	0.030 (0.463)	—	-0.070 (-0.404)
Europe	0.591 (1.007)	1.717 (1.271)	-0.209 (0.851)	0.262 (1.046)
Middle East	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
Asia	-0.255 (1.040)	1.190 (1.078)	-1.008 (0.897)	-0.784 (0.940)
Africa	0.156 (0.897)	0.387 (0.912)	-0.489 (0.719)	-0.335 (0.742)
N	100	100	106	106
Pseudo-R ²	0.165	0.197	0.130	0.141

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are reported in the brackets. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$. The variable ‘Deaths’ represents the logarithm of average annual battle-related deaths, based on the cumulative sum of all intrastate conflicts in one country within the uninterrupted time period. The variable ‘Incompatibility’ shows the main reasons why a conflict takes place (incompatibility over government, over government and territory, or over territory – i.e. the implicit category). The variable ‘Previous conflicts’ represents the number of conflict periods experienced since 1989. *a* - after additional testing, the variable ‘Incompatibility’ is not proven to be statistically significant as a whole in this regression model.

Hypothesis 4 (rejected): The UN is more likely to be involved in the regions where non-UN actors are less active.

Table 3: Involvement of the UN and non-UN actors in conflicts according to regions

<i>Actor/ Region</i>	<i>Europe</i>		<i>Middle East</i>		<i>Asia</i>		<i>Africa</i>		<i>Americas</i>	
<i>UN</i>	2	2	0	0	1	1	2	3	1	3
<i>UN + non-UN</i>	3	3	0	0	2	2	7	7	1	1
<i>non-UN</i>	1	2	0	0	0	1	4	4	0	0
<i>none</i>	10	10	10	10	20	19	35	36	11	12
<i>Conflicts total</i>	16	17	10	10	23	23	48	50	13	16

Note: Cell entries represent the numbers of states undergoing an internal armed conflict, in which an international actor(s) has established a peace operation. The first number stands for the results when using Model 1, the second number for Model 2.

Table 3 shows the variants of the UN and non-UN actors' involvement in conflicts according to regions. Considering Europe and Africa as regions where non-UN actors are more active, the activity of the UN will be compared between the regions where the non-UN entities are more active and where they are less active. First, the activity of the UN will be perceived only in binary logic (i.e. establishment of a UN peace operation in a conflict – yes or no). After applying the tests of means, both models indicate that the null hypothesis (i.e. equality of means) can be rejected, but, surprisingly, in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the UN is actually less likely to intervene in the regions where also non-UN actors are less active (at the significance level of 90% for Model 1). When comparing the activity of the UN with regard to the number of peace operations established, the result is the same (at the 90% significance level for both models). Generally, it can be seen that no peace operation has been sent to most of the conflicts. From the 24 conflicts, to which some actor has sent a peace operation, i.e. 21.8% (or 30 conflicts, i.e. 25.9%, as for Model 2), the joint cooperation of UN and non-UN entities is most often. The UN alone has established peace operations only in 6 states, i.e. 5.5% of states undergoing an internal conflict (or 10, i.e. 8.6%, as for Model 2). There is thus a big correlation between the activities of the UN and the non-UN entities.

Table 4: Logit analyses of the establishment of UN peace operations with regard to the activity of other actors

<i>Variable</i>	<i>UN 1 (Model 1)</i>	<i>UN 2 (Model 1)</i>	<i>UN 1 (Model 2)</i>	<i>UN 2 (Model 2)</i>
Constant	-6.110** (1.395)	-6.637** (1.646)	-4.963** (1.159)	-5.321** (1.349)
Deaths	0.672** (0.202)	0.669** (0.214)	0.550** (0.176)	0.541** (0.183)
Incompatibility		a		a
- over government	—	0.737 (0.656)	—	0.596 (0.587)
- over gov. and territory	—	0.922 (1.074)	—	0.648 (1.010)
Previous conflicts	—	-0.089 (0.433)	—	-0.129 (0.390)
Activity of non-UN actors	0.810 (0.587)	0.904 (0.608)	0.485 (0.528)	0.587 (0.538)
N	110	110	116	116
Pseudo-R ²	0.161	0.178	0.112	0.125

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are reported in the brackets. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$. The variable ‘Deaths’ stands for the logarithm of average annual battle-related deaths. The variable ‘activity of non-UN actors’ is a dummy variable, representing whether the conflict has taken place in a region where non-UN actors are more (i.e. Europe, Africa) or less (i.e. Middle East, Asia, Americas) active. The variable ‘Incompatibility’ shows the main reasons why a conflict takes place (incompatibility over government, over government and territory, or over territory – i.e. the implicit category). The variable ‘Previous conflicts’ represents the number of conflict periods experienced since 1989. *a* - after additional testing, the variable ‘Incompatibility’ is not proven to be statistically significant as a whole in this regression model.

Controlling for the effect of conflict seriousness in terms of battle-related deaths, the fact whether a region is characteristic by strong or weak activity of non-UN actors does not seem to be so relevant for the allocation of UN peace operations, as can be seen from Table 4. It could be concluded that there is significant link between the UN and the non-UN entities in the field of peace operations, but on the contrary to this hypothesis, all actors tend to pay attention to the same regions. Therefore, the regions considered as rather overlooked by non-UN actors (i.e. Middle East, Asia and Americas) have not hosted many UN peace operations either. Consequently, the assumed burden-sharing between the UN and other entities in the field of peace operations cannot be said to take place at the macro-level, i.e. across the regions. However, the discriminatory effect might not be so relevant, if one considers also the influence of other factors. Especially the seriousness of the conflict in terms of battle deaths seems to play a more important role in the UN decision-making on peace operations.

Hypothesis 5 (rejected): The UN is more likely than non-UN actors to establish peace operations in the most violent conflicts.

The hypothesis that UN holds primacy over the peace operations in the most violent conflicts will be again tested using the tests of means. The two groups represent the UN and non-UN involvement in the conflicts with the highest number of fatalities. Conflicts with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths will be included in the analyzed sample, since this threshold is usual seen is the boundary between 'wars' and other types of conflicts.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the results show that the hypothesis of the equality of means cannot be rejected at a statistically significant level for neither model, even when lowering the threshold for the most violent conflicts to 500 battle deaths. The same result can be reached also when the third-party's involvement in conflicts is conceptualized not as a dummy variable, but when the number of peace operations established in one conflict is taken into considerations as well. The hypothesis will thus be rejected.

Table 5: Involvement of the UN and non-UN actors according to conflict deaths

<i>Actor/ Conflict deaths</i>	<i>25-100</i>		<i>101-500</i>		<i>501-1000</i>		<i>>1000</i>	
<i>UN</i>	0	1 (1)	2 (2)	4 (4)	1 (1)	1 (3)	3 (5)	3 (5)
<i>UN + non-UN</i>	0	0	3 (8)	3 (8)	5 (16)	5 (18)	5 (12)	5 (14)
<i>non-UN</i>	1 (1)	3 (4)	1 (1)	1 (1)	2 (2)	2 (3)	1 (2)	1 (2)
<i>none</i>	35	35	28	29	10	10	13	13
<i>Total</i>	36	39	34	37	18	18	22	22

Note: Cell entries represent the numbers of states undergoing an internal armed conflict, in which a given third-party (or no third-party) has established a peace mission. The first part represents the result for Model 1 and the second part for Model 2. The number in the brackets then represents the overall amount of peace operations organized by a given actor (or combination of actors).

The summary of peace operations by actor and number of fatalities (i.e. annual average battle-related deaths during a conflict) is presented in Table 5. This table also supports the finding related to the previous hypothesis (see Table 4), i.e. that with growing number of conflict fatalities, there is a higher chance of UN involvement. However, so is the likelihood of the establishment of a non-UN peace operation and therefore, based on the abovementioned tests, it can be concluded that the UN is not more likely than other actors to be involved in the most serious conflicts.

CONCLUSION

The main observation resulting from the empirical analysis is that the non-UN actors follow similar patterns in allocation of peace operations as the UN. Both in absolute and relative terms, all actors have in general paid most attention to Europe and Africa, while no new peace operation has been established in the Middle East. This observation is in line with the expectation that more developed regional integration provides a better ground for the regional actors to organize peace operations. In this sense, Asia and Americas seem to be rather overlooked regions, even though Americas was initially thought of as a region where peace operations by regional actors could be expected to be more common. In these two regions, however, *ad hoc* coalitions are more active, which could be seen as an attempt to balance the inactivity of regional organizations. As regards the UN, it has sent most of its peace missions to Europe and Africa, which are regions where non-

UN entities have also been involved most. Besides, in many conflicts (and also in the most violent conflicts), these actors have established peace operations together. From this perspective, it cannot be said that UN balances the (in)activity of other actors or that it holds primacy over peace operations established in states which undergo the most serious conflict in terms of battle deaths. Nonetheless, it is possible that the assumed co-operation and sharing of costs between the UN and the other actors could instead take place in individual conflicts, i.e. at the operational level.

Furthermore, the results of the analysis give rise to some additional questions. Why are some regions and so many states undergoing a conflict overlooked as regards peace operations? Is it because other forms of conflict management are preferred in a given context? Or are the omitted conflicts – and the states in which they take place – somehow different (e.g. less deadly, longer of shorter, leading to less negative externalities, less willing to let a third-party to get involved into the conflict), which makes the international actors less interested in stepping in? It is possible that the instruments of conflict management tend to differ across the regions. This might be determined by the characteristics of the regional political environment, political culture, and understanding of security, which consequently influences also the openness of a state towards a third-party (albeit neutral) involvement into internal affairs. This could help explain why especially Americas and Asia rarely host a peace operation. The non-existence of new peace operations in the Middle East⁵⁵ has probably more complex roots, given the complicated geopolitical situation in this region. Also, some of the old missions could continue from the Cold War period, thus addressing also the current conflicts. On the other hand, if these peace operations have not helped end the conflict, they could have been replaced by other missions, perhaps with a stronger mandate. However, there is also the possibility that other methods of conflict management are preferred by the international community.

To conclude, the issue of regionalization in the field of peace operations can be potentially interesting and fruitful topic for a further research, but what is needed is better data that would allow focusing on other possibly relevant aspects that characterize the intrastate conflicts and the peace operations that are sent to these conflicts in more detail. Alternatively, the allocation and effectiveness of peace operations could be analyzed in a broader context of other conflict management techniques, which might also provide a better ground for the analysis of the observed regional differences.

NOTES

¹ COLLIER, Paul, et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*.

² *Ibid.* 173-188.

³ The term ‘peace operation’ and its relation to other similar concepts will be explained below. In this article, the terms ‘peace operation’ and ‘peace mission’ will be used interchangeably.

⁴ DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis* and DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations Since the 1990s*.

⁵ O’NEILL, John Terence, REES, Nicholas, *United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era*, p. 23-41.

⁶ E.g. *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Editors DANIEL, Donald C. F., TAFT, Patricia, WIHARTA, Sharon and HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*.

⁷ E.g. Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 [online].

⁸ The definition does not include post-conflict ‘peace-building’ and stabilizing efforts, e.g. election monitoring, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring etc., because it can be argued that these activities would very much increase the heterogeneity of the analyzed scope of peace operations, and thus the focus will

be put rather on the more 'demanding' types of operations. This definition is in line with DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis* and HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*.

⁹ DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, p. 781.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Although some authors do not stress the fact that a peace enforcement operation must be authorized by the UN (e.g. Daniel et al. 2008: 28), only UN-mandated peace enforcement will be considered in this paper, because otherwise such an operation could be according to international law confused with an act of aggression (cf. Morris and McCoubrey 1999: 134).

¹³ DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*.

¹⁴ DANIEL, Donald C. F., WIHARTA, Sharon, Introduction, p. 5.

¹⁵ See e.g. BELLAMY, Alex J., WILLIAMS, Paul, GRIFFIN, Stuart. *Understanding Peacekeeping*, FETHERSTON, A. B., *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, MORRIS, Justin, MCCOUBREY, Hilaire, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, O'NEILL, John Terence, REES, Nicholas. *United Nations Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era*

¹⁶ DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, DOYLE, Michael W., SAMBANIS, Nicholas, *Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations Since the 1990s*, DURCH, William J. *The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis*, FORTNA, Virginia Page, Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? *International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War*.

¹⁷ GILLIGAN, Michael, STEDMAN, Stephen J., Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?, p. 41-42.

¹⁸ E.g. BELLAMY, Alex J., WILLIAMS, Paul D. Who's Keeping the Peace?, NEACK, Laura. *UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?*, and *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Editors DANIEL, Donald C. F., TAFT, Patricia, WIHARTA, Sharon.

¹⁹ FINNEMORE, Martha, *Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 102-103.

²⁰ JACOBSEN, Peter V., National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?

²¹ GILLIGAN, Michael, STEDMAN, Stephen J., Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

²² MULLENBACH, Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.

²³ GILLIGAN, Michael, STEDMAN, Stephen J., Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

²⁴ MULLENBACH, Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.

²⁵ HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*, p. 17.

²⁶ GRAHAM, Kennedy, Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping, p. 167-168.

²⁷ O'NEILL, John Terence, REES, Nicholas, *United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era*, p. 169-191.

²⁸ MORRIS, Justin, MCCOUBREY, Hilaire. *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 130, 147.

²⁹ For a brief overview of concrete regional organizations and their competences in the field of security and defence, see GRAHAM, Kennedy, *Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping*, p. 174.

³⁰ Annan in GRAHAM, Kennedy, *Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping*, p. 177.

³¹ E.g. Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 [online], A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility Report of The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges And Change [online], and In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General [online].

³² Resolution 1631 (2005) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5282nd meeting, on 17 October 2005 (S/RES/1631 (2005)) [online].

³³ For the purpose of simplification, this category will be further referred to as ‘ad hoc coalitions’ (or similarly).

³⁴ BELLAMY, Alex J., WILLIAMS, Paul D. Who’s Keeping the Peace? p. 168-170.

³⁵ PUGH, Michael C., *The World Order Politics of Regionalization*, p. 31.

³⁶ DIEHL Paul F., *Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management*, p. 272.

³⁷ *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Editors DANIEL, Donald C. F., TAFT, Patricia, WIHARTA, Sharon.

³⁸ BELLAMY, Alex J., WILLIAMS, Paul D. Who’s Keeping the Peace?, p. 167-171 and DIEHL Paul F., *Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management*, p. 273.

³⁹ HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*, p. 15.

⁴⁰ For more detailed description of regionalization in the field of peace and security, see e.g. GRAHAM, Kennedy, *Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping*, MORRIS, Justin, MCCOUBREY, Hilaire, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, editors DANIEL, Donald C. F., TAFT, Patricia, WIHARTA, Sharon and *The United Nations & regional security: Europe and beyond*, editors PUGH, Michael C., SIDHU, Waheguru P. S.

⁴¹ DIEHL Paul F., *Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management*, p. 276.

⁴² HELDT, Birger, *Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities*, p. 18.

⁴³ DIEHL Paul F., *Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management*, p. 280.

⁴⁴ HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*. Same categorization is also used in the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2010, which will serve as a basis for the following empirical part. The choice of these five regions is thus based on the standard categorization used in the scholarly literature. Further, distinguishing more regions in the analysis (e.g. East and South Asia) might improve the analysis in terms of its theoretical background, since the smaller regions could be characterized with more precision, but on the other hand, these regions would include only lower number of cases and the significance of results would then be compromised.

⁴⁵ Based on *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, editors DANIEL, Donald C. F., TAFT, Patricia, WIHARTA, Sharon and GRAHAM, Kennedy, *Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping*.

⁴⁶ MULLENBACH, Mark J., *Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions*.

⁴⁷ GILLIGAN, Michael, STEDMAN, Stephen J., *Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?*

⁴⁸ HELDT, Birger, *Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities*, p. 18.

⁴⁹ GRAHAM, Kennedy, *Regionalisation and responses to armed conflict, with special focus on conflict prevention and peacekeeping*, p. 183.

⁵⁰ HELDT, Birger, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004*, p. 43-50.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² The dataset and replication data are available at <http://n.ethz.ch/~dagmarz/download/PV/>.

⁵³ An armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” – see UCDP/PRIO *Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook* [online], p. 1.

⁵⁴ See SMALL, Melvin, SINGER, J. David. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980*.

⁵⁵ Interestingly, in the analysis of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, it was found that Middle East was actually the target of UN operations most often - see NEACK, Laura, *UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?*

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APPENDIX I: PEACE OPERATIONS BY ACTOR AND REGION

Table 6: Peace operations by actor and region

<i>Actor/Region</i>	<i>Europe</i>		<i>Middle East</i>		<i>Asia</i>		<i>Africa</i>		<i>Americas</i>		<i>Total</i>	
UN	6	8	0	0	4	4	13	15	2	3	25	30
Reg. org.	4	9	0	0	1	1	13	14	0	0	18	24
— AU	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	8	8
— CIS	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2
— ECOWAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	5	5
— EU	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
— NATO	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
— OSCE	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Ad hoc	2	2	0	0	1	3	3	3	1	1	7	9
<i>Total</i>	12	19	0	0	6	8	29	32	3	4	50	63

Note: The abbreviations used in the table are as follows – regional organization (reg. org.), African Union (AU), Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CIS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The first part of each cell represents figures for Model 1, the second part for Model 2.

APPENDIX II: LIST OF PEACE OPERATIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS**Peace operations addressing an ongoing conflict (Model 1)**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Name of the peace operation</i>	<i>Start year of the operation</i>
Liberia	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Liberia)	1990
Angola	UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM II	1991
El Salvador	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador - ONUSAL	1991
Rwanda	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I)	1991
Rwanda	OAU Military Observer Team - MOT (Rwanda)	1991
Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Bosnia-Herzegovina)	1992
Cambodia	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia-UNTAC	1992
Croatia	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Croatia)	1992
Georgia	Joint Peacekeeping Force - JPF (Georgia/Ossetia)	1992
Moldova	Moldovan Joint Force - MJF (Moldova)	1992
Mozambique	UN Operation in Mozambique - ONUMOZ	1992
Rwanda	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group - NMOG I (Rwanda)	1992
Somalia	UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM I	1992
Georgia	UN Observer Mission in Georgia - UNOMIG	1993
Georgia	Russian Abkhazia Peacekeeping Operation	1993
Rwanda	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda - UNAMIR	1993
Somalia	UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM II	1993
Tajikistan	CIS peacekeeping mission (Tajikistan)	1993
Burundi	OAU Observation Mission in Burundi (OMIB)	1994
Rwanda	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda - UNAMIR	1994
Tajikistan	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan - UNMOT	1994
Angola	UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM III	1995
Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO Implementation Force /Operation Joint Endeavor	1995
Bosnia-Herzegovina	OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina	1995
Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - UNMIBH	1995
Croatia	UN Confidence Restoration Operation - UNCRO (Croatia)	1995
Angola	UN Observer Mission in Angola - MONUA	1997
Comoros	OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC I	1997
Sierra Leone	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Sierra Leone)	1997
Guinea-Bissau	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Guinea-Bissau)	1998
Sierra Leone	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone - UNOMSIL	1998
DR Congo	UN Observer Mission in the DR Congo-MONUC	1999
DR Congo	OAU military observation mission (DR Congo)	1999
Indonesia	UN Assistance Mission in East Timor - UNAMET	1999
Indonesia	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor - UNTAET	1999
Indonesia	International Force East Timor INTERFET	1999
Serbia	UN Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK	1999
Serbia	NATO Kosovo Force - KFOR	1999
Sierra Leone	UN Mission in Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL	1999
Sudan	Civilian Protection Monitoring Team - CPMT (Sudan)	2002
Burundi	AU Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	2003
Cote d'Ivoire	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	2003
Cote d'Ivoire	Operation Licorne	2003
Liberia	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	2003

Liberia	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003
Burundi	UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	2004
Cote d'Ivoire	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004
Haiti	US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF-Haiti)	2004
Haiti	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004
Sudan	African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS II-Darfur)	2004

Peace operations in the 2-year post-conflict period (Model 2)

<i>Location</i>	<i>Name of the peace operation</i>	<i>Start year of the operation</i>
Morocco	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991
Haiti	UN Mission in Haiti - UNMIH	1993
Moldova	OSCE Mission to Moldova	1993
Georgia	CIS peacekeeping mission (Georgia/Abkhazia)	1994
Georgia	OSCE Monitoring Mission (Georgia/Ossetia)	1994
Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO Stabilization Force/Operation Joint Guard	1996
Croatia	UN Transitional Authority in East Slavonia - UNTAES	1996
Croatia	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka - UNMOP	1996
Guatemala	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	1997
Papua New Guinea	Truce Monitoring Group - TMG (Papua New Guinea)	1997
Papua New Guinea	Peace Monitoring Group - PMG (Papua New Guinea)	1998
DR Congo	EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the DRC/ Operation Artemis (IEMF-DRC)	2003
Macedonia	EU Peacekeeping Force in Macedonia/ Operation Concordia (EUFOR - Macedonia)	2003